FROM THE SAGE'S GARDEN TO THE PALATINE.

A study of the origin of Epicureanism and Stoicism, their development in Rome, their affinity with the traditional Roman character, and their influence on Roman emperors of the Julio-Claudian line.

by

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INTRODUCTORY NOTE

This thesis has a threefold purpose. It is intended, firstly, to trace the development of the Epicurean and Stoic philosophies from their origins in Greece to their subsequent acceptance, with some modifications, in Rome ; secondly, to ascertain the ways in which certain tenets of each philosophy agreed with the traditional character of the Roman people; and, thirdly, to determine the extent to which the Julio-Claudian emperors were affected in their work and outlook by the Stoic and Epicurean doctrines of their day. To be effective, a philosophy must influence not only those who preach, but also those who hear; and this study has been undertaken in order to discover whether a philosophy like Stoicism, known to the world mainly, though not entirely, from the writings of its supporters, was powerful enough to affect the policies of administrators who professed adherence to no philosophic school.

Owing to difficulties of reproducing Greek originals in typed form, and in order to avoid breaking the continuity of the type-written page, quotations from Greek authors have been incorporated into the body of the text in translation, and the originals written in footnotes.

Since the field of literature in this subject is almost inexhaustible, the books and periodicals which I have consulted and which are listed in the bibliography can at best be regarded as a representative selection of the material available. My thanks are due to the staff of the Library of the University of Tasmania for providing this material over a number of years, and to the Department of Classics for many valuable suggestions.

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CHAPTER ONE

Introduction - Brief review of the development of Greek philosophy from the Ionians to the Cynics, and of Stoic and Epicurean indebtedness to various schools of thought.

"Ars est enim philosophia vitae".[1] Thus philosophy appeared to Cicero, and thus it appeared to the leaders of the Epicurean and Stoic schools of thought. This connotation of philosophy as concerned with life and with human relationships, however, showed a radical change in outlook from the times when the Ionians first began to speculate on the nature of the universe and the workings of the physical world. These early philosophers, Thales, Anaximander and Anaximenes, who flourished between 600 and 550 B.C., made considerable progress in the sphere of scientific method, deducing as they did from their observations that the world had been formed rather by natural processes, than by the intervention of a supernatural being.

To each philosopher a different picture of the universe presented itself. Thales regarded the prime substance as water, from which the world originated and to which it would return, and the earth as a flat disc floating on this watery substance; Anaximander, after more extensive observation, chose earth, water, mist and fire as the four main elements, all of which were forms of a common, indeterminate substance -the infinite- which surrounded and governed the universe; while Anaximenes accepted air as the fundamental form, explaining the origin of fire as rarified air and of earth as air that had condensed. Yet the conclusions reached by these three Milesian thinkers, important as they were in pioneering naturalistic speculation, had little direct influence on the tenets held by later philosophic schools. It remained

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1. Cicero: De Finibus, III, 4.

for Heraclitus of Ephesus,(c.500 B.C.) as a result of his observation of technical processes,to provide an account of the universe which the Stoics later adapted to their own use, at a time when the same techniques of manual labour which had prompted its formation were regarded with some disdain.

In contrast to Anaximenes' first principle of air,Heraclitus chose fire which,as he had observed,was the active agent responsible for producing change in so many technical and natural processes. This principle of change was the underlying secret of the world,and in it were embodied law,fate and justice. In an attempt to explain the relative permanence and fundamental impermanence of things,Heraclitus added to his doctrine of change the idea of tension and opposite tension. Just as there existed in the bow and lyre a harmony brought about by contrary forces - an "inverted harmony", as it were - Heraclitus assumed that the hidden unity of nature arose from the existence in every object of a force which moved it up towards fire,and an opposite force which moved it down towards earth. The process of change was therefore twofold,and the existence of matter in any particular state was the result of tension,of a balance between these opposing forces. The apparent stability of things was therefore only relative,since nature as a whole was moving either upwards or downwards between the two extremes.[2.]

It was this choice of fire as the world substance which later influenced Zeno,founder of the Stoic school,and led him to derive from Heraclitus' theory the groundwork of his own physics. With certain modifications,it was Heraclitus' doctrine of tension which found a prominent place in the Stoic theory of knowledge,and,by his view that the world was permeated by universal reason,he undoubtedly influenced the ethics of the Stoics.

The Ionian philosophers in general had regarded philosophy as purely naturalistic,materialistic and atheistic. For them,fundamental matter existed naturally and by chance,and,from the elements of matter,

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2. Diels:Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, fr.51,p.162. παλίντροπος ἁρμονίη

inanimate,yet somehow moved by an inherent force,were created heaven, earth,and the things therein,not least among which was the human soul. In this system,it was inevitable that order or design,justice and morality should be regarded as man-made,and that providence or mind should have no place. It was here that the greatest contrast existed between the Ionians and the Stoics who,although indebted to their predecessors in so many ways,accepted as their main doctrine the all-pervading reason,or providence,which,with the exception of Heraclitus,the Ionians,by the very nature of their speculation, neglected.

Not so great,however,was the difference in outlook between these early philosophers and the Epicurean school,whose physics were derived mainly from the teachings of Leucippus and his pupil,Democritus, (c.440B.C.). While the former,a native of Miletus,could well be included,in spite of the difference in time,among the Ionian philosophers,the latter could claim affinity only by virtue of his outlook. Together,these two men represented the highest peak of development in the Ionian tradition.

It was from Democritus that Epicurus derived not only his physics,which formed the groundwork of his philosophical system,but also his psychology,with its central doctrine of images. For Democritus,as for his older contemporary,Leucippus,the universe was composed of an infinite extent of void and an infinite number of atoms. These atoms,uncreated and eternal,were alike in substance, but different in size,shape,arrangement and position. In the finest and most spherical of them,self-motion was assumed to be an essential attribute. Through their perpetual movement in the void,which resulted in their various combinations and dissolutions,the atoms formed all the objects of the world. Every perceptible thing was an arrangement of atoms differing only in size and shape, but possessing no inherent qualities of colour,taste or smell. Atoms were the only

fundamentals,from which all else was derived. Democritus it was who first completely developed the atomic theory of the nature of the universe,a theory which,being the culmination of the movement of rational speculation,exerted a profound influence not only on Epicurus and his followers,but on many later materialists. Although belief in the atomic theory of necessity involved a disbelief in the gods as popular religion imagined them to be, it did not abolish them in their entirety. Rather,in keeping with his theory,Democritus envisaged gods,like all else,composed of atoms and giving forth images of themselves which imprinted the idea of them on the senses. In this respect also,Epicurus became his debtor.

In spite of the idea of necessity contained in his physical theory,in the ethical field Democritus showed no trace of fatalism, believing as he did that man could be educated to live well,and that "to conquer oneself is the foremost and noblest of all victories,but to be overcome by oneself is the most disgraceful and basest of things."[3]. While bequeathing to Epicurus the legacy of his physical theory,in certain respects Democritus could rightly claim the Stoics as his ethical heirs. For all his materialism,he was able to say : "To a wise man,all the earth is accessible,for the whole world is the fatherland of a noble soul";[4]- an attitude which the Stoics,diametrically opposed to him in physical theory,were only too ready to adopt.

Although Democritus properly belonged to the Ionians in outlook and method,his system of physics owed not a little to the findings of philosophers who,though contemporaneous with the Ionians, had developed along very different lines. Simultaneously with the growth of the naturalistic tradition in Ionian Greek thought,came the

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3. Quoted Masson:Lucretius,Epicurean and Poet,p.309.

4. Diels:op.cit.,fr.247,p.194. ἀνδρὶ σοφῷ πᾶσα γῆ βατή· ψυχῆς γὰρ ἀγαθῆς πατρὶς ὁ ξύμπας κόσμος.

religious tradition which originated with the Pythagoreans in Magna Graecia (c.540 B.C.). Not all the credit could be claimed by Pythagoras, however, for had not the statement of Heraclitus - "all human laws come from one divine source" -[5] indicated, though distantly, the course which later philosophers and, in particular, the Stoics, were to follow ? Be that as it may, the religious tradition which, with the Pythagoreans, developed as a connected attitude of mind, rather than as isolated opinions of individual thinkers, was, in many ways, a reversal of the naturalistic viewpoint, placing, as it did, the soul and its properties - thought, mind, design, law - before all the qualities of matter. Nature, the source of the materialists' speculations, was ousted from its position by design or providence, by whose operation, it was considered, the works of nature were formed.

Unlike the Milesian philosophers, Pythagoras was not only a scientist, but also a reformer, the twofold task of whose religious brotherhood it was to practise asceticism and to study mathematics. He was among the first to advocate a daily examination of conscience, a practice which, particularly among the later Stoics, found great favour. Also in contrast to the Milesians, and in conformity with the religious tradition of his philosophy, he propounded a belief in the immortality of the soul and its transmigration after death, regarding the perishable body as a prison which the soul inhabited only for a time. In mathematics, Pythagoras found the key to the riddle of the universe; mathematical relations replaced physical processes like rarefaction and tension, and number was substituted for fire as the first principle. Although the doctrines of Pythagoras were not directly incorporated into the teachings of the Stoics and Epicureans, whose physical theories had found their origin in naturalistic doctrines and whose ethics were concerned more with the soul of man on earth than in any future life, the religious tradition which he established, whereby

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5. Diels: op.cit., fr.114, Heraclitus. τρέφονται γὰρ πάντες οἱ ἀνθρώπειοι νόμοι ὑπὸ ἑνὸς τοῦ θείου.

ethics took precedence over natural philosophy,had a profound influence on the development of future systems of thought and conduct.

To a certain extent,the abstract reasoning of the Pythagoreans, more befitting their souls than a contemplation of mundane processes, marked a stage of advancement not only in philosophy but also in society. With Heraclitus,industrial techniques had provided the basis for his adopting fire as the first principle, since it was by fire that changes were produced. Among the Pythagoreans,on the other hand,philosophy,especially the philosophy of numbers,was very far removed from the skills of industry, a fact which was,perhaps,indicative of the changing viewpoint of a world in which the increase in slavery was marked by a corresponding contempt for manual labour.

Philosophy was further separated from its roots in practical life by the teachings of Parmenides of Elea,(c.500 B.C.),who rejected the experimental method of observation and based his facts exclusively upon reason. His conclusion that the only existing thing was Being,divine and finite,eternal and unchangeable,and that,since this Being was nowhere broken by Non-Being,there was no place for movement, was in direct contrast to Heraclitus' supposition that "all things flow", and,though logically sound,was not supported by actual experience. It did,however,provide a foundation upon which other systems of reasoning were built up. The atomic system of Democritus,based as it was upon the notion of an immense number of eternal solids,each of which resembled the single cosmic Being,was in effect an extension of the Parmenidean reasoning and,in its new form,was the theory adopted by Epicurus.

From Parmenides were derived two theories whose doctrines the Stoics adopted in part. The first variation was made by Empedocles (c.450 B.C.) who,denying the unity and motionlessness of the Being,divided it into four ultimate roots - earth,water,air and fire - which,in themselves,were divine,unchanging matter, but

which,being moved by non-material forces,such as love and hate,or attraction and repulsion,fortuitously combined to produce organisms. Anaxagoras (500-428 B.C.) further subdivided these roots into a large number of original and eternal seeds (spermata) by whose combination and separation were made the substances of the world. Unlike the atoms of Democritus,however,each of these seeds,containing a little of all the qualities of which the senses provided knowledge, were set in motion by mind which,as Anaxagoras said,was "something that bears sway over everything,great or small,that possesses soul."[6] From one proposition,therefore,came two opposing conclusions,one of which,as interpreted by Epicurus,formed the framework for his whole philosophy and provided for his system of reasoning a materialistic basis in keeping with the best scientific traditions of the naturalists;the other,as adapted by Zeno and combined with the Heraclitan doctrine of fire as the first principle,gave the Stoics the essential rules from which their system of physics evolved,and supplied them with the notion of divine,all-pervading mind,or reason,as the basis for their ethics. In the latter sphere,it was to the metaphysical tradition of Pythagoras,Parmenides and his followers,rather than to the purely physical speculations of the naturalists,that the Stoics were the rightful heirs.

The growth of philosophy away from practical life and techniques which had at first assisted its speculations led to an excessive concentration on abstract reasoning and to a neglect of the application of the results of such reasoning to the conditions of the time and to the lives of the people. It was to the credit of both Epicureanism and Stoicism that,while selecting their first principles of physics from the theories put forward by the naturalists,they did not forget,rather they emphasised,the function of philosophy as concerned with man and with human life. This change from an attitude which regarded it as the function of philosophy to offer a scientific explanation of the structure of the universe to one which considered

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6. Quoted Haarhoff: The Stranger at the Gate,p.12.

that an extension of the religious tradition of Pythagoras and Parmenides as applied to human beings was the main justification for the practice of philosophy was largely due to one man - Socrates.

Socrates supplied so many fruitful thoughts that he became "virtually the founder of all the leading post-Socratic schools - Platonic,Peripatetic,Cynic,Megaric,Stoic,Epicurean alike. All derived their impulse,directly or indirectly,from him ; and each claimed for its own tenets a basis in the Socratic teaching." 7.

"Socrates autem primus philosophiam devocavit e caelo et in urbibus conlocavit et in domus etiam introduxit et coëgit de vita et moribus rebusque bonis et malis quaerere." 8.

That this process of humanizing philosophy originated with the Pythagoreans could not be doubted; but its transfer from a preoccupation with a study of the soul from the point of view of an after-life to the application of its teachings to practical,ethical life was brought about in the first place by the Sophists,who,with certain reservations,anticipated Socrates. The Sophists themselves were primarily teachers,rather than philosophers,whose work it was to teach the liberal arts,in particular those related to business and the duties of life. Their prime interest,therefore,lay in man himself,rather than in mere physical speculation. "Man",said Protagoras,"is the measure of all things"; yet,in this one statement, appeared both the strength and the weakness of the Sophists' position. By asserting this Protagorean doctrine,the Sophists acknowledged the importance of human dignity and assigned to man his rightful place in the universe,making it the responsibility of philosophy henceforward to deal with man as a person,rather than as a material part of a purely material cosmos. Yet,together with this recognition of man's importance,came an over-estimation of his capabilities in making subjective judgments,and,implicit in the ordinary interpretation

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7. Davidson: The Stoic Creed,p.11.

8. Cicero: Tusculanae Disputationes, V,4,10.

of Protagoras' formula,was the conclusion that truth was merely relative,that there was no universal knowledge,and,consequently,no absolute standard of ethics. The choice between right and wrong varied with each individual and depended upon his personal preference for the good or the expedient as the basis of his moral code. Supported by the oratory and logic of the Sophists,such a doctrine, offering solutions to questions concerning morality,customs and institutions only from the standpoint of individual and subjective reasoning,easily led to scepticism. It remained for Socrates, while still upholding the rights of the individual,to assert that absolute truth existed and could be attained,not in the form of a ready-made opinion supported merely by long-established custom,but as the result of an investigation by the test of reason which,if properly applied,led to clarity of thought,true knowledge and objective morality. To one convinced above all that his vocation was primarily to know himself and,by inductive reasoning,to help others to know themselves,convinced also that vice was ignorance and virtue knowledge,the notion that lack of knowledge could preserve happiness - "Where ignorance is bliss, 'tis folly to be wise"-[9]. would have seemed preposterous.

By his direct contact with human minds,rather than by the propounding of an abstract theory,by his true appreciation of the power of human reason,by his concern with the practical issues of morality,and,more especially,by his own personal character,Socrates provided an example which inspired not only philosophers but mankind in general. It was not surprising that his ethical teaching,not as an elaborated system based on a preconceived theory of universal physics,but as a human,psychological treatment of practical problems, influenced the ethical outlook of future schools of philosophy,and caused the Stoics,whose test of greatness was life and character, rather than the power of abstract speculation,to regard him with special devotion and accept him as an Ideal Sage.

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9. Gray: Ode on a Distant Prospect of Eton College,lines 99-100.

To the two greatest philosophers of the Greek world,and those about whom the most adequate information has remained,the Stoics and Epicureans were not as deeply indebted as to their predecessors,particularly in regard to their physical theory. There were,however,in the ethical doctrines of both schools, definite influences of Plato's and Aristotle's teachings,the Stoics acknowledging the greater debt to Plato and the Epicureans to Aristotle.

Plato's philosophy,being a combination of the doctrines of Heraclitus and Parmenides,admitted the former's theory that all objects of sense were fleeting and changeable,and,at the same time, supported the latter in maintaining that only Being could really exist. From these two somewhat contradictory statements was derived the Platonic theory of Ideas - perfect,eternal prototypes of visible objects,imperceptible by the senses,comprehended only by reason, and imparting to each earthly object a share of their own divine essence. Of these forms,the Good,like the Stoic Reason,was the ultimate principle. This theory,being as it were an extension on a loftier plane of Anaxagoras' original and eternal seeds,when transposed to the material plane gave the Stoics their "logoi spermatikoi" , seeds of the divine reason which permeated every object. In contrast to Plato,however,for whom the sensations provided only the material for knowledge,and real knowledge resided in the soul's perception of the eternal Idea,the Stoics and Epicureans founded all knowledge on sense-perception. They looked not for an abstract quality,but for a concrete object.

With Pythagoras,Plato believed in the immortality of the soul,a doctrine which the Stoics,while not completely disregarding it, accepted only within very fixed limits,and which the Epicureans,by the very nature of their philosophical system,were forced to deny. Similar,too,was their disregard of Plato's teaching that suicide was cowardly and impious. Both Stoics and Epicureans,each in accordance with their own tenets,maintained that suicide was at times necessary and even desirable.

Like Pythagoras, Plato was concerned with the regeneration of the political life of Greece, and his aim in founding the Academy was to train a new type of citizen of the ruling class who would be capable of reforming public life. This scheme of political reconstruction was a genuine, though impractical, attempt to overcome the confusion of the time and to restore the fabric of a state shaken by war and revolution. Since a perfect state could arise only if its citizens were perfect, and since perfection could be brought about only by understanding the eternal values, Plato's aim, strengthened by his desire to serve his city as an active statesman, was to reshape society by placing control in the hands of ideal rulers, trained in the pursuit of wisdom, who would perceive that the well-being of the state lay in the realization of the Good. For this purpose, the right training of the emotions, the exercise of reason, and the practising of the four cardinal virtues - justice, wisdom, temperance and courage - were all-important.

Influenced as the Stoics undoubtedly were by these ideas, they nevertheless differed from Plato in their emphasis on the attainment of virtue by the individual for his own sake, and not for the sake of the state. This rise of individualism and its corresponding indifference towards public affairs reflected a decrease in the feeling of responsibility towards the state and its members. While Plato thought like a citizen, concerned with the welfare of the city-state in which man, as a communal being, could find his greatest good, Zeno the Stoic thought like an individual, anxious only for the good of the soul under difficult circumstances. In the one, there was a belief in the possibility of man's progress through the betterment of the community, in the other the realization that the days of the city-state were numbered and that, only by resignation and submission to one's existing conditions, could there be found not the hope of progress but a consolation for living. Yet, in spite of this difference in outlook, the Stoic insistence on political service as a necessary part of a citizen's duty was,

to some extent,a result of Plato's teaching,while the Epicurean abstinence from public affairs,like many other Epicurean theories,was in direct contrast to it.

On the other hand,the principles of Aristotle,the pupil of Plato's Academy,whose own school of thought contrasted so sharply with that of his master,influenced Epicureanism to a considerable extent, yet had only a slight effect on Stoicism. Very far removed from the Stoic belief in the completeness of virtues and vices was the doctrine of Aristotle that virtues were means between two vices. From the Aristotelians,however,Zeno,the founder of Stoicism,acquired his knowledge of logic and metaphysics,and from their teachings,also, in conjunction with the theory of Heraclitus,he derived his principle of "pneuma" - fiery,intelligent breath. For Aristotle,the "pneuma" was the instrument through which the immaterial acted on the material; the Stoics,being materialists,applied the idea to the universe as a whole,- a living and organic universe,which they regarded as the ultimate reality,and not,as with Plato,dependent on a transcendent spiritual world of reality. Their "pneuma" became the forming and ruling principle of the universe,from which were derived the "logoi spermatikoi".

In the ethical sphere,it was the Epicurean,rather than the Stoic,school which derived benefit from Aristotle's theories,in particular,his theory of pleasure. To Aristotle,as later to Epicurus, pleasure was complete at any given moment; it was a quality,rather than a movement or a becoming,a stable and definite condition,rather than,as Plato considered,a determined movement having a definite end. Aristotle's amendment to Plato's viewpoint had a marked influence on Epicurus,for whom pleasure existed in repose,not in movement.

This doctrine of static pleasure was opposed by another school of thought,the Cyrenaics,under their leader,Aristippus,who, accepting Heraclitus' theory that everything was in motion,could admit the existence only of dynamic pleasure - the reception by the senses of some stimulus from an external object - and therefore

denied the possibility of pleasure in repose,as being merely negative. For Aristotle,however,as for Epicurus,pleasure resided not in the pursuit,but in the possession, and was a positive condition of stability. "Ainsi de même que chez Aristote l'acte auquel le plaisir est attaché est immobile sans être inerte,de même, chez Epicure, l'équilibre,condition du plaisir,est stable sans être la négation du mouvement. L'immobilité produite par l'équivalence de mouvements contraires,qui se neutralisent dans un équilibre stable n'est pas de l'inertie,et le plaisir comme la condition dont il dépend est une réalité parfaitement positive."[10.]

In contrast to Aristippus,who maintained that there was no degree of difference between pleasures and that one pleasure was not more pleasant than another,Aristotle asserted that pleasures were of different kinds and were produced to different degrees in particular people. This tenet was adopted by Epicurus,whose placing of the greatest good in static pleasure , as opposed to the separate acts of pleasure of the Cyrenaics,was an echo of Aristotle's- "it is clear that happiness should be placed among those things which are chosen for their own sakes and not among those which are chosen for some other reason:because happiness does not lack anything, but is sufficient in itself."[11.]

While preferring Aristotle's definition of pleasure to that put forward by the Cyrenaics,however,Epicurus was compelled to agree with the latter in admitting,as a logical result of his belief in pleasure as the greatest good,that grief or pain was the greatest evil - a theory which,many years later,was to incur the disapproval of Cicero;"deinde ad hanc enervatam mulliebremque sententiam satis docilem se Epicurus praebuit."[12.]

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10. Brochard: La Théorie du Plaisir d'après Epicure;quoted by Manning in introduction to:Epicurus's Morals(Charleton) p.xxxvi.

11. Aristotle: Ethics,Bk. K,vi,2;p.459(Burnet).
δῆλον ὅτι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν τῶν καθ'αὑτὰς αἱρετῶν τινα θετέον καὶ οὐ τῶν δι' ἄλλο · οὐδενὸς γὰρ ἐνδεὴς ἡ εὐδαιμονία ἀλλ' αὐτάρκης.

12. Cicero:Tusculan Disputations,II,6,15.

It was by an extension of his theory of happiness that Aristotle, allowing happiness to consist primarily in intellectual conte mplation, formed the conclusion that the gods, to whom ordinary m ortal actions, seeming trivial and unworthy, could not be attributed, spent their time in contemplative speculation, a conclusion which Epicurus incorporated into his own teachings.

Not only happiness, but even immortality, as defined by Aristotle, consisted in this highest of man's activities - thinking about thought. T is was the only true immortality in which the eternal part of man was concerned with the eternal. Since such immortality could be attained only by those who had leisure to exercise their intelligence, Aristotle went further and concluded that, just as there existed by nature the two elements - matter, refractory and disorderly, and mind, imposing on matter the working out of definite ends - so too did there exist by nature two classes of men, masters and slaves, of whom the existence of the latter as a docile labouring class made it possible for the masters to think about thought, rather than about things. His view of the master-slave relationship, and his unquestioning acceptance of its existence by nature, indicated more clearly than the teachings of any other school the extent to which the gap between the philosopher and the trader or artisan had widened. It was left for the later Stoics to attempt, at least theoretically, to bridge the gap.

One other school of thought - Cynicism - left its mark on the ethical teachings of the Stoics. Cynicism was not a philosophy but a way of life in which virtue or, in the Cynic interpretation of the word, life according to nature, was all-important. Under the guidance of Diogenes, the Cynics had practised a deliberate, self-conscious asceticism, in which only the barest necessities of life were retained, and tranquillity of mind was sought in complete poverty and detachment from worldly ties. For the most part, the Cynics were wandering preachers who regarded the universe as their city and who,

unlike the members of the great learned schools,gave practical advice to ordinary people. Their way of life,however,was inextricably bound up with an attack on convention and a condemnation of learning. Yet,in spite of this,it was they who were largely responsible for determining the development of Stoicism first and foremost as a rule of life. From the examples set by the leading Cynics in practising patience and endurance, despising self-indulgence and pleasure, and thereby attaining strength and nobility of soul, the Stoics drew their picture of the Ideal Sage. Although repelled by the slovenly and,at times,offensive habits of the Cynic philosophers, Zeno was able to accept Diogenes,along with Socrates and a few others, as a pattern of his wise man; but it was an idealised Diogenes who served him as an example.

The Ionian philosophers,with their "frank and self-forgetful externalized curiosity",[13] had offered a material explanation of the evolution of the world,from which both Stoics and Epicureans derived the outlines of their physical theories. With Pythagoras,this purely naturalistic speculation was replaced by a religious point of view which,in a complete breakaway from the Ionian outlook,resulted in the abstract metaphysics of Plato. Socrates,Aristippus and Diogenes,each in his own way,transformed philosophy from its naturalistic beginnings and its metaphysical development into a rule of conduct which,for Socrates,would make men wiser and better citizens, and for later philosophers,would provide them with inner security and a bulwark against the difficulties of the times.

Plato and Aristotle had formulated their philosophical theories in the terms of the city-state,for which they had aimed to provide a thorough-going ethical basis. After the time of Alexander the Great,however,the security and definite form which the city-state had given to life had vanished. The resulting sense of instability made it imperative for later philosophers to supply a rule of life

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13. Wells: Short History of the World,p.113.(Pelican)

which,by guaranteeing a self-sufficient,inward security and an unshakeable tranquillity,would be proof against the ways of fortune.

Into this philosophical heritage of naturalism, metaphysics and ethics, entered Epicureanism and Stoicism,each drawing on its predecessors for varied aspects of its teachings, each defending its position with unyielding dogmatism and each, by contrasting means,promising to man a rule of life which would uphold him against the contingencies of fate and supply him with the security of inward well-being,at a time when his external security was most gravely threatened.

CHAPTER TWO

Growth of Epicureanism in Greece.

"It is a duty for both old and young to pursue wisdom; for the former, in order that, as he grows old, he may be young in good things because of the pleasures of the past, and for the latter, in order that, while he is young, he may at the same time be old because of his fearlessness in facing the future. Therefore we must practise the things that produce happiness, since, if it is present, we have everything, and, if it is absent, we do all in our power to get it."[1]

Such was the opinion of Epicurus, founder of the school which has since borne his name. Born in Samos in 342 B.C., at the age of eighteen he went to Athens, where he attended the Academy, at that time under the direction of Xenocrates. This austere man, with his emphasis on ethics, set the mind of Epicurus on the course which it was afterwards to follow. When the Athenian colonists were expelled from Samos in 322, Epicurus and his family became refugees in Asia Minor, and here, in 311, he founded his school, first at Mitylene, then in Lampsacus. By 306 B.C., having formulated his own doctrines and attracted to himself a number of followers, he was able to return to Athens and buy a garden on the outskirts of the city, where he discoursed with his friends and formed a community secluded from the tumult of the outside world. He died in 270 B.C.,

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1. Diogenes Laertius: Lives of Eminent Philosophers, X, 122.
ὥστε φιλοσοφητέον καὶ νέῳ καὶ γέροντι· τῷ μὲν ὅπως γηράσκων νέος ᾖ τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς διὰ τὴν χάριν τῶν γενομένων, τῷ δ' ὅπως νέος ἅμα καὶ παλαιὸς ᾖ διὰ τὴν ἀφοβίαν τῶν μελλόντων. μελετᾶν οὖν χρὴ τὰ ποιοῦντα τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν, εἴ γε παρούσης μὲν αὐτῆς, πάντα ἔχομεν, ἀπούσης δέ, πάντα πράττομεν εἰς τὸ ταύτην ἔχειν.

leaving behind him a well-formulated body of doctrine,which his disciples attempted neither to improve nor modify,and the memory of an exceptional capacity for friendship.

Though Epicureanism was essentially a philosophy of life and conduct,in its effort to provide a physical basis for living it was led to build a detailed and ingenious framework of natural philosophy. Unlike the early Ionian philosophers,however,Epicurus had no interest in science on its own account,but valued it solely as providing a naturalistic explanation of phenomena which popular superstition regarded as the work of the gods. His aim,therefore, was to banish from men's minds the superstitious fear caused by supernatural religion,which,to him,was the source of man's greatest unhappiness. To overcome this fear,it was necessary to regard the universe not as a creation of providence controlled by a rigid and inflexible fate,but as a piece of mechanism governed solely by natural causes,without any interference by supernatural beings. The problem of his physical philosophy,then,was to ascertain how man,whom he believed to have free will,could use,or even possess,this gift in a universe governed by purely mechanical processes. In the atomism of Democritus,and in his own contribution to this theory,he found his answer.

"Nothing arises from nothing; for,in that case,anything would have arisen from anything,without having need of its proper seeds. And if something which has vanished from sight had perished into non-existence,everything would have perished,since the particles into which it broke up did not exist."[2] With this as his first principle,Epicurus,like Democritus,chose as the two elements of existence matter and void,the former because of his belief in the evidence

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2. Diogenes Laertius: op.cit., X,39. οὐδὲν γίγνεται ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος· πᾶν γὰρ ἂν ἐκ παντὸς ἐγίνετ' ἂν σπερμάτων γε οὐθὲν προσδεόμενον. καὶ εἰ ἐφθείρετο δὲ τὸ ἀφανιζόμενον εἰς τὸ μὴ ὄν, πάντα ἂν ἀπωλώλει τὰ πράγματα, οὐκ ὄντων εἰς ἃ διελύετο.

of sense-perceptions, which guaranteed the existence of matter, the latter because it provided matter with a place in which to exist and move. From these two elements were fashioned not only one universe but an infinite number of worlds, beyond which existed nothing that could be introduced into the universe to modify it, or that could be imagined by thought.

Following the teachings of Democritus, Epicurus admitted the infinity of both matter and space, and the eternal, perpendicular movement of the atoms in and through the void. These atoms, possessing three properties - shape, size, and weight - were solid, unchanging particles which formed objects by means of their cohesion and which, by their dissolution, destroyed them. Yet, though in time the objects which they formed might be destroyed, the atoms themselves did not change, but, retaining their own properties, remained as solid, indissoluble seeds from which new things might be formed. This eternal supply of atoms made possible the creation of an infinite number and variety not only of the objects found within a universe, but also of universes themselves, each of which had its own characteristics arising from the chance collection of atoms which composed it. After a time, with the dissolution of its component parts, a world might disappear and a new universe be formed from the atoms thus dispersed.

For the general outlines of his theory, Epicurus was indeed indebted to Democritus and, like him, was a materialist whose world was governed not by any ordering intelligence, but by mechanical causes. In his system, there was no room anywhere for divine activity. "To assign a unique cause for these effects," (he was referring to thunder, earthquakes and other natural phenomena) "seeing that the phenomena suggest several causes, is madness and inconsistency on the part of the zealots of a vain astronomy, who assign meaningless causes for certain phenomena, whenever they are unwilling to release the divinity from its burdens."[3]

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3. Diogenes Laertius: op.cit., X,113. Τὸ δὲ μίαν αἰτίαν τούτων ἀποδιδόναι, πλεοναχῶς τῶν φαινομένων ἐκκαλουμένων, μανικὸν καὶ οὐ καθηκόντως πραττόμενον ὑπὸ τῶν τὴν ματαίαν ἀστρολογίαν ἐζηλωκότων καὶ εἰς τὸ κενὸν αἰτίας τινῶν ἀποδιδόντων, ὅταν τὴν θείαν φύσιν μηδαμῆ λειτουργιῶν ἀπολύωσι.

Unlike Democritus,however,in the physical sphere he was not a determinist and could not believe,as Democritus did,that atoms were at all times controlled by rigid natural laws. Such a belief, involving the notion of an impersonal,overruling fate or necessity, an idea religious in its origin,was scarcely compatible with the views of one who was attacking religious superstition and who affirmed the existence of human free will. To insure against the possibility of his atomic theory's resulting in a physical determinism,Epicurus,while retaining the continual downward movement of atoms in the void,accounted for their collision,resulting in the formation of individual objects, by introducing the idea of inherent free will - spontaneous movement in the atoms - which caused them to swerve slightly from their perpendicular course and clash against each other. Not only the world,but also all individual phenomena,were thus made to depend not on any divine will,or rigid mechanical law,but on the voluntary and undetermined movements of atoms. The conclusion that atoms had power to swerve at will suited Epicurus' belief in man's free will and led him to affirm that an explanation of this freedom was to be found in the possession of free will by the atoms that composed the human mind. The doctrine of atomic declination,"the central and most original doctrine of Epicureanism",[4] anticipated by more than two thousand years the findings of modern scientists,whose growing conviction that life is inherent in all matter,whether organic or merely chemical,affords an interesting parallel.

It was not merely physical objects that were created by the chance collisions of atoms,but also the soul of man. According to Epicurus,the soul was composed of the smoothest and roundest atoms which were distributed through the body. Being material,it was subject to dissolution in the same way as all other objects and,for this very reason,was freed from the necessity of enduring an afterlife and the subsequent terrors with which popular superstition endowed it. As Epicurus himself so succintly declared: "Death is

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4. Guyau:La Morale d'Epicure. Quoted Masson,op.cit.,p.xxvii,introduction.

nothing to us, since, when we are here, death is not present, and when death is present, then we are not."[5] Even if the body were to suffer partial destruction, it would still retain its feeling as long as the soul continued to exist. When once, however, the atoms composing the soul's substance were scattered from the body, it would then lose all feeling and be dead. Death therefore contained nothing fearful, since it was itself an end of all feeling. The fact that the soul could both act and feel provided a further proof of its corporeality. "We can conceive of nothing incorporeal but void. But void can neither act nor feel; it only allows the atoms to move through it. Therefore those who say that the soul is incorporeal are talking nonsense, for, if that were the case, it could neither act nor feel: but as it is both these properties are clearly distinguished in the soul."[6]

Like Plato and Aristotle, Epicurus regarded the soul as composed of two parts, a higher, intelligent principle - mind, and a lower, vital principle - life. Life itself consisted of a certain movement of atoms which, if disordered by a blow, produced a state of unconsciousness lasting until the atoms returned to their proper motion. Likewise, an act of will, such as walking, arose from the infinitely slight movements of the small soul-atoms, which, continually increasing in strength, finally produced movement in the body as a whole. By attributing man's will to the power of declination in the atoms of the soul, Epicurus subtly connected his physics and psychology. It was not surprising, therefore, that his theory of knowledge was similarly related.

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5. Diogenes Laertius: op.cit., X,125.
ὁ θάνατος οὐδὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς, ἐπειδὴ περ ὅταν μὲν ἡμεῖς ὦμεν, ὁ θάνατος οὐ πάρεστιν· ὅταν δ' ὁ θάνατος παρῇ, τόθ' ἡμεῖς οὐκ ἐσμέν.

6. Ibid., X,67.
καθ' ἑαυτὸ δὲ οὐκ ἔστι νοῆσαι τὸ ἀσώματον πλὴν τοῦ κενοῦ. τὸ δὲ κενὸν οὔτε ποιῆσαι οὔτε παθεῖν δύναται, ἀλλὰ κίνησιν μόνον δι' ἑαυτοῦ τοῖς σώμασι παρέχεται. ὥστε οἱ λέγοντες ἀσώματον εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν ματαίζουσιν· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἂν ἐδύνατο ποιεῖν οὔτε πάσχειν, εἰ ἦν τοιαύτη· νῦν δ' ἐναργῶς ἀμφότερα ταῦτα διαλαμβάνεται περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν τὰ συμπτώματα.

In sense-perception could be found the basis of all knowledge,and on the senses even reason was made to depend. If the senses were false,reason was also false. Perception was considered the fundamental criterion of truth,error being due only to mistakes in judgment. Sensations themselves,such as sight,colour, hearing or smell,were caused by atoms,emanating from an object of sense and,at the same time,retaining a natural identity with the particular object by which they were discharged. These outline-reproductions of objects - images - travelled speedily through the air until,entering the pores of the various sense-organs,they came in contact with the soul-atoms,on which they made an impression resulting in the appropriate sensation. Since it was the images of objects,rather than the objects themselves,which were perceived, sense-perception was an indirect process,but,nevertheless,trustworthy,as the images were material forms emanating from external objects. Even after the dissolution of the objects from which they originally proceeded,the thin films of atoms continued to exist and,by penetrating into the human mind during sleep,were responsible for producing dreams.

A second criterion of truth was given by concepts,or general notions - mental pictures arising from repeated perceptions of a similar type of image. Concepts were valued because they provided man with the material from which he formed opinions about the things he perceived; for it was necessary,as Epicurus realised, not only to receive sense-impressions but also to make judgments from them and thus to build up a theory of knowledge. To a certain extent,Epicurus,for all his materialistic individuality,did not remove entirely from his system the absolute forms from which concepts might be obtained. By making concepts depend,however,on the valid sense-perception and judgment of each individual,he produced a theory of knowledge which could become highly subjective. The Epicurean wise man might have known how to distinguish a mere impression from actual fact,but all men had not acquired that ability; and Epicurus'

willingness to make all decisions of truth or error depend on the judgment of the individual implied that a standard of truth existed only for the wise.

As a logical conclusion of his belief in sense-perception, and in spite of his opposition to popular religion, Epicurus was compelled, because of the overwhelming general belief, to admit the existence of the gods. According to his theory of knowledge, the clear and distinct picture of the gods which existed in men's minds must have been produced by films of atoms emanating from the objects which they represented; for this reason, it was obvious that the gods existed. Very far removed from the popular deities concerning whom the people made such false assumptions, were the gods envisaged by Epicurus. Created, like everything else in the universe, from atoms, and continually replenished by a constant stream of atoms, to replace those given off as images, they were both material and immortal. Their home was to be found in the calm spaces of void between the universes, and there they lived a calm and blessed existence, passing their time not in interfering with the activities of the world or determining the course of events, but in eating, drinking, and talking Greek in perfect happiness. To a large extent, the gods of Epicurus were endowed with the same qualities and possessed of the same attitude as the wise man of his ethical treatises.

Yet, while denying that the gods took any interest in the world, Epicurus did not completely discard prayer. Just as his gods were not those of the popular belief, so too were his prayers different, being rather meditations on the character of the gods to make his own mind more receptive to the influence of the divine images which, containing the spirit of tranquillity, would increase his inner peace of mind. Selfish, perhaps, and lacking in altruism as these prayers might have been, they showed an attitude that was at least more mature and less vindictive than that of many polytheistic entreaties.

The physical theory propounded by Epicurus was developed

not as an end in itself,but as a means whereby man might be freed from the unfounded superstitions and terrors which beset him. By his conception of the nature of the gods,Epicurus intended that man need no longer be afraid of the actions of a malevolent deity. His view of death as a painless dissolution into nothingness was designed to take away man's fear not only of dying,but also of the dreaded hereafter. Since fate no longer played a part in governing the universe,and since providence was no longer responsible for ordering the course of men's lives,the varied portents and omens which hitherto had produced such deep-rooted,superstitious fears,being now rightly interpreted as purely natural phenomena,ceased to hold any terrors for mankind.

Freed therefore from all fear,and knowing that happiness could be found only during life in this world - "the place where,in the end,we find our happiness,or not at all!" -[7.],the followers of Epicurus regarded as their goal the pursuit of happiness and the attainment of a mind at peace.[8.]

"We say that pleasure is the beginning and end of a happy life;for we know it to be the first and innate good,and from it we derive all choices and rejections."[9.] With this as his foundation-stone,Epicurus built up his system of ethics,a system which,at first sight,appeared to have no moral grandeur or heroic elevation,but which, in reality,was neither as selfish nor as immoral as its basic principle implied. It was not the fault of the system that men of later ages, ignoring the restraint and high moral character of its founder,chose to practise only those aspects of it which suited their excessive tastes.

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7. Wordsworth: The French Revolution, lines 39 - 40.

8. C.f. footnote 1,page 17.

9. Diogenes Laertius: op.cit.,X,128-9. Τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ τέλος λέγομεν εἶναι τοῦ μακαρίως ζῆν· ταύτην γὰρ ἀγαθὸν πρῶτον καὶ συγγενικὸν ἐγνωμεν, καὶ ἀπὸ ταύτης καταρχόμεθα πάσης αἱρέσεως καὶ φυγῆς.

To a certain extent,Epicurus derived from the Cyrenaics his tenet that pleasure was the only good and pain the only evil. In keeping with his physical theory,however,he regarded pleasure as an orderly motion,and pain as a disorderly motion,of the atoms composing the human body. Since,for him,morality was therefore an activity which produced pleasure,virtue ceased to have any value for itself,and derived its worth only from the pleasure which accompanied it.Pleasure thus became the sole guide of life,and the only criterion of goodness.

Like the Cyrenaics,Epicurus did not overlook the importance of pleasures of the appetite,which he regarded as the beginning and root of all good; for if the pleasures of taste,music and beautiful sights were omitted,he did not consider it possible to perceive what was good. To this extent only did he agree with the Cyrenaics;but in his theory was to be found a far nobler attitude than existed in the Cyrenaic viewpoint,according to which pleasure consisted in the largest possible sum of individual momentary pleasures of the highest possible intensity. To the Epicurean,every pleasure was good in its own right,and every pain evil,but every individual pleasure was not always desirable, neither was every pain to be avoided. For just as the wise man should avoid those pleasures which,when carried to excess,produced not happiness but pain,so too should he endure,and even welcome,the pains which he knew would be followed by an even greater pleasure. His choice of action,therefore,depended not on the momentary,but on the ultimate, result,and the wise man would make his choice in such a way that, though he might at times be called upon to suffer pain,he would finally achieve the only true happiness and the ultimate end of living - perfect tranquillity of mind,consequent upon the removal of all pain.

This undisturbedness,regarded by many,even in Epicurus' day, merely as an intermediate state between pleasure and pain,was,to the Epicureans,not only pleasure,but the highest type of pleasure,which could be neither increased nor amplified. How different was this belief in the value of static pleasure - freedom from both passion and pain - from the hedonistic approach of the Cyrenaics,who,without regard

for consequences,advocated the acceptance of every momentary pleasure as a good in its own right.

There was a further contrast to be found in the attitudes of the two schools towards bodily and mental pleasures and pains,the Cyrenaics asserting that pleasures and pains of the body produced the greater effect,and the Epicureans maintaining the greater importance of spiritual and mental feelings. Since,as Epicurus realised,the most potent pleasures were those of remembrance and anticipation,it followed that past pleasure could be stored up in the mind and re-lived through remembrance,while future happiness could be eagerly awaited in anticipation; so that,whereas the actual experiencing of a pleasure was but momentary,its existence in the mind was enduring. So too with the opposite of pleasure - pain - whose effect,according to the Cyrenaics,was worse in the body than the mind,but,for the Epicureans, was far worse in the soul than in the body. For,as Epicurus maintained,"only the present time troubles the body; but the soul is troubled by the past,the present and the future."[10.]

Moreover,bodily pain was made more easily bearable by the remembrance that long-lived pains were slight in effect,and pains of great force could not endure, "so that the Brevity was a comfort against the violence thereof,and the Levity against Diuturnity."[11.] In the teachings of one whose mind,even in pain,was fortified by the recollections of past pleasures or the knowledge that it was good to sustain some pains in order afterwards to enjoy more abundant pleasures, this ability to transcend,rather than submit to,the effect of bodily pain was an ennobling feature. It was,after all,not a Stoic but an E picurean who first maintained that the wise man could be happy even on the rack.[12.] In the Epicurean psychology,the debasing factor of self-pity played no part.

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10. Diogenes Laertius:op.cit.,X,137. τὴν γοῦν σάρκα τὸ παρὸν μόνον χειμάζειν, τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν καὶ τὸ παρελθὸν καὶ τὸ παρὸν καὶ τὸ μέλλον.

11. Charleton: Epicurus 's Morals,p.13.

12. Diogenes Laertius:op.cit., X,118.

Deriving from his physical theory the power to overcome fear of death and divine retribution, and from his ethical theory the method of achieving freedom from pain in the pursuit of pleasure, Epicurus united both aspects of his teaching in his attempt to attain the goal of perfect tranquillity of mind. This serenity of soul, with its emphasis on intellectual pleasure, constituted the pleasant life which was to be the aim of all of his followers, for, "when pleasure is present, there is neither pain nor sadness."[13.]

The ultimate aim, however, was not to be achieved by the unrestrained and excessive enjoyment of pleasure, but by "sober reasoning, examining the cause of every choice and rejection, and driving out mere opinions, through which the greatest disturbances take possession of the soul."[14.] The pleasant life depended, therefore, upon the exercise of reasoning in choosing or rejecting individual pleasures, in short, upon the practising of those virtues necessary for making the wisest choice. As Epicurus asserted, "the pleasant life does not exist without prudence, honour and justice, nor do prudence, honour and justice exist without pleasure."[15.] Consistent with his belief in pleasure as the only good, however, he did not admit the intrinsic goodness of virtues, but regarded them as valuable only in so far as they contributed to pleasure.

Virtue itself had four component parts - prudence, temperance, courage and justice, of which prudence was the most important. By reason of their common descent from prudence, all the virtues were closely connected, yet all were not equal, as the Stoics maintained. Experience, which played a large part in the Epicurean philosophy, had afforded too many examples of the inequality of virtues and vices for Epicurus to subscribe to the Stoic tenet. As experience had shown,

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13. Diogenes Laertius: op.cit., X, 139(III) ὅπου δ'ἂν τὸ ἡδόμενον ἐνῇ ------- οὐκ ἔστι τὸ ἀλγοῦν ἢ τὸ λυπούμενον.

14. Ibid. X, 132.
-----ἀλλὰ πήφων λογισμὸς καὶ τὰς αἰτίας ἐξερευνῶν πάσης αἱρέσεως καὶ φυγῆς καὶ τὰς δόξας ἐξελαύνων ἐξ ὧν πλεῖστος τὰς ψυχὰς καταλαμβάνει θόρυβος.

15. Ibid. X, 132.
οὐκ ἔστιν ἡδέως ζῆν ἄνευ τοῦ φρονίμως καὶ καλῶς καὶ δικαίως, οὐδὲ φρονίμως καὶ καλῶς καὶ δικαίως ἄνευ τοῦ ἡδέως.

temperance,and certainly prudence,could be more complete in one man than in another,and common sense made it plain that the man who beat his servant and the man who beat his father did not commit equal offences !

Prudence,"tamquam artifex conquirendae et comparandae voluptatis",[16] ranked high among the virtues,since it both directed the choice of pleasures,rejecting whatever might cause pain, and also, by expelling sadness and fear from the mind,led to tranquillity of spirit. Closely connected with prudence was temperance,a virtue to be practised not for its own sake but because,by avoiding some pleasures,it led to greater ones. Prudence was responsible for judging the right and wrong pleasures,and temperance for putting that judgment into effect. Without prudence and temperance,man could not discriminate between the consequences of his actions,and thus had no guide in rejecting those unnecessary pleasures which resulted in more grievous pain. The wise and temperate man,- and what better example of temperance could be found than the life of Epicurus himself ? - realising that excessive and inordinate desire produced pain,limited his desires to those which were necessary to his nature and easily satisfied, not forgetting that the requirements of nature were small. In eating,he practised sobriety rather than gluttony,"for sumptuous feasts and full meals generate,exasperate and prolong Head-aches, Rheums,Gouts,Fevers and other Diseases."[17] While sobriety preserved the health and agility of the body,it likewise retained the acuteness and vigour of the mind,so necessary to the wise man whose chief business of life was contemplation. Moreover,if ever the temperate man,whose habit it was to refrain from luxurious foods,should attend a feast,his pleasure in tasting sumptuous dishes would be many times greater than that experienced by a confirmed glutton. It was prudent, therefore,to be temperate in eating,as in all other actions,both in order to avoid the pain consequent upon excessive and frequent indulgence,and also in order to bring to the enjoyment of occasional

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16. Cicero: De Finibus, I,42.
17. Charleton: op.cit.,p.46.

luxuries a mind unspoiled by satiety.

Another form of temperance was to be found in the three qualities of mildness, modesty and moderation - as opposed to anger, ambition and avarice - all of which contributed in no small way to the wise man's attainment of inner tranquillity. The man who, possessing both prudence and temperance, exercised these virtues in his pursuit of happiness, knew that pleasure consisted in satisfying not innumerable vain desires but single necessary ones. "Of the desires, some are natural and necessary, while others are natural and not necessary; some are neither natural nor necessary, but are engendered by empty opinion."[18] In the first category were those desires (such as eating when hungry) which could be satisfied without trouble or expense, and which, when satisfied, produced pleasure by causing a removal of pain. In the second category, were placed the desires for luxuries (such as eating sumptuous foods in preference to plain meals) which varied the pleasure received without removing the pain, or which, if they did remove the pain, frequently replaced it by one that was new and often more severe. The third category consisted of the unlimited and immoderate desires (such as ambition to receive honours and public praises) which, since they were not essential to man's well-being, and since their non-realisation produced no pain, it was quite unnecessary to satisfy.

Having limited his desires to those in the first category, which could be easily satisfied, and having schooled himself not to depend upon luxury or riches, the loss of which inevitably caused discontent to one who previously had enjoyed them, the temperate man was thus superior to any threat of fortune and, in his moderate self-control and asceticism, could derive from his life the greatest happiness. Of the true Epicurean, it would not be said that "nothing is enough for him to whom enough is too little."[19]

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18. Diogenes Laertius: op.cit., X,149. τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν αἱ μὲν εἰσι φυσικαὶ καὶ ἀναγκαῖαι· αἱ δὲ φυσικαὶ καὶ οὐκ ἀναγκαῖαι· αἱ δὲ οὔτε φυσικαὶ οὔτε ἀναγκαῖαι, ἀλλὰ παρὰ κενὴν δόξαν γινόμεναι.

19. Masson: op.cit., p.351. (From Vatican MS. 68)

Over the door to his garden, Epicurus had this inscription: "Stranger, here, if you please, you may abide in good condition; here, the supreme good is pleasure; the steward of this homely cottage is hospitable, humane, and ready to receive you; he shall afford you barley-broth and pure water of the spring, and say, friend, are you not well entertained ? For these gardens do not invite hunger, but satisfy it; nor increase your thirst with drinks, while they should extinguish it, but wholly overcome it with a natural and pleasing liquor."[20] No more adequate passage could be found to express the attitude of Epicurus towards temperance and moderation.

Epicurean happiness was not to be achieved by prudence and temperance alone, for the remaining virtues - courage and justice - though of little value in their own right, were also considered to be inseparable from a life of true pleasure. Guided by reason, the wise man acquired courage, not as an absolute virtue, but as a means to obtaining greater happiness by fortifying him against the absolute evils, bodily pain and mental discontent. It was to the credit of Epicurus that, in his pursuit of pleasure, he did not disregard the psychological aspect of pain, whose effect, as he taught and, by his own precept, proved, a courageous mind could mitigate by enduring it with firmness, for the sake of pleasure in the relief that would follow. Not only individual pain, but even injuries or torture caused by enemies or tyrants, the true Epicurean was to endure with fortitude, knowing that intense pain would shortly end and that lasting pain could not be violent, realising, moreover, that impatient complaints increased the pain which courage could alleviate. Thus, even while surrounded with the most cruel torments, the wise man could still retain his happiness, for he had learned to withdraw his mind from his bodily sufferings.

This attempt to conquer pain by contemplation was indeed an uplifting feature in the Epicurean teachings, but one which later

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20. Charleton: op.cit., p.50.

philosophers,lacking the courage to put it into practice,often subjected to ridicule.

Courage was considered necessary by Epicurus not only for its worth in mitigating bodily pain but also because of its value in removing discontent from the mind. Since it was by discontent alone that the tranquillity of the mind was disturbed,the wise man would learn to acquire the courage to expel from his mind all the false conceptions which troubled his serenity. Thus freed from depending for his happiness on those external things which popular opinion in error regarded as good,he was armed against the blows of fortune,knowing,as he did, that his ultimate pleasure and peace of mind rested on his own reasoning,rather than on any brief intervention of chance.

In accordance with his belief that every good,and every evil, existed only in sensation,and that death,the end of all sensation, was therefore of no account,the true Epicurean was relieved of the fear of what was popularly regarded as the greatest evil,or,alternatively,the end of the evils of life. For him, life was not a burden but,if wisely spent,a rich harvest of pleasures,while death,a return into those particles which,before they combined to form his person,had existed in an unfeeling state,contained no evil.

This calmness in the face of death was itself a form of the courage advocated by Epicurus,a courage which not only taught men to despise death - for all mortal beings a difficult task - but even to welcome it when the evils of life became intolerable. With typical moderation,however,Epicurus advised suicide only in extreme circumstances,regarding as a fool the man who,discontented because of his own imprudence and intemperance,preferred to take his life rather than to remedy the cause of his discontent. "Every man therefore ought to make it his care so to live that life may not be ingrate or tedious to him; and not to be willing to part with life till either Nature, or some intolerable Case,call upon him to surrender it."[21.]

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21. Charleton: op.cit.,p.79.

When difficulties became so extreme that present and future happiness in life seemed impossible,and when reason showed that death provided a painless exit,then suicide was justified. "Yet,nevertheless, we are not to attempt anything in that kind but when it may be attempted conveniently and opportunely; and when that time comes, then are we to dispatch,and leap over the battlements of life bravely."[22] In the Epicurean attitude there existed no pretence of nobility or altruism; the sole criterion of pleasure,or,still more important,of freedom from pain,was applied even to decisions about suicide,decisions which demanded the utmost prudence,moderation and courage.

Epicurus used the same criterion with regard to justice, valuing it as a virtue not because it was good and its opposite,injustice,evil,but because the "just man was most free from confusion of mind,while the unjust was filled with the greatest disturbance."[23] Justice itself was an agreement between men of particular societies to avoid actions likely to cause mutual disadvantage. In keeping with his attitude towards the other virtues,Epicurus maintained that there was no universal law of justice applicable in every place and circumstance. "In general,justice is the same for all men,since it is something mutually expedient in the community; but in its particular application in different countries or under varying conditions,the same thing is not always considered just by everyone."[24] The duty of the Epicurean wise man was therefore to live justly in accordance with the laws of his particular community,in order that he might be freed from the fear of punishment and enjoy greater security. In the

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22. Charleton: op.cit., p.79.

23. Diogenes Laertius: op.cit., X,144. ὁ δίκαιος ἀταραχτότατος, ὁ δ' ἄδικος πλείστης ταραχῆς γέμων.

24. Ibid.,X,151.
κατὰ μὲν τὸ κοινὸν πᾶσι τὸ δίκαιον τὸ αὐτό, συμφέρον γάρ τι ἦν ἐν τῇ πρὸς ἀλλήλους κοινωνίᾳ· κατὰ δὲ τὸ ἴδιον χώρας καὶ ὅσων δή ποτε αἰτιῶν οὐ πᾶσι συνέπεται τὸ αὐτὸ δίκαιον εἶναι.

same way,he was to avoid injustice,not as a wrong in itself,but as the root of the mental anxieties aroused by a guilty conscience and the perpetual fear that his crime would be discovered,for "crimes, though they may be secret,can never be secure ; nor doth it avail an Offender to be concealed from others while he can never be concealed from himself."[25].

In spite of Epicurus' statement that the laws,which were, after all,organised justice,were made "for the sake of the wise men, not in order to prevent their doing wrong,but in order to prevent their being wronged,"[26]. the wise man,by virtue of his wisdom,would still obey the laws and exercise justice for his own security,knowing that his safety and peace of mind were inextricably bound up with the condition of the society in which he lived. There might be occasions when injustice seemed likely to bring the greater profit,but the fear of discovery,together with the knowledge that riches generally caused discontent,would prevent the true Epicurean from practising injustice. If,at any time,the desire for pleasure and tranquillity of mind should be insufficient to deter him from an unjust action,he should first consider the advice of his teacher to call to mind some wise and good man whom he should imagine to be always present,supervising his actions,and do nothing which he would not do in the wise man's presence.[27].

Closely connected with Epicurus' views that just living brought greater security,was his belief in the value of friendship, which produced pleasure and,at the same time,guaranteed a secure and tranquil life. Epicurus' emphasis on the importance of friendship

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25. Charleton: op.cit.,p.108.

26. Stobaeus:Florilegium,43, 139.(Quoted Adam:Texts to illustrate a Course of Elementary Lectures on Greek Philosophy after Aristotle, p.26.) οἱ νόμοι χάριν τῶν σοφῶν κεῖνται, οὐχ ὅπως μὴ ἀδικῶσιν ἀλλ' ὅπως μὴ ἀδικῶνται.

27. Seneca:Epist. XI, 8(---"Aliquis vir bonus nobis diligendus est ac semper ante oculos habendus,ut sic tamquam illo spectante vivamus et omnia tamquam illo vidente faciamus." Hoc,mi Lucili,Epicurus praecepit.)

was,like his other beliefs,based on purely rational grounds and referred solely to friendship among the wise,excluding from that category the common people,among whom was to be found neither faith nor constancy and who,being unable because of their lack of wisdom either to converse pleasingly or behave fittingly,could not appreciate the benefits of friendship. For the wise man,the ideal friend was one who valued candour,simplicity and truth,and who was "not morose, querulous and murmuring at all things,but full of Complacency,Alacrity, and pleasant Hopes,so that his Conversation may not sowre,but sweeten the occurrences of life." [28].

Since friendship could not exist without mutual confidence, Epicurus opposed the practice of community possessions,which implied mistrust. In his opinion,friends should have freedom,when necessary, to use one another's property as their own,without altering the original ownership. Thus in adversity and prosperity each could give and receive mutual assistance. Having selected his friends,the wise man would maintain firm and lasting friendships,loving his friends not less than himself,rejoicing in their happiness,sympathising in their sorrow,and even,should the occasion arise,suffering death in their place.[29]. He would agree with Epicurus that "of all the means which wisdom procures for ensuring happiness in the whole of life,by far the most important is the obtaining of friendship."[30].

This acceptance of friendship,whether justified rationally or by other means,as one of the most potent influences in human life was the finest feature of the Epicurean ethics ; it was amply illustrated by the life of Epicurus himself,who gathered around him in his garden a fellowship of friends whom he regarded as capable of continuing his school after his death and who,in their turn,out of devotion

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28. Charleton:op.cit.,p.115.

29. Diogenes Laertius:op.cit.,X,121.

30. Ibid.,X,148,(XXVII). ὧν ἡ σοφία παρασκευάζεται εἰς τὴν τοῦ ὅλου βίου μακαριότητα, πολὺ μέγιστόν ἐστιν ἡ τῆς φιλίας κτῆσις.

for their founder,carried out the task entrusted to them without departing from his teachings in any way. It was rightly said of Epicurus that he "lifted up friendship into a kind of sacrament, which should ennoble all human fellowship and brighten the darkest places of life."[31.]

In contrast with his theory of strong and loyal friendship, yet,at the same time,in harmony with his ultimate aim of tranquillity of mind,Epicurus counselled a prudent detachment from family ties and abstinence from marriage. The wise man was not to fall in love nor marry and rear a family,since such responsibilities would perplex him and distract him from his pursuit of pleasure. In the same way,in order to prevent any mental disturbance and confusion,he would participate in affairs of state only in exceptional circumstances. If his nature was such that,being inclined towards state administration, he was restless at leading an obscure and inactive life,his happiness and peace of mind could best be realised by his participation in public affairs. For those,however,who found contentment in contemplation rather than action,a life of public service was to be entered into only if the state required their services.

The followers of Epicurus were therefore schooled in citizenship only to the point of practising justice and obeying the laws,and this merely with a view to their own security. How different from the Platonic and Aristotelian training for citizenship was Epicurus' teaching that the wise man should intervene in public affairs only if he seemed likely to undergo greater personal discomfort as a result of his non-intervention. Yet,at a time when the independent city-states of Greece,weakened by internecine wars,were succumbing to the control of foreign garrisons,it was inevitable that the citizens,no longer free to govern themselves,should transfer their interests from participation in community life to concentration on individual welfare.

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31. Masson: op.cit., p.352.

When Epicurus could claim that "when security against our fellow-men has been attained for a time, there arises in its purest form, most firmly fixed in its power and resources, that security which results from tranquillity of mind and withdrawal from the multitude,"[32] the transfer from purely political to purely individual philosophy was almost complete.

Because of its high intellectual content, Epicureanism appealed only to a select minority, whose main interest lay in individual security rather than in active participation in public affairs. Probably more than any other contemporary philosophy, its doctrines revealed the decline in the city-state and the insecurity of political life, an insecurity, however, which the Epicureans could not overcome merely by ignoring it. Because of this insecurity, their philosophy provided rather a compensation for living than a stimulus to progress. Since earthly possessions and associations could not guarantee positive happiness, man's greatest hope was to avoid pain and attain to quiet contentment. The Epicurean withdrawal from public affairs into the solitudes of the sage's garden diminished their influence , and caused other schools to treat them with a contempt which they did not deserve.

Such a philosophy, with its insistence on individual, rather than absolute, standards, and with no set doctrine, could not serve as an adequate basis for social morality. In his system of ethics, Epicurus relied too much on the good sense of the wise man and on his ability to judge for himself the things which should properly be chosen or avoided. His advice to keep free of worry and pain, being wrongly interpreted by his many opponents, and even by some of his nominal adherents, as involving an indolent acceptance of the good things of life and a neglect of its responsibilities, was a further cause of his philosophy's having only a limited appeal.

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32. Diogenes Laertius: op.cit., X, 143 (XIV). τῆς ἀσφαλείας τῆς ἐξ ἀνθρώπων γενομένης μέχρι τινὸς δυνάμει τε ἐξεργαστικῆ καὶ εὐπορίᾳ εἰλικρινεστάτη γίνεται ἡ ἐκ τῆς ἡσυχίας καὶ ἐκχωρήσεως τῶν πολλῶν ἀσφάλεια.

Yet, though Epicurus tended to over-estimate the capabilities of human reason, his approach to contemporary moral issues showed a sound appreciation of human nature, together with a healthy contempt for people who continually blamed chance, rather than themselves for their own misfortunes. His remarks that the wise man "sees that necessity is irresponsible and fortune unstable, but our own actions are free, and it is to them that blame and its opposite, praise, naturally attach;——— it is better that what is rightly judged in action should not turn out well merely through chance,"[33] were not the opinions of a man who was accustomed to transfer to fortune the responsibility for his own moral behaviour. His general hedonistic principles were by no means incompatible with high moral aspirations, and the picture of his wise man was hardly that of a debasing figure. "Sic enim ab Epicuro sapiens semper beatus inducitur: finitas habet cupiditates, neglegit mortem, de dis immortalibus sine ullo metu vera sentit, non dubitat, si ita melius sit, migrare de vita. His rebus instructus semper est in voluptate; neque enim tempus est ullum, quo non plus voluptatum habeat quam dolorum. Nam et praeterita grate meminit et praesentibus ita potitur, ut animadvertat, quanta sint ea quamque iucunda, neque pendet ex futuris, sed exspectat illa, fruitur praesentibus ab eisque vitiis, ———, abest plurimum et, cum stultorum vitam cum sua comparat, magna afficitur voluptate. Dolores autem, si qui incurrunt, numquam vim tantam habent, ut non plus habeat sapiens quod gaudeat quam quod angatur."[34] Epicurus interpreted life as it was, giving due emphasis to the value of pleasure and not overlooking the effect of pain. In his system as a whole, there existed an originality of outlook which was lacking in Stoicism and which, even in its most egoistic aspects, contained an attractive frankness and a genuine feeling for humanity.

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33. Diogenes Laertius: op.cit., X, 134 - 135. διὰ τὸ τὴν μὲν ἀνάγκην ἀνυπεύθυνον εἶναι, τὴν δὲ τύχην ἄστατον ὁρᾶν, τὸ δὲ παρ' ἡμᾶς ἀδέσποτον, ᾧ καὶ τὸ μεμπτὸν καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον παρακολουθεῖν πέφυκεν. ——— βέλτιον γὰρ ἦν τοῖς πράγμασι τὸ καλῶς κριθὲν μὴ ὀρθωθῆναι διὰ ταύτην.

34. Cicero: De Finibus, I, 62.

It was not the task of the Epicurean wise man to judge harshly all the rest of mankind. If his servant disobeyed him,he was to pity, rather than punish,"and to make allowance on occasion for those who were of good character."[35] Mankind as a whole did not receive his censure for failing to comply with his own standards.

Like all purely material philosophies,however,Epicureanism, in spite of its attempt to reconcile man's consciousness with the material forces which created it and to explain how atoms,being dead bodies with no secondary qualities,produced by mere collocation sight,colour,sound and smell,could not solve the problem of how man, who,it acknowledged,was no mere automaton but the possessor of free will and consciousness,was created with all his distinctive mental characteristics from absolutely dead atoms and incorporeal void. This problem confronted all materialistic philosophers,and it was to the credit of Epicurus that,in his physical system,based as it was on the two principles - physical necessity,which determined the existence of matter and void, and arbitrary,undetermined chance,which caused the atoms to swerve at will - he provided an ingenious,though inconclusive and unproven,solution to the age-old problems of determinism and free will,materialism and consciousness. Yet this solution,which suited his own views on divine order,religious superstition, and the position of man in the universe,was merely a foundation on which his ethical system was built. Epicureanism was distinctly ethical,a practical rule of life and conduct,in which the few cracks in the material foundation were comparatively unimportant.

By setting up for his followers to copy a model of a wise man's life that,although difficult,was not impossible to attain,Epicurus provided for his school a system which,in spite of its withdrawal from general human ties,remained intensely human and which,at any rate,possessed a sincerity not imbued with the hypocritical pretence of altruism which coloured some contemporary and later philosophies.

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35. Diogenes Laertius:op.cit., X,118. οὐδὲ κολάσειν οἰκέτας, ἐλεήσειν μέντοι καὶ συγγνώμην τινὶ ἔξειν τῶν σπουδαίων.

CHAPTER THREE

Growth of Stoicism in Greece.

Zeno, the founder of the Stoic school, was born about 335 B.C., at Citium in Cyprus. By profession a merchant, at the age of twenty-two, on a voyage to Greece from Phoenicia, he was shipwrecked near Peiraeus and, from there, went up to Athens where he made the acquaintance of the Cynic philosopher, Crates, whose pupil he became. For some years a follower not only of Crates but also of the Megarian dialecticians, Diodorus and Stilpo, and the Academicians, Xenocrates - the same Xenocrates who inspired Epicurus - and his successor, Polemo, in 300 B.C., in the Stoa Poecile at Athens, he founded his own school of thought. From this time onwards, because of this connection with the Stoa, or colonnade, in which he delivered his lectures, his followers, previously called Zenonians, became known as Stoics.

Zeno himself was an austere, frugal man, "gloomy, severe, and of a frowning countenance,"[1] a man whose life was an example of temperance, virtue and dignity, and whose teachings aimed to give to a disillusioned and declining people the means of obtaining that inward peace which had its roots in a healthy moral nature. His devotion to philosophy and his upright way of life won for him the respect of the Athenian people, who honoured him with a golden crown and decreed that, after his death, his tomb should be built in the Ceramicus at the public expense. That Zeno, who was a non-Athenian and, moreover, a man whose soured attitude and cursory, though trenchant,

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1. Diogenes Laertius: op.cit., VII, 16. αὐτὸν δὲ στυγνὸν τ'εἶναι καὶ πικρόν, καὶ τὸ πρόσωπον συνεσπασμένον.

speech might well have been expected to arouse resentment, should have been thus publicly honoured, whereas Socrates, a native-born Athenian, had been condemned to death by his fellow-citizens, was proof that, in the intervening space of one hundred and forty years, the efforts of the philosophers had begun to bear fruit; - proof also that the narrow patriotism and intense local feeling for the old city-state, destroyed under the stress of prolonged civil war, was being replaced by a new outlook, in which the distinction between Athenian and Spartan, between even Greek and Barbarian, was slowly disappearing, and the worth of man was being assessed not from his birthplace but from his character as a human being and a citizen of the world. While the roots of this new attitude lay deep in the history of the preceding century, in the teachings of Zeno could be traced its growth.

Nevertheless, the credit for formulating the Stoic body of doctrine was not due to Zeno alone. Unlike Epicureanism, its contemporary rival, Stoicism grew from the theories of three philosophers, among whom Zeno was the guiding spirit. On his death in 263 B.C., he was succeeded in the leadership of the school by his pupil, Cleanthes, a native of Assos in the north-west of Asia Minor. Though reputedly slow of comprehension - "an unventuresome rock" -[2]. Cleanthes was renowned for his industry, sincerity and deep religious spirit. After his death in 232 B.C., the presidency of the Stoa passed to his pupil, Chrysippus, whose birthplace had been Tarsus, in Cilicia. Chrysippus, a somewhat arrogant man and a voluminous writer, with more than seven hundred treatises to his credit, made Stoicism pedantic but, at the same time, systematic. Of such value was his work in shaping the Stoic doctrine that it was said of him "if there had not been a Chrysippus, there would have been no Stoa." [3].

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2. Diogenes Laertius: VII, 170. Ξῆνος ἄτολμος.

3. Ibid., VII, 183. εἰ μὴ γὰρ ἦν Χρύσιππος, οὐκ ἂν ἦν Στοά.

After Chrysippus, the main lines of doctrine were complete. Zeno had established the logical criteria and introduced the main ethical tenets; Cleanthes had stressed the mutual interdependence of Stoic logic, ethics and physics; and Chrysippus had welded the theories of his predecessors into a systematic whole, in which could be traced not only his own reasoning and dialectic but also the religious spirit of Cleanthes and the austere simplicity of Zeno.

Just as the physical system of Epicureanism had its origin in the theories of the naturalist philosopher, Democritus, so too did the Stoic physics take their source from the theories of the pre-Socratic, Heraclitus. Zeno himself, a thorough-going materialist, had little interest in physical science for its own sake, but valued it only for its contribution to virtue, which, for him, was all-important. Thus Stoicism was primarily a system of ethics, but, as a philosophical system and not merely a rule of conduct, it could disregard neither logic as its guiding theory of method nor physics as its foundation.

For Zeno, as previously for Heraclitus, the world substance was fire - not the earthly, destructive fire, but rather a creative, fiery breath, which permeated passive matter. This constructive fire, the active cause in the universe, was alive, rational and intelligent; it was the factor which made the universe orderly and not chaotic. Regarded as divine, because there was nothing more excellent, as providence, because it was an active, purposeful power ruling the universe, and as consciousness, because man, a part of the universe, could not possess a quality which did not exist in the guiding spirit of the universe, this rational fire became the Stoic conception of god.

According to the Stoics, reality consisted of two principles - passive (matter, devoid of qualities) and active (immanent reason or divine fire). The active principle - god - while immanent in the universe, was also the primal source from which were generated the passive elements which composed the corporeal world. In these elements,

the active fire distributed itself in varying degrees of tension, implanting in all things the "logoi spermatikoi" (seminal reasons) - active formative qualities which determined the form of each individual object.

To this extent, Zeno and his followers had enlarged upon the doctrines of constructive fiery breath, tension, and all-pervading reason, which they derived from Heraclitus. Likewise, his theory that the world was "eternally born from fire and resolved into fire again, according to fixed cycles; and that this was determined by fate,"[4] was accepted by the Stoics and extended into their doctrine of the universal conflagration, according to which the passive elements of matter, which originally proceeded from the primal fire, were periodically re-absorbed in it. In contrast to the Epicurean belief in the infinity of matter, the Stoic universe, being continuously destroyed and re-created, was neither eternal nor indestructible. After each conflagration, the only existing reality was the primal fire itself which, in due course, would create another universe exactly similar to its predecessors. Because the universe, created by and from this divine fire, was itself divine and governed by universal reason, its composition could in no way be improved. The cycle of creation, re-absorption and restoration thus admitted of no change, and the law of necessity demanded that each new universe should be a repetition in every detail of the previous universes, in which all things had been ordered for the best. "For there again will be Socrates, Plato and each of the people, with the same friends and citizens; and they will believe in the same things, talk with the same people, conduct the same affairs; and the whole city, village and field will likewise be restored."[5]

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4. Diogenes Laertius: IX, 8. γεννᾶσθαί τε αὐτὸν ἐκ πυρὸς καὶ πάλιν ἐκπυροῦσθαι κατά τινας περιόδους ἐναλλὰξ τὸν σύμπαντα αἰῶνα. τοῦτο δὲ γίνεσθαι καθ' εἱμαρμένην.

5. Nemesius: De Natura Hominis 147. Greek text quoted Adam (op.cit.) p.41, para.152. ἔσεσθαι γὰρ πάλιν Σωκράτην καὶ Πλάτωνα καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν ἀνθρώπων, σὺν τοῖς αὐτοῖς καὶ φίλοις καὶ πολίταις καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ πείσεσθαι καὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς συντεύξεσθαι καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ μεταχειρίσεσθαι, καὶ πᾶσαν πόλιν καὶ κώμην καὶ ἀγρὸν ὁμοίως ἀποκαθίστασθαι.

Unlike the Epicureans, whose universe was formed by purely mechanistic causes, the Stoics saw in the universe order, harmony and law, which they attributed to an active, purposeful power, a divine providence or fate, responsible not only for creating the universe but also for determining the course of every event. By this rational, living universe, where chance was non-existent, all things were directed and controlled, whether by reason, providence, fate or nature made no difference; for all were but different aspects of the Stoic god.

In different degrees, every object of creation shared in the divine substance. The distribution of seminal reasons produced in inorganic objects the principle of being, and in plants the principle of growth. In animals it resulted in movement and irrational soul, and in human beings in reason, the highest manifestation of the divine fire and man's ruling faculty, to which the remaining parts of the soul were subordinated. Yet, while tacitly implying a difference between man's body, and his soul which was part of the divine fire, the Stoics refused to admit of any such distinction, regarding body and soul as corporeal and as one and the same. In their pantheistic materialism, the primal substance of the universe, impersonal fire, was endowed with all the attributes of a living spirit and credited not only with ordering the universe but also with watching over the actions of each of its creations. It was not surprising that later Stoics, overlooking the essential connection between the physics and ethics of their philosophy, gradually transformed it into a religion, and came to regard divine reason not as a purely impersonal force, synonymous with the material universe, as their founder, Zeno, had envisaged, but as a separate, spiritual personality. Nevertheless, in spite of the failure of early Stoicism to distinguish between mind and matter, its account of a material soul inspired by a breath of divine reason was more plausible than the Epicurean theory, in which life, sensation and reason were all produced from lifeless atoms, devoid of any secondary qualities.

To the early Stoics, then, all things - body, soul, god and the world - being of the same material substance, were capable of acting

and reacting on one another, just as, in a human being, body produced sense-impressions in the soul, and soul produced movements in the body. Yet soul, though material, was at the same time rational, being a part of the divine reasoning fire breathed into the first man and transmitted through him to all future generations. As a part of the only existing reality - primal fire - the substance of the soul, like the Epicurean soul-atoms, was indestructible and, in this sense, immortal, even when re-absorbed into the world-soul.

In consequence of this objective immortality of the material soul, which their physics demanded, the early Stoics were faced with the problem of the survival after death of individual souls, a problem whose solution, for them, was not to be found in the Epicurean denial of any future existence. In the minds of the Stoic founders, doubts arose concerning not so much the actual survival of the soul as the length of its immortality, Cleanthes maintaining that all souls lived on until the final conflagration, when they would be absorbed into the deity, and Chrysippus limiting survival to include only the souls of the wise. Yet, in spite of the differences in Stoic belief in this matter, from the time of Cleanthes individual immortality as a continued, though not endless, existence after death was a recognised part of the Stoic doctrine.

While regarding theoretical studies as subordinate to ethics, Zeno could not build up a philosophical system without the support of logical criteria. Philosophy was like "a fertile field, logic being the encircling fence, ethics the crop, and physics the soil or the trees."[6] Chrysippus, on the other hand, placed greater value in theoretical studies and, as a result of his systematic collection of details, logic and the theory of knowledge assumed a definite place in the Stoic philosophy.

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6. Diogenes Laertius: VII, 40. εἰκάζουσι δὲ ζῴῳ τὴν φιλοσοφίαν ----- --- ἢ ἀγρῷ καρποφόρῳ· οὗ τὸν μὲν περιβεβλημένον φραγμὸν τὸ λογικόν, τὸν δὲ καρπὸν τὸ ἠθικόν, τὴν δὲ γῆν ἢ τὰ δένδρα τὸ φυσικόν.

While lacking the mutual dependence found in Epicurean logic and physics, Stoicism attempted to provide a connecting link between the two by asserting that, just as an impression on wax was made by means of seals, so sense-experiences arose from actual imprints made on the material soul by particular external objects.[7] The strength or clearness of these impressions was attributed to the physical property of strain or tension. This was the theory proposed by Cleanthes; but his successor, Chrysippus, being of a less literal turn of mind and realising that it was impossible for a number of impressions to be made in the same place at the same time,[8] maintained that sensations were not actual imprints but alterations in the soul.

In spite of this lack of consistency, the three Stoic founders agreed that the mind was involuntarily affected by outside objects, whose impression the will was free either to accept as a true representation of the object or to reject as false. Knowledge consisted, therefore, in the ability to distinguish between true and false impressions and to make one's mental conceptions agree with reality. Stoic concepts, however, having no metaphysical reality, and no existence outside of consciousness, could not serve as an absolute criterion of truth, which, for the Stoics, depended entirely on the subjective convictions of each individual. In this respect, Stoicism was even more subjective than Epicureanism, which, in its theory of atom-images produced from every object, to a certain extent admitted the existence not of absolute truth as a whole but of atom-films which had their own separate existence, and from which true knowledge could be obtained.

Stoic knowledge was thus founded primarily on sense-perception, on the impressions inscribed on the mind which, at birth, was a "tabula rasa." As each impression (φαντασία) was imprinted on the active, responsive substance of the mind, there remained a memory of the object

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7. C.f. Sextus Empiricus VII, 228; quoted Adam, p. 31, para. 113.

8. C.f. Diogenes Laertius: VII, 50.

whose impression had been received, just as "those who see some bright object retain a memory of it when it has gone."[9] A number of similar memories produced experience, from which the mind formed firstly its concepts and then its knowledge and reasoning. Like knowledge, reason was a development which arose gradually from sense-perceptions, and was a faculty in which the Stoics had implicit trust, for it was through reason that they were akin to the spirit of the universe. Yet their account of the development of man's reason as a result of his sense-perceptions was curiously inconsistent with their contention that, in each man's mind, was implanted at birth a particle of that divine fire which they regarded as synonymous with the reasoning power in the world.

The gradual development of knowledge and reason as a product of experience resulted in the formation of two types of concepts - those produced reflectively and those produced spontaneously. While both types arose equally from experience, the latter - pre-conceptions (προλήψεις) - comprised those general ideas whose truth could be verified by the universal consent of mankind. In order to give this opinion a logical basis compatible with their physical beliefs, the Stoics distinguished between the impressions received through sense-organs and those received through the mind, placing in the latter category the general notions - such as virtue and god - which were not innate, but which developed from experience between birth and the age of fourteen.

Plato's doctrine that knowledge was reminiscence had little effect on the Stoic theory. The Stoic mind possessed not innate ideas, but innate powers, the powers of receiving impressions and of forming concepts on the basis of its experience. For Zeno and his followers, heredity played no part in determining the development of

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9. Aetius IV, 11. Quoted Adam, p. 32, para. 116. αἰσθόμενοι τινος οἷον λευκοῦ ἀπελθόντος αὐτοῦ μνήμην ἔχουσιν.

the human mind,nor were they troubled by the possibility of the mind's retaining some recollection of its former state of existence when it returned to earth again after a conflagration. In spite of much evidence to the contrary,the Stoic mind remained at birth a "tabula rasa."

In an endeavour to prove that,in a rational universe,everything had been ordered for the best,the Stoic logic and theory of knowledge revealed a tendency to over-simplify,often inconsistently, matters which permitted of no simple explanation,and resulted in a dogmatic defence of an illogical position. In many respects,the relationship between the Stoic logic and physics was loose and artificial,and their attempt to explain rational thought in terms of physics was no more successful than that of the more logical Epicurean system to explain the existence of thought itself in terms of atoms. Nevertheless,as a very real part of Stoic philosophy,logic,divided as it was into rhetoric,dialectic and canonic,provided a method of reasoning whereby fallacious arguments might be refuted,supplied a means of defining terms and understanding or expressing physical and ethical statements,and,at the same time,determined a standard of truth. The ultimate test of the truth of a presentation lay in its definiteness,in its degree of tension,which compelled the mind's immediate and irresistible assent and which satisfied it that it had proceeded from a real object. The wise man,rightly accepting in his mind the impressions based on reality,would thus attain true knowledge through the exercise of his own reasoning,while the hasty man,careless in his interpretation even of the most convincing impressions,would acquire false knowledge unrelated to reality.

Having once chosen the physical soil for their philosophical garden and erected their encircling logical fence,the Stoic founders were ready to sow their crop of ethics. Since Stoic philosophy as a whole was concerned primarily with the life of man and the well-being

of the human soul, a link between ethics and physics was found in the conception of soul, which, consisting as it did of material fire, was itself part of that universal fiery breath - divine reason - by which the universe was pervaded and controlled. In this single system of nature, every part of the universe had its share, and the individual life was good when it conformed to the ruling principle of the world. The aim of life was, therefore, as Zeno said, "to live in agreement with nature." [10] Zeno's interpretation of nature, however, contrasted sharply with that of his Cynic predecessors, whose insistence on the necessity of living according to nature had resulted in their casting aside all limits of convention and restraint. For Zeno, the aim of life was to be attained not by rejecting civilization and living according to the primitive instincts of a noble savage, but by increasing man's degree of civilization through the exercise of his rational powers, by virtue of which he was akin to the universal reason.

"Living harmoniously with nature" permitted of two interpretations, the first of which, as maintained by Cleanthes, regarded nature as the nature of the universe, while the second, which Chrysippus supported, understood it as strictly human nature. In reality, however, the connection between Stoic physics and ethics removed any distinction of this kind, since man's own nature, his reason, was an essential part of the nature, or reason, of the universe. "The end is life in accordance with nature, that is, in accordance with our own human nature as well as that of the universe, refraining from every action forbidden by the law common to all things, that is to say, the right reason which pervades all things and is identical with Zeus, the lord and governor of the universe." [11]

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10. Diogenes Laertius: VII, 87.
τὸ ὁμολογουμένως τῇ φύσει ζῆν.

11. Ibid., VII, 88.
διόπερ τέλος γίνεται τὸ ἀκολούθως τῇ φύσει ζῆν, ὅπερ ἐστὶ κατά τε τὴν αὑτοῦ καὶ κατὰ τὴν τῶν ὅλων, οὐδὲν ἐνεργοῦντας ὧν ἀπαγορεύει εἴωθεν ὁ νόμος ὁ κοινός, ὅπερ ἐστὶν ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος, διὰ πάντων ἐρχόμενος, ὁ αὐτὸς ὢν τῷ Διΐ, καθηγεμόνι τούτῳ τῆς τῶν ὄντων διοικήσεως ὄντι.

That the world as a whole gave evidence not of haphazard and chaotic development,but of orderly and intelligent planning,was to the Stoics sufficient proof that,behind the creation and workings of the universe,there was a beneficent,impersonal providence or fate - natural law or universal reason - a power that was ethical as well as intellectual. By this power all things had been ordered,and were being guided wisely and for the best. Man,therefore,acknowledging the underlying wisdom of the world,would accept the universe as it was and submit to his fated destiny. From this standpoint,since all things had been determined by natural law,he would have no choice but to live in accordance with nature,as providence decreed.

Yet,by introducing a typically inconsistent compromise,the Stoics showed themselves to be not absolute fatalists. Just as their universe was governed not by a purely mechanical fate,but by an intelligent providence,so too were the actions of man not wholly determined for him but to a certain extent dependent upon his own free will. Chrysippus was the first to distinguish between the automatic necessity of fatalism - the oriental philosopher's

"---------- Chequer-board of Nights and Days
Where Destiny with Men for Pieces plays."[12]

and the theory of determinism which,while acknowledging the exceptionless rule of cause,at the same time admitted the intervention of human thought and the part played by human will. Living in accordance with nature thus came to be interpreted partly as submission to the divinely appointed order of the world,but mainly as an adjustment of man's attitudes of mind and a voluntary direction of his will towards the ends which conformed to nature. Man alone possessed the power of consciously and deliberately assenting to the dictates of universal reason,and true virtue lay not in his actions but in his interior attitude towards events. "Non quid fiat aut quid detur,refert,sed

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12. Rubaiyat of Omar Khayyam,XLIX.

qua mente, quia beneficium non in eo, quod fit aut datur, constitit, sed in ipso dantis aut facientis animo."[13] This insistence upon the inwardness of virtue, as contrasted with the Epicurean practice of judging the value of an action by its result, was proof that, in this respect at least, the Stoics did not overlook the fundamental composition of the human mind. By recognising the fact that, ultimately, most actions, whether right or wrong, arose not so much from external coercion as from inner conviction, and by placing the worth of an action in the intention rather than the result, they provided a new conception of virtue which later was to exert a widespread influence.

In keeping with their doctrine that, by the presence of divine fiery breath, all parts and events of the universe were interconnected in a mutual sympathy and tension, and in complete contrast to their contemporary Epicurean rivals, the early Stoics maintained the importance of divination and oracles. The world had been arranged in such a way that certain material events were preceded by certain signs, such as flights of birds or flashes of lightning, which the wise man could rightly interpret as the fore-runners of the appropriate events. Yet the Stoics' belief in divination as an indication of the future was merely an extension of their deterministic theory, which did not involve their material divinity in taking any interest in individual fissures of livers or songs of birds, "neque enim decorum est nec deis dignum."[14]

Among the superstitious, divination and soothsaying frequently resulted in the postponement or cancellation of a proposed course of action; since the Stoic universe, however, was predetermined, it followed that actions must occur as ordained and that an acknowledgement of divination in its purely superstitious aspect was incompatible with a belief in the divinity as absolute order. Nevertheless, as a result of their observance of a number of cases in which predictions had come true, the Stoics assented to the science of divination and interpretation,

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13. Seneca: De Beneficiis, I,6,1.

14. Cicero: De Divinatione, I,118.

and,at the same time,found proof of their theory that certain signs naturally preceded certain events.

Closely connected with the Stoic acceptance of divination was their belief in astrology. To their minds,the heavens,as the visible image of the divine,revealed to man the workings of the divine mind,and among their followers the practice of star-worshipping was not uncommon. So great was the Stoic belief in a geocentric universe in which the earth,spherical in shape and motionless,held pride of place and the stars gave indications of the divine,that the most devout of their star-worshippers,Cleanthes,considered that Aristarchus,a contemporary scientist who maintained that the sun,and not the earth,was the centre of the universe,should be indicted for impiety. Among ancient philosophers,only the Epicureans insisted that the heavenly bodies,composed as they were of lifeless atoms, were neither divine nor eternal; but the general popular belief in astrology and divination was too firmly fixed for the more scientific opinion to prevail.

Basing their acceptance of divination on the fact that,in their deterministic universe,the divinity which formed it had arranged for certain events to be preceded by certain signs,from which the events could be predicted,the Stoics,acknowledging the power of the all-pervading divinity - known as Zeus,Athena,Hera,Poseidon,according to its various powers - likewise recognised the value of prayer. Understanding,however,that human prayers could in no way alter the determined course of events,they aimed in their prayers,as in their ethical system,at cultivating a right attitude of mind towards the destiny which they could not escape. In Cleanthes' "Hymn to Zeus", probably the most perfect of Stoic prayers,was revealed most clearly the early Stoic conception of pantheism,in which god,the universal reason,earned men's praises for his supreme control of the world,but was freed from the responsibility of evil actions committed by "wicked men in their own folly."[15] Even in Cleanthes' prayer,however,could be

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15. Cleanthes apud Stobaeum:Eclogae I;quoted Adam,p.54,para.196.
κακοὶ σφετέρῃσιν ἀνοίαις.

seen the beginnings of the development of Stoicism as a religion rather than a philosophy, and the eventual replacement of the Stoic material god by an almost personal deity.

As a logical result of the Stoic belief in determinism and the necessity of following along the paths prepared by Zeus, it appeared that all voluntary action or moral responsibility would cease to have any significance. To overcome this difficulty, Zeno maintained that true virtue lay not in man's apathetic submission to a destiny which he could not avoid, but in his willing and cheerful assent to those things which were in accordance with nature. It was through the exercise of that particle of divine substance, his reason, that he learned to place his will in harmony with the design of the universe. Morality was, therefore, the expression of the divine in man and in human life and, as such, was absolute and universal.

In all living things, the first natural impulse tended towards self-preservation and was accompanied by a fear of circumstances which might cause injury or death. Just as in animals this impulse naturally led to their seeking out the conditions most suitable for their proper existence, so in men it resulted in their attempting to discover the type of life most suitable to rational beings, which, as Zeno maintained, was a life in agreement with nature, "a virtuous life, since nature guides us towards virtue".[16] Virtue, then, was desirable not for any external motives, but for its own sake. Happiness was to be found in virtue which, according to the early Stoics, was in itself sufficient to produce well-being.

Like Epicurus, Zeno divided virtue into four primary sections - wisdom, self-control, justice and courage - defining wisdom as "the knowledge of things good and evil, and of what is neither good nor evil";[17] self-control as "the knowledge of things to be chosen and

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16. Diogenes Laertius: VII, 87.
----- ὅτιεε ἐστὶ κατ' ἀρετὴν ζῆν· ἄγει γὰε πεὸς ταύτην ἡμᾶς ἡ φύσις.

17. Ibid., VII, 92.
ἐπιστήμην κακῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ οὐδετέεων.

avoided,and of what should neither be chosen nor avoided;" justice as "knowledge capable of assigning value to each thing"; and courage as "the knowledge of what is dangerous and not dangerous,and of what is neither dangerous nor not dangerous".[18] Corresponding to each primary virtue were numbers of subordinate virtues - good counsel, presence of mind,and discretion being secondary to wisdom,and discipline and propriety to self-control; justice was subdivided into respect and honesty,and courage into endurance and confidence.[19] In order to provide a closer connection between Stoic ethics and physics, Cleanthes maintained that virtue was the result of tension,the physical tightening property of the divine fire,which,acting in the soul, produced justice,if it were a question of just distributions,or courage, if it were a matter for endurance,and caused the appropriate aspect of virtue to be present at the right time.

Like virtue,vice was classified under four main headings - folly,excess,injustice and cowardice - from which were derived the secondary vices,such as stupidity,incontinence and ill-advisedness. An echo of Socrates was heard in the Stoic theory that each vice was a form "of ignorance of those things of which the corresponding virtues are the knowledge."[20]

Since each virtue was a form of knowledge or wisdom in its different aspects,the wise man,because of his wisdom,would therefore possess every virtue. As Chrysippus asserted,"the man who does not possess all the virtues is not perfect,just as a deed which is not done in accordance with every virtue is incomplete."[21] As a natural

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18. Stobaeus:Eclogae II;quoted Adam,p.44,para.162. σωφροσύνην δ'εἶναι ἐπιστήμην αἱρετῶν καὶ φευκτῶν καὶ οὐδετέρων· δικαιοσύνην δὲ ἐπιστήμην ἀπονεμητικὴν τῆς ἀξίας ἑκάστῳ· ἀνδρείαν δὲ ἐπιστήμην δεινῶν καὶ οὐ δεινῶν καὶ οὐδετέρων.

19. For complete list,see Stobaeus:Eclogae II,quoted Adam,p.44,para.160.

20. Diogenes Laertius: VII,93. ----- εἶναι δ' ἀγνοίας τὰς κακίας, ὧν αἱ ἀρεταὶ ἐπιστῆμαι.

21. Plutarch: De Stoicorum repugnantiis,1046 E,quoted Adam,p.45,para. 164. οὔτε γὰρ ἄνδρα φησὶ τέλειον εἶναι τὸν μὴ πάσας ἔχοντα τὰς ἀρετὰς οὔτε πρᾶξιν τελείαν ἥτις οὐ κατὰ πάσας πράττεται τὰς ἀρετάς.

result of this conclusion, it followed that, if a wise man possessed every virtue, a foolish man possessed every vice. Man, therefore, was either wholly virtuous or wholly vicious, and, between the two extremes, the early Stoics, unlike the Peripatetic school, admitted no middle point and, consequently, no moral progress. To suppose an instantaneous conversion from complete vice to complete virtue was absurd, yet moral progress could be achieved in no other way while the doctrine was held that, "just as a stick is either straight or crooked, so is a man either just or unjust; nor can he be more just or more unjust,"[22] or that "those who are approaching virtue are no less in the midst of vice than those who are far away from virtue."[23] Among virtues and vices, there was no difference in degree, each virtue being of equal value and each vice of equal worthlessness, but the distinction between virtue and vice was absolute and inflexible.

This lofty ideal of perfect virtue, as embodied in the perfect sage, on whose example the Stoic was to mould his own life, though uplifting was, at the same time, completely unattainable and beyond the reach even of the most ardent of Stoic supporters. Even if such a sage were discovered to illustrate Zeno's theory, he would be far too inhuman a figure to command allegiance. Living in accordance with nature had thus resolved itself into living a life of absolute perfection, a doctrine which, since the ideal was impossible to attain and since all who had not become completely virtuous were still in the midst of vice, excluded the majority of mankind from obtaining its benefits. How contrary to rational human nature it was for one who favoured a life in harmony with nature or reason to assert that to be completely virtuous was the only good, the only evil not to be virtuous, and that everything else was indifferent.

To lessen the difficulty created by this absolute division between virtue and vice, the early Stoics were compelled to admit that,

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22. Diogenes Laertius: VII, 127. ὡς γάρ δεῖν φασιν ἢ ὀρθόν εἶναι ξύλον ἢ στρεβλόν, οὕτως ἢ δίκαιον ἢ ἄδικον, οὔτε δὲ δικαιότερον οὔτ' ἀδικώτερον.

23. Plutarch: De communibus notitiis, 1065A, quoted Adam, p. 45, para. 167. οὐδὲ οἱ πελάζοντες ἧττον τῶν μακρὰν ὄντων ἐστὶν ἐν κακίᾳ.

among the class of things which they regarded as indifferent, some were preferable (προηγμένα) and would be chosen by the wise man, while others would be avoided (ἀποπροηγμένα). Of the indifferents, those which were preferred, such as life, health and wealth, were in accordance with nature and contained in themselves a degree of positive, but not absolute, value - the latter belonging to virtue alone - while their opposites, such as death, illness or poverty, possessed only negative value and would be rejected by the wise man if, in so doing, he did not act unvirtuously.

"The things to be preferred, then, are those which have positive value, for example - among mental qualities, natural ability, skill, progress and the like; among bodily qualities, life, health, vigour, good condition, soundness of organs, beauty and so on; and among externals, wealth, fame, noble birth and the like."[24] In the first category, were included the qualities which were preferred for their own sakes and were in accordance with nature, in the second, those which were preferred for the sake of something else, such as the advantages which they produced, and in the third, those which were preferred both for themselves and for other reasons. In accordance with their love of classification, the Stoics divided into similar categories the things that were to be rejected. The obtaining of the things that were preferred and the rejection of their opposites was an "appropriate act" (καθῆκον), and wisdom became apparent when the proper preference was consistently exercised; here again virtue lay not in the thing chosen but in the wisdom of the preference.

Yet while the wise man preferred some indifferents and rejected their opposites, their presence or absence in no way affected his happiness, since his whole well-being lay in wisdom or virtue, which was completely independent of external circumstances. Virtue, then, residing as it did in man's will, depended entirely on the

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24. Diogenes Laertius: VII, 106. Προηγμένα μὲν οὖν εἶναι ἃ καὶ ἀξίαν ἔχει οἷον ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν ψυχικῶν εὐφυΐαν, τέχνην, προκοπήν, καὶ τὰ ὅμοια· ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν σωματικῶν ζωήν, ὑγίειαν, ἰσχύν, εὐεξίαν, ἀρτιότητα, κάλλος, καὶ τὰ παραπλήσια· ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἐκτὸς πλοῦτον, δόξαν, εὐγένειαν, καὶ τὰ ὅμοια.

individual himself and on his willingness both to accept judgments that accorded with his reason and to remove from his mind those false judgments which could lead him into error. This doctrine of the inwardness of morality was a fundamental tenet of Stoicism. The Stoic sage, his will in conformity with reason, acted virtuously in full knowledge that he was doing the right thing for the right reason. Not for the sake of any accompanying pleasure, however, did he pursue virtue, for pleasure, after all, was an indifferent unworthy either of choice or rejection, but rather for the sake of duty, performing those right actions which befitted his state of life. Zeno himself first worked out a detailed system of these duties, "appropriate actions" which became "right actions" (κατορθώματα) because the motive underlying them was right and because the act itself was a deliberate attempt to conform with the law of nature. These perfect acts of duty were absolutely virtuous deeds, such as being wise or acting justly, while intermediate duties (appropriate actions) were those like marriage, or serving in parliament, which, while they were right actions for certain reasoning persons, nevertheless were not complete acts of duty in accordance with absolute virtue. Moreover, it was characteristic of the early Stoic belief in complete, but not partial, virtue, that only the wise man was considered capable of truly virtuous conduct and of actions that were consistently right. In their insistence that true virtue was to be found in the intention rather than in the action, the Stoics were in complete agreement with one far removed from them in time and tradition, for whom it was

> "----------the greatest treason
> To do the right deed for the wrong reason." 25.

The Stoic theory that virtue was knowledge, or reason, contained some difficulties, not least among which was the problem of evil. To admit the absolute existence of evil was a reflection on the goodness of the divine reason, which had ordered all things for

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25. T.S.Eliot: Murder in the Cathedral, p.44 (Faber & Faber edition, London, 1938).

the best,and completely to deny its existence was,in the face of the contrary evidence,impossible. In order not to detract from the beneficence of providence,the Stoics maintained that evil was subjective,being due to a voluntary ignorance on the part of man,which prevented him from setting his will in harmony with reason. A justification for the existence of evil,not as a positive entity in a perfect world,but as a defect common to the unwise,was found in the law of relativity,by which the existence of a good thing implied the natural existence of its opposite. In support of this theory,Chrysippus maintained that "evil comes about in some way according to the reasoning of nature,and it is not,so to speak,without its uses in the universe; for without evil,there would be no good."[26].

In spite of their acceptance of a pre-determined universe, the Stoics were not prepared on this count to free the vicious man from responsibility for his actions,for,as they affirmed,the error which was the essence of his vice was voluntary and could be overcome when he adjusted his will and consistently performed right actions. For this reason,it was justifiable to punish a person who acted unvirtuously,even though he might attempt to make fate responsible for his deeds. Thus,when Zeno's slave whom he was beating for stealing pleaded that "it was fated that I should steal",Zeno's reply -"and that you should also be beaten!" [27]. was in keeping with the general Stoic attitude regarding the nature of vice.

Just as true virtue lay in the intention,rather than in the act itself,so too did vice exist in the mind,for an action was not evil in itself,but became good or bad according to the intention of

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26. Plutarch:De Stoicorum repugnantiis,1050 F; quoted Adam,p.38,para. 138. γίνεται μὲν γὰρ καὶ αὐτή, πως κατὰ τὸν τῆς φύσεως λόγον, καί, ἵν' οὕτως εἰπω, οὐκ ἀχρήστως γίνεται πρὸς τὰ ὅλα· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν τἀγαθὸν ἦν.

27. Diogenes Laertius: VII,23. δοῦλον ἐπὶ κλοπῇ, φασίν, ἐμαστίγου· τοῦ δ' εἰπόντος, "εἱμάρτο μοι κλέψαι," "καὶ δαρῆναι."

the doer. How different was this Stoic insistence on attitude before an action as the criterion of goodness from the Epicurean practice of determining the value of an action from its result. Yet although the Stoic viewpoint implied a certain subjectivity of virtue and vice, in actual fact it stressed the contrary opinion; virtue and vice were the only absolutes, virtue being the sole good and vice the sole evil. Pain and suffering were not in themselves evils, since at times they could result in good, neither were pleasure and wealth in themselves goods, for some pleasures were disgraceful and wealth was sometimes used for bad purposes.

For the Stoics, then, pleasure, which contributed neither to happiness nor misery, was certainly unworthy of being selected as the ultimate goal of philosophy. As a consequence of natural impulses, rather than a natural impulse itself, pleasure was regarded as "an irrational elation of mind at the existence of what seems to be worth choosing".[28] Possibly in a desire to contradict the Epicurean emphasis on the value of pleasure, Cleanthes considered not only that it was an indifferent, but also that it was "neither natural nor valuable in life, just as a broom is not natural".[29] For this reason, it had no moral worth, and played no part in the well-being of the wise man, who thus became an even more unapproachable figure.

The Epicurean philosophy had elevated pleasure into an ideal which the Stoics made no attempt to understand. To them, concentrating only on one aspect of pleasure, Epicurus' theory seemed low and unworthy, pandering, as they thought, to the baser pleasures which they themselves were attempting to suppress. In their attitude towards pleasure, the Stoics disregarded its existence as a necessary and natural part of the human constitution, and failed to allow for its

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28. Diogenes Laertius: VII, 114. Ἡδονὴ δέ ἐστιν ἄλογος ἔπαρσις ἐφ' αἱρετῷ δοκοῦντι ὑπάρχειν.

29. Sextus Empiricus, XI, 73; quoted Adam, p. 49, para. 179. ἀλλὰ Κλεάνθης μὲν μήτε κατὰ φύσιν αὐτὴν εἶναι μήτε ἀξίαν ἔχειν αὐτὴν ἐν τῷ βίῳ, καθάπερ δὲ τὸ καλλυντέον κατὰ φύσιν μὴ εἶναι.

psychological value. In their eyes, pleasure was a sign not of health and happiness but of degeneracy and decline.

Cleanthes' denial that pleasure was an essential constituent of well-being was consistent with the Stoic viewpoint that emotions were weaknesses, lacking the physical tension on which depended the strength of soul and body. According to Zeno, passion, or emotion, was "an irrational and unnatural movement in the soul, or an exaggerated impulse",[30] which, being contrary to reason and ultimately due to wrong judgments about preferences and rejections, should be not controlled by reason but completely eradicated.

The emotions were classified under four headings - grief(an irrational mental contraction), fear(an irrational anticipation of evil), desire(an irrational longing), and pleasure(an irrational elation of mind) - each of which, like the divisions of virtue or vice, was further divided into its respective parts. Forms of grief included pity, envy, jealousy, sorrow, pain, confusion; forms of fear were terror, hesitation, consternation, panic, mental agony; forms of desire included want, hatred, anger, love, resentment; and forms of pleasure were enchantment, delight and transport.[31] All of these perturbations, which were false judgments not caused by any force of nature, the wise man would suppress, knowing that virtue was to be found in rational action independent of irrational impulses.

In contrast to the four irrational emotions, the Stoics admitted three good emotional states - joy, discretion and purpose. Joy was reasonable elation, the opposite of pleasure, from which were derived enjoyment, mirth and cheerfulness; discretion, a reasonable shunning, was the opposite of fear and had as its derivatives reverence and modesty; while from purpose, a reasonable longing and the opposite of

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30. Diogenes Laertius: VII, 110. --- ἡ ἄλογος καὶ παρὰ φύσιν ψυχῆς κίνησις ἡ ἔσχατη πλεονάζουσα.
31. C.f. Diogenes Laertius, VII, 110 - 114.

desire,were derived goodwill,kindness,respect and affection. While the dividing line between the rational and irrational emotions seemed fairly fine,Zeno and the early Stoics had no hesitation in drawing a marked distinction,and in condemning all emotions which lay on the irrational side of the line. The life of the wise man developed, therefore,into a battle against those emotions which were classified as unnatural and unvirtuous and which prevented his performing the perfect right actions in which true virtue resided.

Apathy,or passionlessness, - contempt for pain and pleasure, and indifference towards objects of affection - became the Stoic ideal. This extreme and one-sided viewpoint,which gave insufficient recognition to human emotion,resulted in an unnatural asceticism and was responsible for creating the stern,unattractive personality of the Stoic sage. Utterly indifferent to riches or power,and without any irrational feelings,even sympathy,towards friends or family,the sage alone lived a life of pure reason according to nature,remaining self-sufficient and self-poised under feelings of pleasure and pain alike.

In putting their theory into practice,however,the Stoics found it difficult to discover a wise man who conformed with their ideal and whom they could set before their followers as an example. This task was made even more difficult by reason of their division of all mankind into two rigid classes - wise and foolish - of whom the wise,in all their actions,acted consistently in accordance with virtue,and the foolish,by analogy,in accordance with vice. Since an example of a perfect sage could not be found,the logical conclusion of this particular doctrine was that,if the absolute division between wise and foolish were true,mankind as a whole must be composed of utterly vicious fools. Such a conclusion naturally produced complaints from those who considered that the classification was,perhaps,a little unjust. "Chrysippus does not prove that he himself or any of his acquaintances or teachers are wise. Why then do they think and speak

as they do about others, saying that all are mad, senseless, wicked, and have reached the peak of bad luck and of every misfortune ?"[32] In this, as in other matters, therefore, the Stoics were compelled to compromise; being unable to find an example of a perfect wise man, they selected Socrates, together with the two Cynic leaders, Antisthenes and Diogenes, as most nearly satisfying their requirements.

Though the apathy of the Stoic sage made it impossible for him to cherish any sympathetic feelings towards friends and family, nevertheless, as a duty demanded by reason, he would "honour his parents, brothers and country, and associate with friends."[33] Yet Stoic associations lacked the sincerity of Epicurean friendship, and were limited to the wise men alone, because of their likeness to one another. Among the bad, friendship did not exist. No generous enthusiasm was felt at the good fortune of friends, nor was sympathy extended to them in their trouble, for both emotions were signs of irrational weakness which would disturb the wise man's freedom from passion. Unlike Epicurus, however, Zeno did not counsel abstention from marriage, but rather considered it a duty to the state.

While regarding the majority of mankind as foolish and depraved, the Stoics did not, on this account, refuse to participate with them in public life, for the wise man was "naturally made for society and action."[34] Contrary to the Epicureans, whose doctrines generally dissuaded them from taking any active part in politics, and in keeping with the more altruistic side of their own philosophy, they entered political life both as a duty and also as an opportunity for restraining vice and promoting virtue, but it was their own particular virtue,

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32. Plutarch: De Stoicorum repugnantiis, 1048 E; quoted Adam, p.50, para. 184. οὔτε αὐτὸν ὁ Χρύσιππος ἀποφαίνει σπουδαῖον οὔτε τινὰ τῶν αὐτοῦ γνωρίμων ἢ καθηγεμόνων. τί οὖν περὶ τῶν ἄλλων φρονοῦσιν ἢ ταῦτα ἅπερ λέγουσιν; μαίνεσθαι πάντας, ἀφραίνειν, ἀνοσίους εἶναι, ἐπ' ἄκρον ἥκειν δυστυχίας, κακοδαιμονίας ἅπασης.

33. Diogenes Laertius: VII, 108. --- τὸ γονεῖς τιμᾶν, ἀδελφούς, πατρίδα, συμπεριφέρεσθαι φίλοις.

34. Ibid., VII, 128.
--- κοινωνικὸς γὰρ φύσει καὶ πρακτικός.

rather than the good of mankind as a whole, which claimed their interest. Their belief that justice had a natural basis led them to assert that the wise man should not only obey the laws, but also participate in the government which created them, sharing in community life as an act of duty.

For the Stoics, believing as they did in the absoluteness only of virtue and vice, and the indifference of all other factors, including pain and death, suicide was a justifiable course of action if supported by reason. Under stress of special external circumstances, such as incurable disease, when life could no longer be included among the preferable indifferents, death was to be chosen and, if necessary, self-inflicted. Within the limits set by reason and virtue, the Stoics normally pursued the indifferents which were preferable and rejected their opposites. However, the wise man, whose life became filled with too great a number of undesirable circumstances from which his reason showed him that he could not escape, would take his own life in accordance with his reason and as a duty. For though he did not consider pain an evil, yet he regarded it as an alternative to be rejected if freedom from pain was thereby obtainable. Moreover, death, which it was beyond his power to ward off indefinitely, was destined by nature for all men, and, in hastening death, he was acting in accordance with the ultimate natural law. If nature gave him the sign, it was his duty to agree without complaint. In such a way died Zeno who, after leaving his discussion, stumbled and broke a toe; then, "striking the ground with his fist, he spoke the line from the "Niobe" - I come; why do you call upon me ? - and died at once by suffocating himself."[35] Cleanthes likewise took his own life, after persuading himself that the illness which he had just experienced was a natural and reasonable indication that his time to die had come.

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35. Diogenes Laertius: VII, 28.
παίσας δὲ τὴν γῆν τῇ χειρί, φησὶ τὸ ἐκ τῆς Νιόβης,
ἔρχομαι· τί μ' αὐδεις;
καὶ παραχρῆμα ἐτελεύτησεν, ἀποπνίξας ἑαυτόν.

However,the Stoic attitude towards suicide,which,in many ways,was akin to the Epicurean,was,to a certain extent,incompatible with their theory that man was self-sufficient and that the virtue in his soul provided complete satisfaction and enabled him to rise above the inconveniences of pain and suffering. As their justification for suicide,the Stoics maintained that man could show wisdom and strength just as much in assenting to the indications of nature that death awaited him,as he could at other times in refraining from irrational feelings and pleasures. Here,again,virtue lay in the wisdom of his choice.

The divine fire,or world spirit of the Stoic universe,from which all things began and to which they would return,united all parts of the universe in a mutual sympathy. Man shared his essential nature, reason,in common with all mankind,and the unity of men as rational beings was stronger than the irrational divisions caused by their diversities. As a result of the physical nature of the Stoic cosmos, and in many ways influenced by recent historical trends and,in particular,by the example of Alexander the Great,Zeno was thus able to propound a cosmopolitan ideal,a world-state,free from racial prejudice, in which all men were inhabitants by virtue of their partaking of divine reason. Yet,while the Stoic cosmos was one society presided over by divine reason,true citizenship was reserved for gods and wise men alone. They were to be not merely citizens of one particular city or state,but citizens of the world,whose duty was to practise benevolence towards their less wise fellow-inhabitants. Even in the early days of Stoicism,the narrow attitude towards individual virtue was beginning to expand into a wider principle.

In spite of the lack of consistency between the three branches of Stoic philosophy,its influence among the educated classes was considerable. At a time when the limited security of the city-state had been replaced by the uneasiness arising from wider boundaries,

when the hitherto accepted standards of morality had been undermined both by prolonged warfare and by the negative, destructive criticism of some philosophies, in short, when Greece was intellectually and physically weary, the ethical teachings of Zeno supplied an urgent need. For the Stoics, a lofty ideal, even if unattainable, was preferable to a goal that was ignoble and easily reached; and, provided that their philosophy furnished a guide to morality, they were content to disregard its numerous logical inconsistencies.

In its original form, as determined by the three great founders, Stoicism was not popular among the ordinary people. Its theory of the absolute value of reason, and of virtue as the sole good, proved unacceptable to the majority, for whom, also, the perfect Stoic sage, who alone had true knowledge of every subject and was disturbed by no irrational emotions, was an impassive, even ridiculous, figure. Moreover, there was in Stoicism a certain lack of feeling, "brutish insensibility", as the Epicureans termed it,[36] which ordinary people found unpalatable. The unmitigated sternness of the Stoic wise men who were "not pitiful and made no allowance for anyone; and did not remit the penalties fixed by law, since indulgence, pity and even equity were signs of a weak mind which affected kindness instead of punishing",[37] did not appeal to the general temperament, and was strangely inconsistent with Stoic cosmopolitanism, which might have been expected to produce in its supporters a more humane attitude.

In spite of the Stoics' affirmation that man's will was free to accept or reject the laws of divine reason, the destiny which ruled their universe had a cramping effect upon their ethics and conduct. To what extent the vice or virtue of an individual depended on himself, and to what extent it was determined for him by his natural destiny,

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36. Charleton: Epicurus's Morals, p.28.

37. Diogenes Laertius: VII, 123. --- ἐλεήμονάς τε μὴ εἶναι συγγνώμην τ' ἔχειν μηδενί· μὴ γὰρ παριέναι τὰς ἐκ τοῦ νόμου ἐπιβαλλούσας κολάσεις, ἅτε τὸ γ' εἴκειν καὶ ὁ ἔλεος αὐτὴ θὴ ἐπιείκεια οὐδενειά ἐστι ψυχῆς πρὸς κολάσεις προσποιουμένης χρηστότητα.

were questions which Stoicism could not answer. Virtue was desirable not for the good which it might produce but as an end in itself,and, even if perfect virtue were obtainable,the knowledge that the world was ultimately doomed to be destroyed in the general conflagration was sufficient to dampen any enthusiasm for a virtuous life which achieved nothing on earth and which appeared to have no permanent results.

Zeno's theory of duties,and his emphasis on the importance of public activity,gave his followers a solid theoretical basis for engaging in public life. However,this alone was not sufficient to ensure the general popularity of his philosophy,which remained confined almost exclusively to the educated classes.

The effect of the illogicalities in Stoicism,however,was not to lessen its general influence among the educated Greeks,but rather to direct the interest away from its physical theory and towards its ethical and religious aspects. For Aristotle,the chief value of philosophy had resided in intellect and contemplation. For Zeno,it lay in its ability to mould man's conduct and to direct his activities,- a change of emphasis which was in keeping with the general attitude of the times. Intellectual,contemplative philosophy was possible only in a society which was comparatively untroubled by outside events. In a society whose very foundations had been shaken, and whose traditional outlook had been overturned,it was possible for the Stoics to introduce a philosophy which was chiefly concerned with the morality and well-being of individuals in their own right ,with a duty primarily to themselves as persons,rather than as citizens whose first duty was to the state. When the freshness had departed from Greek life and when living itself was a thing to be endured rather than enjoyed,the serenity of the Stoic sage,independent not only of external conditions but even of time itself,was an ideal of happiness through virtue which,while not wholly obtainable,gave man an incentive that was not completely beyond his reach.

Like Epicureanism, Stoicism as a cosmological system neither was, nor could be, proved, and its doctrines, although compiled by a logical process of thought, resulted in conclusions which human nature could not justify. Yet, notwithstanding its illogicality and the impossibility of reaching its goal of perfection, its ethical standards provided a means of practising a life that conformed with the rational spirit of the universe, and the ideal Stoic sage remained as a model of the highest type of life,- impassive perhaps, yet neither quite as brutish nor as inhuman as the opponents of Stoicism maintained.

"Quam gravis vero, quam magnifica, quam constans conficitur persona sapientis ! qui, cum ratio docuerit, quod honestum esset, id esse solum bonum, semper sit necesse est beatus vereque omnia ista nomina possideat, quae irrideri ab imperitis solent. rectius enim appellabitur rex quam Tarquinius, qui nec se nec suos regere potuit, ----------recte eius omnia dicentur, qui scit uti solus omnibus; recte etiam pulcher appellabitur (animi enim liniamenta sunt pulchriora quam corporis); recte solus liber nec dominationi cuiusquam parens nec oboediens cupiditati; recte invictus, cuius etiam si corpus constringatur, animo tamen vincula inici nulla possint.----------quod si ita est, ut neque quisquam nisi bonus vir et omnes boni beati sint, quid philosophia magis colendum aut quid est virtute divinius ?" [38]

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38. Cicero: De finibus, III, xxii, 75.

CHAPTER FOUR

Historical Development of Epicureanism and Stoicism in Rome.

"Philosophandum est paucis;nam omnino haut placet."[1] In these words was expressed the general attitude of Rome towards the new learning imported from Greece during,and after,the second Punic War.

Early in the second century before Christ,knowledge of Greek literature opened the way to the wider field of philosophy, which,at first,appeared not practical enough for the traditional Roman character. Although Ennius,whose knowledge of Greek literature had acquainted him with certain aspects of philosophy,made mention of the Epicurean theory of the indifference of the gods towards mankind,[2] his was an isolated example,and the majority of his countrymen not only remained voluntarily unaffected by Greek philosophical writings but even strove to prevent their influence from reaching the Roman youth.

With typical conservatism and a strong desire to protect the standards of the state,in 173 B.C. the Senate banished from Rome two Epicurean philosophers whom they regarded with suspicion and,at the time of the elder Cato,(161 B.C.) virtually gave impetus to the philosophic movement by decreeing that philosophers should not be permitted in Rome. In spite of the Senatorial decree,fate seemed to favour the philosophers,for,in 159B.C.,Crates,a Stoic,who came to Rome as an envoy from Attalus of Pergamum,broke his leg,and,being forced to remain in Rome during his convalescence,could not resist

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1. Ennius,apud Gellium: Noctes Atticae,V,15,9. Quoted Adam,p.56, para. 197.

2. Cicero:De Divinatione,I,58,132.

the opportunity to lecture on literature and philosophy. Four years later, an embassy consisting of three philosophers - the Peripatetic Critolaus, the Stoic Diogenes and the Academic Carneades - was sent from Athens to Rome to plead for the remission of a fine, and, during its visit, expounded its views on philosophy. "Then, immediately, those young men most fond of learning betook themselves to these envoys and observed them with attention and admiration. And especially the influence of Carneades, whose power was very great and the fame of whose power was not lacking, seized on the large, liberal audiences and, like a wind, filled the city with its sound." [3] To many Romans, however, the wind was obviously blowing in the wrong direction.

The content of these lectures and, in particular, Carneades' sceptical approach to cherished Roman conventions, whose existence, valuable as indeed it was, could be justified only by an appeal to tradition rather than dialectic, appeared to Cato as a challenge to all that was worthwhile in the Roman state. Accordingly, he advised the Senate to vote that the envoys should return home "to their own schools, and there argue with the children of Greeks, while the young Romans listened to the laws and the magistrates as before." [4] In its struggle to preserve the old by forbidding the new, the Senate had once more won the day; but its victory was short-lived, for the seeds of philosophy had been scattered and the plants were already appearing. Within two hundred years, a philosopher was to be prime minister, and, less than a century later still, the emperor himself was to be a professed adherent of a philosophic school.

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3. Plutarch: Cato Maior, XXII, 2. εὐθὺς οὖν οἱ φιλολογώτατοι τῶν νεανίσκων ἐπὶ τοὺς ἄνδρας ἦντο καὶ συνῆσαν ἀκροώμενοι καὶ θαυμάζοντες αὐτούς· μάλιστα δ' ἡ Καρνεάδου χάρις ἧς δύναμίς τε πλείστη καὶ δόξα τῆς δυνάμεως οὐκ ἀποδέουσα, μεγάλων ἐπιλαβομένη καὶ φιλανθρώπων ἀκροατηρίων ὡς πνεῦμα τὴν πόλιν ἠχῆς ἐνέπλησε.

4. Ibid. ---- περὶ τῆς πρεσβείας, ὅπως οὗτοι μὲν ἐπὶ τὰς σχολὰς τρεπόμενοι διαλέγωνται παισὶν Ἑλλήνων, οἱ δὲ Ῥωμαίων νέοι τῶν νόμων καὶ τῶν ἀρχόντων ὡς πρότερον ἀκούωσι.

Meanwhile, in Greece, the two philosophies, Epicurean and Stoic, had continued to flourish along their own particular lines.

After the death of Epicurus in 270 B.C., the leadership of his school had passed to his disciple, Metrodorus, and, later, to Colotes, both faithful adherents of the rigid doctrines laid down by their master, and both concerned more with polemic writings against other schools than with revision of their own theories. Throughout its six centuries of existence, in fact, Epicureanism remained constant to the basic system propounded by Epicurus, showing no trace of the flexibility, or the tendency towards modification and development, which was a feature of both the later Stoic and Academic schools of thought.

In Athens, towards the end of the second century, Apollodorus, probably the most learned of the Epicureans and a writer on varied subjects, assumed the leadership of the school. He was succeeded by his pupil, Zeno of Sidon, whose lectures Cicero attended in 79 B.C.. Zeno, in turn, passed on the leadership to his pupil, the Athenian-born Phaedrus, who previously had lectured in Rome in 88 B.C., and had instructed Cicero, when a young man, in the precepts of Epicureanism.[5] Though unsuccessful in convincing his pupil of the truth of his doctrines, Phaedrus at least earned his respect, for his character if not for his theories, towards which Cicero's dislike was too fundamental and deep-rooted to be overcome by any amount of personal admiration.

Only fifty years after the Senatorial ban on philosophers, not only were Greek Epicureans lecturing in Rome, but also Roman citizens were visiting Athens to study and even practise Epicurean ideals. That Cato's hopes should have had such unexpected results was not entirely due to the continued growth of Epicureanism in Greece, nor even to the lectures and discussions of visiting teachers, important though these undoubtedly were, but rather to the writings of several Roman authors, who aimed to popularize the doctrines of their school by offering them to their fellow-citizens in their own language.

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5. De Finibus, I, 16.

Earliest among these writers was Amafinius,an older contemporary of Cicero,whose published treatises gave his readers their first written introduction in Latin to Epicurean philosophy. At a time when the Peripatetics and Academics had little to say to Roman audiences, "C. Amafinius exstitit dicens,cuius libris editis commota multitudo se ad eam potissimum disciplinam,sive quod erat cognitu perfacilis, sive quod invitabantur inlecebris blandis voluptatis,sive etiam,quia nihil erat prolatum melius,illud,quod erat,tenebat." [6.]

The influence of Amafinius' writings was supplemented by the literary works of Philodemus,a native of Gadara in Palestine, who came to Rome about 75 B.C.. His friendship and connections with the family of Piso enabled him to influence many young students of literature and philosophy and,at the same time,his systematic treatment of Epicureanism served to make its popularity even more widespread.

In the writings of Amafinius and Philodemus,Roman readers were given the opportunity of studying for the first time in their own language the doctrines propounded by the Greek Epicurus. It remained for Lucretius,"the noblest mind among all Roman thinkers", [7.] to set the seal on their work and,in his poetic exposition of the Epicurean beliefs,to invest the doctrines of the school with an intensity of feeling of which Epicurus himself would have been incapable.

Born about 98 B.C., [8.] Lucretius lived through troubled times in Rome. During his short lifetime,the names of Marius,Sulla,Cinna and Catiline had made an unforgettable impression,while,at the time of his death in 55 B.C.,the terrorism of Clodius was at its height. Though Rome was still a virile nation,to Lucretius,whose poetic sensibilities gave him an instinctive dislike of war and its horrors,the disturbances of civil war and rioting appeared as the first signs of

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6. Cicero: Tusculanae Disputationes,IV,3,6.
7. W.Warde Fowler: The Religious Experience of the Roman People,p.358.
8. The exact dates of Lucretius' birth and death are uncertain.

national decadence. Furthermore, the increasing barrenness of the Italian country had convinced him that the earth itself was already worn out and the end of the world was near. For one with this conviction, daily accustomed to the familiar sights of warfare and death, any belief in the continual moral progress of the world was impossible. Man's peace of mind could be attained only by withdrawing from normal activities and accepting a philosophical doctrine which would enable him, in spite of the terrors of his day, to cast out fear from his mind. In this search for tranquillity, Epicureanism provided a perfect guide.

In his attempt to find peace of mind by disregarding contemporary events, and in his temperament generally, Lucretius belonged to a later age, in which the contemplative withdrawal from public life and the search for inward peace were more widely justified. In his own time, however, the doctrines of Epicurus, even though interpreted with the earnestness of a reformer and the sensibilities of a poet, seemed lacking in realism. Yet, by his fervent desire to show to others the way of peace and tranquillity, he revealed an enthusiasm for humanity far in excess of the hopelessness of the future which his writings implied.

It was the fervour of Lucretius' poetry which led later writers, perhaps in compensation for their own lack of appreciation of his poetic genius, to build up around him a tradition of insanity, declaring that he, "having been driven mad by a love potion, wrote several books in his lucid intervals" - "T. Lucretius poeta nascitur, qui postea amatorio poculo in furorem versus, cum aliquot libros per intervalla insaniae conscripsisset ----------". [9] To set out a Greek philosophical system in Latin, with so few examples in his native language to serve as guides, was, as Lucretius himself realized, no mean task -" nec me animi fallit Graiorum obscura reperta difficile inlustrare Latinis versibus esse"; (I,136-7) to interpret that system in poetic form was even more difficult; and the fact that Lucretius succeeded in explaining the doctrines of

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9. Jerome; quoted Masson; T. Lucretius, Epicurean and Poet (1909), p.5.

Epicurus not merely in Latin,but in very readable Latin poetry,was proof not of insanity but of genius.

Lucretius' poem, "De Rerum Natura", provided perhaps the best example of the ability of Roman writers to interpret and mould into an organic whole a system of learning assimilated from a non - Roman source. The atomism of Epicurus,which Lucretius expounded, provided a theory in terms of which all nature,history,life and civilization could be explained; in Lucretius' eyes,it was the answer to the riddle of the universe. His acceptance of this theory,however,was neither hasty nor unconsidered,for,included in his studies in philosophy,were the writings of the pre-Socratics,Heraclitus,Anaxagoras,Democritus and,in particular,Empedocles,whose didactic poem - "On Nature" (Περὶ Φύσεως) - served as a model for his own "De Rerum Natura". Yet it was Epicurus alone who earned his undying respect and admiration.

> " Humana ante oculos foede cum vita iaceret
> in terris oppressa gravi sub religione
> quae caput a caeli regionibus ostendebat
> horribili super aspectu mortalibus instans,
> primum Graius homo mortalis tollere contra
> est oculos ausus primusque obsistere contra." (I,62-67)

In these words,Lucretius revealed the reason for his reverence towards Epicurus,the first to oppose the oppressive and limiting religion of his day. At the time when Lucretius was writing,the official mythology (religio) of Rome had become a highly-developed,superstitious system,retained mainly as a political expedient. Among the cultured classes,belief in the traditional gods was fast disappearing,and,while the practices of divination and augury and the performance of propitiatory sacrifices remained as essential parts of the state religion, many new forms of worship were being introduced from the East. Both in the new kinds of worship and in the old superstition,Lucretius saw nothing but an overwhelming fear - fear of retribution from an offended divinity,and fear of punishment after death. Deeply conscious of the evil influence of superstition -" tantum religio potuit

suadere malorum " (I,101) -he regarded his atomistic philosophy,with its freedom from divine interference and eternal life,as a gospel for mankind,belief in which would scatter the dark terrors of the mind.

With this conviction,Lucretius set out to interpret for Roman minds the one theory which,he believed,was capable of providing them with true freedom. In his hands,Epicureanism,though fundamentally unaltered in doctrine,assumed a significance of purpose envisaged neither by its founder nor,indeed,by the majority of its adherents; for the earnestness of Lucretius was scarcely compatible with the Epicurean ideal state of freedom from disturbance. In the "De Rerum Natura",which furnished an accurate account of Epicurean physics and ethics,the written exposition of Epicureanism in Rome attained its highest peak.

As a philosophical work,Lucretius' poem added little to the doctrines of the system propounded by Epicurus. Concerning himself mainly with the physical aspect of the atomic theory,Lucretius gave a full and exact interpretation of the laws of nature,introducing ethical discussions merely as digressions from his main theme. His task was not to moralize but to expound. While Epicurus had valued a knowledge of natural laws only for its importance in the ethical sphere,Lucretius' interest in nature was deeper and more philosophic. He was concerned not merely with man's conduct,but with his relationship to the universe as a whole. From the world of nature he drew numerous and well-chosen examples to illustrate the bare facts of Epicurean philosophy, - facts which he stated with all the exactness of an admiring pupil. While pupil and master both dealt with essentially similar subject-matter,the scientific ethics of the Greek philosopher and the poetical physics of his Roman interpreter produced quite different effects.

Epicurus was fortunate in having a scientific imagination which far outstripped that of his contemporaries. His keen insight into natural law,together with his grasp of scientific principles,

enabled him to formulate a theory of the world which commanded the minds not only of his immediate disciples but also of philosophers many centuries later. Yet,in his presentation of this theory,there were lacking the poetic warmth and virile tone which Lucretius was able to provide. Pictorially,in the wealth of the illustrations supplied to amplify each step of the physical theory,the pupil far outshone his teacher. The atom-world of Epicurus,rather cold and colourless,appealed to the intellect; but it was the poetic grandeur of Lucretius' world which stirred the imagination. The "wretched minds and blind hearts" (II,14) of those whom he was striving to help could not fail to have been moved by his descriptions and,perhaps, to have found,in his concrete illustrations, proofs more convincing than Epicurus' abstract conclusions.

"Nullam rem e nilo gigni" (I,150)[10]. - every event had a natural cause. With this as his first principle,Lucretius commenced his task of setting out the atomic theory,tracing its development from the existence of unlimited,indestructible particles to the formation of the universe. In the first two books of his poem,he not only stated,but also amplified with diverse examples,the physical laws of Epicurus; indestructibility of matter (I,216),existence of atoms and void (I,330),properties of atoms (I,483-634),their movements and shapes (II,62),their declination (II,216),the growth and decay of the worlds (II,1048) - all found a place in his discussion of the theory which he had so willingly accepted. In his visual,rather than logical,mind,not syllogistic arguments but every familiar sight provided illustrations of the doctrine he had taken it upon himself to expound; and,conversely,essential details of each phase of his theory were deduced from the characteristics of existing objects which he had seen and observed. Few better illustrations could have been found to prove the existence of motion in atoms forming objects

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10. Compare Chapter Two,p.18.

seemingly at rest than his description of the motes tossing in the path of an apparently motionless sunbeam (II,114-120) and of the woolly flocks which,though gambolling on the grass,appeared from a distance to be just a white mass on the green hillside :

> "nam saepe in colli tondentes pabula laeta
> lanigerae reptant pecudes quo quamque vocantes
> invitant herbae gemmantes rore recenti,
> et satiati agni ludunt blandeque coruscant;
> omnia quae nobis longe confusa videntur
> et velut in viridi candor consistere colli." (II,317-322)

In lines such as these,Lucretius made his greatest contribution to the Epicurean theory,adorning his master's doctrine with a wealth of imagery derived from his keen observation of nature. To him primarily as an Epicurean philosopher,nature was the constant natural law,perhaps a form of energy,by virtue of which atoms and void existed and worlds were created without divine interference; but,at times, when the voice of the poet superseded that of the philosopher,nature appeared in all its grandeur as the "daedala rerum" (V,234) and "creatrix" (V,1362),manifest in innumerable diverse ways.

Having established the main tenets of his theory,Lucretius proceeded to trace its application to the soul and body,giving numerous proofs of man's mortality and urging him,for that reason,to have no fear of death or of any future life; "hic Acherusia fit stultorum denique vita" (III,1023). Fools might make their own lives a Hell by continually fearing the punishments of Tartarus,but the wise man,having learned the cause of things,would not dread death but would rather welcome it,knowing that many famous men,even Epicurus himself, had died before.

In his disproportionate assumption that the minds of his contemporaries were thus obsessed with the fear of death,Lucretius was again following Epicurus,in whose day the fear of death was more real and the punishments of a future life more widely accepted. Though an element of such a belief existed in Lucretius' own time,he exaggerated the terrors felt by his fellow-countrymen and,in his fervent desire to free men from all the superstition of traditional religion,

failed to see the need for adapting his master's beliefs in this matter to the different conditions existing in his own country. Nevertheless,it was inevitable that any attack on ritualistic superstition should be aimed both at the gods who interfered with the actions of human beings during their lifetime and at those who meted out punishment to the dead. Freedom from fear could be attained only by rejecting the traditional gods in their entirety,which,of necessity,involved the overthrow of the deities of the underworld,as well as of the earth. Even though Lucretius over-estimated the contemporary fear of death which,to him personally,was very real,he replaced the traditional beliefs with a far finer conception of religion - the conviction that man,receiving from the atom-images of the gods something of their tranquillity and peace,could live a life more worthy of the gods; truly a nobler attitude than the acceptance of a religion which "gave birth to wicked and unholy deeds" - "religio peperit scelerosa atque impia facta". (I,83)

Just as Epicurus had dealt with philosophy in three sections, physical,canonic and ethical,so too Lucretius,having expounded the physical aspect,proceeded in the fourth book of his poem to account for sensation and knowledge. In this sphere also,his contribution lay not so much in his doctrines as in his proofs,for example,his use of the familiar scene of a theatre,whose canvas awnings deflected their colours on to the people seated below,to illustrate the manner in which the surface of every object gave off its thin atom-images:

> "ergo lintea de summo cum corpore fucum
> mittunt,effigias quoque debent mittere tenvis
> res quaeque,ex summo quoniam iaculantur utraque." (IV,84-86)

On the whole,his theory of knowledge through sensation,by means of images which entered the pores of the appropriate sense-organs,added nothing to that already postulated by Epicurus and,like it,was unable to explain completely the origin of sound,colour or consciousness.

While the atomic theory provided a reasonable explanation of the substances from which objects were formed,in spite of the

eloquence of Lucretius it gave no satisfactory account of how the world was created;

> "nam certe neque consilio primordia rerum
> ordine se suo quaeque sagaci mente locarunt
> ---
> propterea fit uti magnum vulgata per aevum
> omne genus coetus et motus experiundo
> tandem conveniant ea quae convecta repente
> magnarum rerum fiunt exordia saepe,
> terrai maris et caeli generisque animantum." (V,419-420, 427-431)

Between the innumerable atoms moving in space and the created world formed from them was a wide gap which the haphazard trial and error method of infinite atom-combinations could not bridge.

It was to Lucretius' credit, however, that he did not merely state, but attempted to prove, the theory which had convinced him. Believing, as he did, that the world had arisen when the atoms, after trying an infinite number of combinations, had at last found the one which was the most suitable, he related this experimental process to the existence of animal-life as well, and, in so doing, produced the first theory of evolution. In order to find the most suitable animal-form, nature had created every possible shape - some without feet, hands or eyes,

> "orba pedum partim, manuum viduata vicissim,
> muta sine ora etiam, sine vultu caeca reperta," (V,840-1)

misshapen monsters, doomed to perish, others capable of preserving their kind. Among the latter was the human form, whose strength of bone and muscle enabled it to survive. In Lucretius, the doctrine of the survival of the fittest found its first champion, and, in his account of the gradual growth of civilization, his scientific imagination anticipated by nearly two thousand years the course that future science was to follow. Disregarding the widespread belief that the world, created by an omnipotent power, could not be imperfect in its origin and that man, fashioned by the divinity, was therefore incapable of improvement, he took his place among the comparatively rare thinkers of antiquity who believed in man's continual progress from primitive

chaos to civilization. The defects of the universe -"tanta stat praedita culpa" (II,181) - were sufficient to convince him that no divine power had been responsible for creating the world; and a belief in the development of humanity was a necessary consequence of the theory that the world was created spontaneously, of its own accord.

As a scientific philosopher, convinced that a knowledge of the laws of nature was sufficient to bring men happiness, Lucretius was primarily concerned with expounding Epicurus' physical doctrines. Unlike his master, or, perhaps, assuming that a knowledge of nature was the first essential, in regard to which all theories of living and conduct were merely derivative, he seemed to regard as unnecessary an interpretation of ethical standards based on physical theory. Nevertheless, although the Epicurean search for happiness and tranquillity was seldom explicitly stated in his writings, from time to time there emerged references to "dux vitae dia voluptas" (II,172) and to the tranquillity of mind to be found in withdrawal from the dangers of life, "because it is pleasant to see what evils you yourself are escaping" - "sed quibus ipse malis careas quia cernere suave est" (II,4).

Without placing Epicurus' emphasis on ethics, Lucretius incorporated into his writings his master's doctrine of desires, (II, 16-55), his view of friendship as, originally, a necessary and utilitarian compact between neighbours (V,1019-20), and, above all, his insistence on the folly of allowing vain, ambitious strivings to rule man's mind. Yet, for all his theory of pleasure and withdrawal from public affairs, at times Lucretius' Roman character prevented him from subscribing completely to the Epicurean ideals, and the very tradition in which he lived infused into his work some of its own moral strength. The greatness of his poem lay in his enthusiasm for humanity and his depth of feeling, which gave to the Epicurean philosophy all the moral fervour of a religion. With the zeal of a missionary, he set out his theory, to free mankind from the fear of death and the limitations of

superstition. This feeling for humanity oppressed by religion was a new development of the theory originally set out by Epicurus, whose teachings, directed mainly to the limited number of wise men, seemed narrow by comparison.

Yet the growth of Epicureanism after its founder's death revealed no change in the doctrines of the school, and Lucretius himself, in spite of his subordination of the ethical to the physical aspect, had made no alteration to the original beliefs of the sect. "He wanted his poem to be an instructive work. He liked the doctrine for itself, as he took it from the master who revealed it to him, and whom he followed with the humble and precise devotion of the faithful for his god." [11] During its six hundred years of existence, in fact, the school of Epicurus remained faithful to the dogmas of its master.

Although Epicureanism continued to exist in Rome, and in Naples where it had a stronghold, until about 400 A.D., it had reached its peak with the writings of Lucretius. In his time, as the predominant creed among the Roman ruling classes, it influenced many distinguished people, and, centuries later, was destined to have a far-reaching effect on philosophers of other nations.

Compared with the development of Epicureanism, the growth of Stoicism after Chrysippus was more flexible and less rigid. While the Stoics produced nothing to equal the writings of Lucretius, the number of their distinguished teachers far exceeded that of the Epicurean school. Among the leaders of the early Stoa in Athens were included two disciples of Chrysippus - Zeno of Tarsus and Diogenes the Babylonian. Of Diogenes' pupils, Antipater of Tarsus succeeded him in the leadership from 150 to 129 B.C., while Archedemus of Tarsus and Boethius of Sidon were both prominent members of the school.

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11. Ernout and Robin: Lucrèce, de la Nature; "Lucrèce, lui, veut faire oeuvre d'enseignement. Il aime la doctrine pour elle-même, comme il est épris du maître qui la lui a révélée et qu'il suit avec la dévotion humble et scrupuleuse du fidèle pour son dieu." P.XIV, Introduction.

Under the attacks made against Stoic dogmatism by the Academicians, even the early members of the school felt the need for modifying part of the strict doctrine laid down by the founders. Thus, while Zeno of Tarsus and Diogenes had suspended their judgment on the question of the physical doctrine of the general conflagration, Boethius denied it completely and asserted a belief in the indestructibility of the world.[12] In the ethical sphere also, the abstract idealism of Zeno and Chrysippus was giving way to a more practical standard which would better conform with the requirements of ordinary life. The ideal Stoic sage was becoming less perfect, but, by the same token, more human. In its ability to modify its doctrine to suit the practical needs of man, Stoicism showed a vitality and a freedom of interpretation which was lacking in Epicureanism.

This tendency to depart from the orthodoxy of the older Stoics was due in no small measure to the contact with the Roman world, in which practical philosophy took precedence over theoretical speculation. It was in its modified form that Stoicism eventually made an appearance in Rome.

The "middle Stoa", as it was called during the transition period, had for its leaders Panaetius and Posidonius, both of whom were instrumental in spreading Stoic beliefs. Although the first philosophers to arrive in Rome had been Epicureans, it was the Stoics whose teachings first became well-known; for, almost eighty years before Lucretius, Panaetius was expounding to Scipio and his friends the main tenets of the Stoic school.

Born in Rhodes about 185 B.C., Panaetius first learned of Stoicism from his father, Nicagoras, himself a Stoic philosopher. Having attended the lectures of Crates at Pergamum - the same Crates who later was to visit Rome as an envoy - he then proceeded to Athens, where he became a pupil of Diogenes, at that time head of the Stoa, and, later, of his successor, Antipater. In 144 B.C., influenced no

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12. Philo: De Incorruptibilitate Mundi, 497; quoted Adam, p. 61, para. 216.

doubt by Diogenes,who had visited Rome on an embassy some ten years previously,Panaetius went to Rome where he joined the Scipionic circle - an educated,literary group under the leadership of Scipio Aemilianus and Gaius Laelius. Among the members of this intellectual coterie, Panaetius became the recognised teacher of philosophy. After accompanying Scipio to the eastern Mediterranean in 141 B.C.,he lived alternately at Rome or Athens until Scipio's death in 129 B.C. Thereafter residing permanently in Athens,he succeeded Antipater as head of the Stoa,a position which he held until his death,twenty years later. Though his visits to Rome had occupied only a small portion of his life,among the Romans his influence as a Stoic philosopher was considerable. In his work was seen for the first time a conscious attempt to adapt Greek philosophy to the needs of the very different Roman character.

Himself an eclectic,Panaetius preferred not so much to maintain the rigid doctrines set out by Chrysippus as to incorporate into his Stoicism the theories of other philosophic schools. In the physical sphere,following Boethius,he rejected the idea of a general conflagration in which the entire world would be destroyed,and adopted from the Peripatetics the doctrine that the universe was eternal.[13.] As a natural result of this,the belief in limited immortality granted to the souls of the wise until the world-conflagration was replaced by that in eternal immortality,in accepting which Panaetius not only followed Plato but also tried to meet the claims of the human heart. Disregarding to a certain extent the belief that all parts of the universe were connected in a mutual sympathy,he queried the value of astrology and divination,[14.] which the early Stoics,in keeping with their philosophical determinism,had rigidly supported. "Nec tamen ausus est negare vim esse divinandi,sed dubitare se dixit."[15.]

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13. Diogenes Laertius: VII,142. Παναίτιος δ' ἀΐδιον ἀπεφήνατο τὸν κόσμον.
14. Ibid.,VII,149.
15. Cicero: De Divinatione,I,3,6.

Since his philosophy taught him that divine reason was the spirit of the universe,he rejected the gods of popular mythology. His feeling for statesmanship,however,compelled him to make some concessions and to grant to the traditional gods a place in the state as senior citizens. Though his philosophy maintained that immanent reason, the basis of personal virtue,was the common link joining mankind to one another and to the gods,his essentially practical nature could not fail to realize the political value of mob superstition arising from belief in the traditional gods. Such a compromise was typical of the course to be followed by Stoicism as it developed in Rome.

In spite of Panaetius' disagreement with some of the most fundamental of Stoic physical doctrines,in his ethical teachings he supported his predecessors in maintaining that man was a part of the world-soul and that his duty lay in co-operating with the spirit of the universe. Yet he could not accept the harsh doctrine of perfect virtue and complete indifference to external goods or fortune. With his more human outlook,he modified this unattainable goal,making progress towards wisdom and virtue his aim and regarding as aids to progress the formerly indifferent properties of health and wealth. Both he and his successor,Posidonius, "denied that virtue was self-sufficing and maintained,on the contrary,that health was necessary, as also were some means of living,and strength."[16] This rejection of the theory that moral progress which did not result in complete wisdom was of no account and that in virtue or vice there were no degrees was characteristic of the transition period of Stoicism,in which the earlier abstract ideas of perfection and wisdom gave way to the active virtues of magnanimity and kindness attainable by the ordinary man. During this time,Stoicism,although less idealistic,

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16. Diogenes Laertius: VII,128. ὁ μέντοι Παναίτιος καὶ Ποσειδώνιος οὐκ αὐτάρκη λέγουσι τὴν ἀρετήν, ἀλλὰ χρείαν εἶναί φασι καὶ ὑγιείας καὶ χορηγίας καὶ ἰσχύος.

became more human. The ideal of the austere and passionless sage, who alone could perform perfect actions, was transformed into the pattern of the good man, attending to his duties and aiming, as far as possible, at the rational perfection of his own individual nature - an aim far more within the capabilities of human achievement.

While retaining Zeno's division of virtue into wisdom, temperance, courage and justice, Panaetius followed Aristotle in regarding each virtue not as complete in itself but as a mean between two extremes. Temperance was a mean between asceticism and the gratification of desires, wisdom lay between hasty judgment and wasting time on unprofitable studies unrelated to practical life. "The severer Stoicism of the old school was mixed with the doctrines of Plato and Aristotle, and watered down to suit the respectable characteristics of the Roman gentleman." [17.]

By adapting Stoic theory to suit its new surroundings, Panaetius laid down the lines which the future development of Roman Stoicism was to take. It remained for his pupil, Posidonius, to consolidate his teachings.

Posidonius was born at Apamea, in Syria, about 135B.C. After studying philosophy at Athens under Panaetius, whom he succeeded as leader of the Stoa in 109, he settled at Rhodes and there established his school. Like Crates and Diogenes, he made his first visit to Rome for political, rather than philosophical, reasons, being sent there in 87 B.C. on behalf of the Rhodians, to appease Marius. [18.] After his return to Rhodes, he included among his pupils Cicero, who, in 78B.C., attended his lectures and was deeply influenced by his teachings. The extent of his fame was shown by Strabo's reference to "Posidonius, the Stoic, the most learned of our contemporary philosophers", [19.] and, in Cicero's account of Pompey's meeting in 63 B.C. with "noster

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17. Cambridge Ancient History, Vol. VIII, p.462.
18. Oxford Classical Dictionary, p.722.
19. Strabo: XVI,2,10. Quoted Adam, p.61, para.221.
Ποσειδώνιος ὁ Στωικός, ἀνὴρ τῶν καθ' ἡμᾶς φιλοσόφων πολυμαθέστατος.

Posidonius",his Stoic character was revealed. For,although grievously ill,he could not refuse to see the great man who had visited him and,discussing at length with Pompey the question of the honourable as the only good,he overcame his pain with true Stoic indifference :"Nihil,agis,dolor ! quamvis sis molestus,numquam te esse confitebor malum."[20.]

Posidonius was the last of the Stoic leaders to take as the basis of his philosophy the physical rather than ethical aspect. In this respect,he followed in the steps of the Stoic founders and of Panaetius,but,unlike his master,he reverted to many of the original Stoic doctrines which Panaetius had revised. Disregarding his master's views on the indestructibility of matter,Posidonius reaffirmed the doctrine of the general conflagration and maintained that the "world was one and finite". [21.] As a logical consequence of this belief,he rejected Panaetius' views on immortality,and returned to the early Stoic doctrine of relative immortality until the next conflagration. To prevent the growth of a sense of futility as a result of this doctrine,and,perhaps,as an incentive to moral progress,he declared that,although hell did not exist,the souls of the wicked, being muddied with sin,could not rise as far as the wise souls of the good,which returned to the upper air to the divine reason with which they were akin.

Believing,as he did,that "all things happened by fate or destiny",[22.] Posidonius did not share Panaetius' scepticism concerning divination,but agreed with Chrysippus that the science of divination gave valuable indications of future events,and that omens and portents were provided by the divine providence to instruct rational beings in what had been ordained for them. He again differed from his teacher in his attitude towards the mythological divinities,

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20. Cicero: Tusc.Disp.,II,25,61.
21. Diogenes Laertius:VII,140. ἕνα τὸν κόσμον εἶναι καὶ τοῦτον πεπερασμένον.
22. Ibid.,VII,149. καθ' εἱμαρμένην δέ φασι τὰ πάντα γίγνεσθαι Χρύσιππος ---- καὶ Ποσειδώνιος.

which he regarded not as opposed,but complementary ,to the divine rational spirit of the universe. Whereas,from a philosophical viewpoint,Panaetius had disclaimed the popular gods,Posidonius retained them,seeing in their various attributes different manifestations of the one supreme being. Though his attempt to reconcile Stoic theology with popular religion was unsatisfactory,for no satisfactory agreement could be made between two such irreconcilable beliefs,in his physical teachings the Romans found a defence not only of their traditional polytheism but also of their widespread use of augury and oracles.

Posidonius agreed with Chrysippus in taking for the basic fact of Stoic physics the existence of the active and passive principles - divine reason and substance without quality - which underlay the formation of the cosmos.[23] Because of the intervention of divine reason in shaping the world,there existed in nature a unity and a sympathy between all parts of the universe. Man's soul,a particle of divine reason,had a natural harmony with the world-soul,and, in following the aim of "life in agreement with nature",man could find a religious sanction for his conduct.

It was with the ethical,rather than physical,aspect of Stoic doctrine that the Romans were most concerned,and,in this sphere, Posidonius interpreted his theories much more freely. His conservative treatment of Stoic physics was more than balanced by his comprehensive adaptation of ethical doctrines. In spite of his lack of agreement with Panaetius on physical questions,in the ethical sphere he was deeply indebted to his master and,like him,aimed to give Stoic ethics a practical basis.

Rejecting the early Stoic view that the mind,in exercising rational choices,should suppress all emotions as being irrational impulses caused by wrong judgments,Posidonius agreed with Plato in acknowledging the existence of an emotional part of the soul. By his acceptance of the Platonic division of the soul into three parts -

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23. Compare Diogenes Laertius: VII,134.

rational,emotional and appetitive - he made the Stoic ethics more human. In order to achieve wisdom and virtue,man was no longer obliged to eradicate his emotions but rather to keep them under control. In Posidonius' application of Stoicism to ordinary life,he emphasized the importance of political activity,regarding participation in political life as a duty to be fulfilled,like any moral duty,by those who were aiming at progress in wisdom and virtue.

Not only philosophy,but also geography and history,claimed Posidonius' attention. In particular,his historical writings contained details of the practical application of his philosophical theory. Just as there existed in the upper air a type of community, presided over by divine reason,to which the souls of the wise -such as deserving statesmen and philosophers - were admitted after death, so, on earth,was this commonwealth of god reflected in the commonwealth of mankind,embodied in the growing strength of Roman domination. This ability to bring current affairs within the scope of a single philosophy was Posidonius' outstanding characteristic.

The three founders of Stoicism had proposed an inhuman,unattainable ideal of perfect wisdom and virtue,which,however,was more or less compatible with their physical theory. During the middle period of Stoicism,Panaetius and Posidonius had introduced the doctrines to Rome and,under Roman influence,had revised the original theories and brought their ethical aims more within the reach of the ordinary man. It remained for the Roman leaders of the later period of Stoicism to complete the cycle by giving prominence to Stoic ethics, at the cost of the physical theory in which,as Romans,they had little interest.

In his philosophical writings,Cicero owed a considerable debt to Stoicism and,above all,to the teachings of Posidonius, - a debt which he,in turn,repaid by preserving for mankind the doctrines from which he drew his inspiration. Yet Cicero himself was not a professing Stoic but a member of the New Academy,an eclectic,whose philosophy was derived from many different sources. While he

interpreted the current philosophies of his day,he added nothing to their doctrines; it was not until the following century that,in the writings of Seneca, Roman Stoicism entered upon the final period of its development.

In spite of the differences in the political natures of Greece after Chaeronea (338B.C.) and Rome at the time of Seneca (c.60A.D.), the philosophical outlook of both nations at these times bore a marked similarity. The destruction of the Greek city-state resulted in an uneasiness,an uncertainty for the future,which found a parallel in the anxiety felt by Roman minds in the age of Caligula and Nero. At such times,philosophy tended to become a religion,rather than a science,and to provide men not so much with an explanation of life as with a consolation for living. In this respect,as also in their respective support of typical Greek and Roman traditions, Zeno and Seneca had much in common; both were concerned with philosophy as a guide to conduct and,just as Zeno,a native of Cyprus,introduced into his philosophy the scientific traditions of his adopted Greece,so the Spanish-born Seneca,in keeping with the general attitude of Rome,paid little attention to Stoic physics,but concentrated mainly on its practical,ethical aspect. In rebellion against the self-indulgence of the Emperors,Seneca found,in Stoicism,a theory which would enable man, through the acquisition of wisdom and virtue,to become independent of external circumstances. The lack of connection between Seneca's precepts and practices,however,was proof that,whatever his true beliefs may have been,Stoic philosophy was for him a way of escape from the conditions which he disliked,but in which he was compelled to acquiesce. Though his political position as tutor to Nero and,later, as his minister,forced him into situations unpleasing to his moral sense,this sense was fully revealed in his philosophical writings which,filled as they were with admirable precepts,gave him a place as one of the leading exponents of Stoic morality.

If Seneca's better self was not always apparent in his actions, his letters did not show him to be lacking in conscience,and,despite

the inconsistency of his position,the man who wrote: "Quid est praecipuum? ---- quidquid acciderit,sic ferre,quasi volueris tibi accidere. Debuisses enim velle,si scisses omnia ex decreto dei fieri",[24] was maintaining the best ethical traditions of the Stoic philosophers.

Unlike the early Stoics,however,Seneca had little time for that aspect of his philosophy which dealt with logical criteria. He opposed both the teachers who taught methods of argument rather than conduct and the pupils who,in aiming to train their wits rather than their minds,turned philosophy into philology.[25] In physics,he adopted the general Stoic doctrine of the conflagration and the destruction of the universe,and he obviously accepted the rule of fate in the world;

> " ---------- moles pulcherrima caeli
> Ardebit flammis tota repente suis.
> Omnia mors poscit. Lex est,non poena perire;
> Hic aliquo mundus tempore nullus erit ." [26]

Even the wills of the gods were "determined and fixed,and carried out by a great and everlasting necessity" - "rata et fixa sunt et magna atque aeterna necessitate ducuntur." [27] For this reason,and with typical Roman realism,he condemned as useless and unnecessary the art of astrology and the knowledge of the heavens,on which the early Stoics had placed such importance. In the same way,he disapproved of the practice of divination. Though not,like Panaetius,doubting the existence of divination,he saw no value in knowing beforehand what was destined to happen in any case. "Per statas vices remeant et effectus rerum omnium aut movent aut notant. Sed sive quicquid evenit faciunt, quid immutabilis rei notitia proficiet? Sive significant,quid refert providere quod effugere non possis? Scias ista,nescias: fient." [28] Following in the steps of his Stoic predecessors by believing in determinism,he asserted that,since all things were governed by fate, virtue and wisdom consisted in making one's will accord cheerfully with what nature demanded; "puta nolle te sequi: duceris." [29] Even in

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24. Naturales Quaestiones :III,praefatio 10-17.Quoted Adam,para.232,p.65.
25. Compare Epis.108,para.7.
26. Oxford Book of Latin Verse,no.232,p.278.
27. Ep.77,12.
28. Ep.88,15.
29. Ep.77,15.

Seneca's time,the Stoic paradox of the co-existence of free-will and determinism still remained.

In his view of the divinity,however,while theoretically accepting the material,rational fire of the early Stoics,in practice Seneca regarded god as transcending matter,as a deity with the attributes of a personal,rather than a purely material,being. Just as Zeno's original doctrine of the Ideal Sage had been modified by Stoics of the middle period,so too,with Seneca and the later Stoics,the abstract idea of an impersonal,fiery breath was replaced by the more human conception of a personal deity.

Seneca's philosophy was intensely practical,having for its aim the reformation of morals. Like Panaetius and Posidonius rejecting the idea of a sudden conversion from complete vice to perfect virtue,he made the pursuit of virtue his goal,regarding his philosophy as providing the means of progress towards wisdom and away from folly. More human than Zeno in his approach to conduct,and realising that even the wise man who had made a considerable advance in his progress towards virtue would be beset by pitfalls from which his reason alone could not save him,he advocated and,indeed,practised,a simple life, bordering on asceticism. Perhaps in a reaction against the excesses of his time,he urged the wise man to occupy himself with the concerns of the mind,rather than of the body -"ideo vir magnus ac prudens animum diducit a corpore et multum cum meliore ac divina parte versatur,cum hac querula et fragili quantum necesse est." [30] Though he did not accept the old Stoic theory that emotions were weaknesses to be eradicated,he stressed the need for their control : "quid enim prodest equum regere et cursum eius freno temperare,adfectibus effrenatissimis abstrahi? quid prodest multos vincere luctatione vel caestu,ab iracundia vinci?" [31] In an age of excess and indulgence,Seneca was one of the few men to retain some ideals and to practise self-discipline.

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30. Ep.78,10.
31. Ep.88,19.

Typically Roman was his insistence on practice as the only way of acquiring virtue and wisdom. It was not enough merely to know what was right; virtue lay in action, in overcoming one's own faults and pardoning those of others. Unlike the early exponents of the Stoic creed, who regarded the mass of mankind as too irrational and vicious to be saved by philosophy, Seneca recognised that he himself, far removed from wisdom as he was, was typical of humanity in common, and that, if Stoicism, by its insistence on inner virtue, could help him in his progress towards wisdom, it could likewise help mankind. Though in no sense a reformer of Lucretius' fervour, his feeling for humanity led him to emphasize the duty of forgiveness, advocate leniency, and acknowledge the relationship existing among all men; "totum hoc, quo continemur, et unum est et deus: et socii sumus eius et membra";[32] "alteri vivas oportet, si vis tibi vivere".[33]

Like most Stoics, Seneca underestimated the power of feeling and emotion. For him, however, pain was not an indifferent to be completely ignored, but a very real entity to be borne with courage. His interpretation of pain and his insistence on bearing bravely not only physical pain but all adverse circumstances of life were the outstanding features of his writings, - characteristics which resulted, in later years, in the use of the term "Stoic" to denote any type of impassive fortitude. The Roman counterpart of the Greek sage was to be one who, "awaiting good-fortune and prepared for bad",[34] could resign himself, without complaint, to whatever lot fate decreed for him.

In his expositions on the nature of pain, as in many other interpretations, Seneca's Stoicism was not far removed from the doctrines of Epicurus : "No one can be in excessive pain for a long time; our most friendly nature has ordered us in such a way that it makes pain either endurable or short."- "Nemo potest valde dolere et diu; sic nos amantissima nostri natura disposuit ut dolorem aut tolerabilem aut brevem faceret". (Ep.78,7.) "Pain is light if imagination adds nothing

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32. Ep.92,30.
33. Ep.48,2.
34. Ep.88,17. (utique secunda exspecto, malis paratus sum)

to it" - "Levis est dolor,si nihil illi opinio adiecerit." (Ep.78,13.) "Ill-health may control your body,but it does not control your mind" - "Corpus tuum valetudo tenet,non et animum." (Ep.78,20). How different in sentiment were these remarks from the opinions of Zeno,and how like those uttered by Epicurus some three hundred years earlier.

It was not only in his view of pain that Seneca approached Epicurus. The value he placed on friendship - "nihil aeque aegrum reficit atque adiuvat quam amicorum adfectus"(Ep.78,4),the need for lessening fear of the future,[35] the belief that death was non-existence, a state similar to that which existed before life,[36] - all were echoes of Epicurean doctrines. For all their differences in physics and theology,and in spite of their contrary ethical aims,by the time of the later Stoics the two schools were approaching each other in many fundamental beliefs,as was inevitable for philosophies whose primary concern was to give man a guide to virtue and happiness. Yet it had taken three centuries for the harsh idealism of the early Stoa to become sufficiently modified for the later adherents to accept some of the human and more generous tenets incorporated into Epicureanism by its founder,at the very beginning of its existence.

Seneca's references to immortality,varied though they were, when uttered as the opinions of a Stoic philosopher in the main agreed with the beliefs of Posidonius. The spirits of the wise would rejoin the divine fire,while those of the less virtuous would be detained closer to the earth in a type of purgatory,until they had been cleansed of their faults and prepared for a reunion with the divinity. To this extent,Seneca maintained the strict Stoic doctrine,but strangely inconsistent with this theory was his hope that the souls of the wise, having reached the higher regions,might converse with the souls of the great - a belief in the survival of personality which was scarcely compatible with Stoic materialism.

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35. Ep.78,14 : "circumcidenda ergo duo sunt,et futuri timor et veteris incommodi memoria".
36. Ep.54,4 : "mors est non esse ---hoc erit post me,quod ante me fuit".

Further,in spite of his acceptance of the general conflagration which implied,at the most,a limited immortality,Seneca could write: "That day,which you dread as if the last,is the day of eternal birth" - "dies iste,quem tamquam extremum reformidas,aeterni natalis est" (Ep.102,26). With a typically Roman desire for at least subjective immortality and posthumous fame,he wrote after an illness,:"I thought I was not dying,since I left my friends to survive me. I thought that I would live not with them but through them. I seemed not to be pouring out my life but to be handing it on." - "Non iudicabam me,cum illos superstites relinquerem,mori: putabam,inquam,me victurum non cum illis,sed per illos. Non effundere mihi spiritum videbar,sed tradere." (Ep.78.4). When dealing with immortality,as with many other questions, Seneca at times permitted his personal feelings to supersede his Stoic beliefs,with the result that his conclusions,though inconsistent,had a wider human appeal.

Like most of the Stoic leaders,Seneca advised suicide if the circumstances of life required it,if reason sanctioned it,and if duty towards others permitted it. While he realised that "at times even living was acting bravely",[37] he was firm in his belief that life itself was not of great importance[38] and that,since death had been ordained as the natural result of life,an early,self-inflicted,honourable death was to be commended as being in accordance with nature. For those whose life was little better than death,a voluntary exit was preferable to a continued existence; "quomodo fabula,sic vita,non quam diu,sed quam bene acta sit,refert. Nihil ad rem pertinet,quo loco desinas.Quocumque voles desine:tantum bonam clausulam impone." (Ep.77,20)

In this phase of his teachings,at least,Seneca's actions provided the best proof of his theory. For,in 65 A.D., being accused of participating in a conspiracy to make Piso emperor, he received orders from Nero to kill himself. With true Stoic courage,he opened his veins and died. Whatever the differences between his theory and practice may have been during his lifetime, - and it would be impossible

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37. Ep.78,2: "aliquando enim et vivere fortiter facere est."
38. Ep.77,6: "non est res magna vivere."

to overestimate the difficulties confronting any public figure who, during the age of Caligula and Nero, wished to put into practice worthwhile philosophical ideals - the manner of his self-inflicted death set the seal on his teachings, and proved his ability to accept his fate with calm resignation.

Though Seneca conducted no official Stoic school, under his influence his freedman, L. Annaeus Cornutus, became a Stoic teacher in Rome, where, in 50 A.D., he held a school of philosophy and rhetoric. His main philosophical work, concerning Greek mythology, expounded the Stoic belief that mythological characters could be explained allegorically. Cornutus was exiled from Rome in 66 A.D., shortly after Seneca had met his death.

Of greater importance in Rome was the teacher Musonius Rufus, (c.30-101 A.D.), who, in spite of numerous intervals of exile from Rome, gave widespread instruction in Stoic precepts. Noted for his strict support of old moral traditions, he believed in philosophy as the only guide to right conduct, and advocated its study for both men and women alike. In his eyes, philosophy was a spiritual medicine which, if taken regularly, provided a cure for moral illnesses. Thus, like Seneca, he valued self-discipline and endurance as aids to man in his progress towards virtue. He preached humanity and, in keeping with the opinions of the early Stoics regarding duties and right actions, stressed the importance of marriage and the family. While maintaining popular religion, subject to the limitations imposed by his philosophy, he first among Stoic philosophers formed the conception of a personal deity in human form, a concept very far removed from the abstract divine fire: "Of the things on earth, man alone is a copy of god, and has virtues similar to his; seeing that we can think of nothing better, even among the gods, than wisdom, justice, bravery and temperance. Just as god then, through the presence of these virtues, is superior to pleasure and greed, is above desire, envy and jealousy, and is noble, beneficent and humane, for such we imagine god to be, so, too, whenever his image - man - acts according to nature, he should be considered to resemble god and, being thus, to be worthy of imitation." [39]

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39. Stobaeus: Florilegium, 117, 8, iv. Quoted Adam, p.66, para.236.
καθόλου δὲ ἄνθρωπος μίμημα μὲν θεοῦ μόνον τῶν ἐπιγείων ἐστίν,

This new conception of the divinity, with its corresponding emphasis on the value of individual dignity, showed a marked advance in Stoic doctrine and had a profound influence on the greatest of Musonius' pupils, Epictetus, a slave in Nero's household. Being permitted by his master, Epaphroditus, to attend the lectures of Musonius, Epictetus profited from the opinions both of Seneca and of his instructor, and, like the latter, became a moral and religious teacher. In many aspects of his teaching, however, he returned to the theories held by Zeno and Chrysippus; with them he shared his belief both in the value of logic as an aid to right reasoning, and, from a moral standpoint at least, in the equality of sins, for he asserted that every sin, irrespective of its nature, involved a perverted will. Less human than Seneca, he nevertheless maintained a firm belief in the brotherhood of man, - a belief perhaps more natural to a slave than an emperor. Influenced by the conception of a personal, transcendent god, this belief, stronger than the theoretical cosmopolitanism propounded by Zeno, became an integral part of Epictetus' doctrine. The particle of god in each man not only made men "kinsmen, brothers by nature and descendants of god,"[40] but also gave them some standard of conduct. "You carry god around with you ——— and you do not perceive that you are defiling him with your unclean thoughts and dirty deeds. And if the image of god were present, you would not dare to do any of the things which you are doing."[41]

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40. Dissertationes, I, 13, 3. Quoted Adam, p. 68, para. 241. --- ὅτι συγγενῶν, ὅτι ἀδελφῶν φύσει, ὅτι τοῦ Διὸς ἀπογόνων.

41. Ibid., II, 8, 9. Quoted Adam, p. 67, para. 238.
θεὸν περιφέρεις ----- ἐν σαυτῷ φέρεις αὐτὸν καὶ μολύνων οὐκ αἰσθάνῃ ἀκαθάρτοις μὲν διανοήμασι, ἑυπαρεῖς δὲ πράξεσι· καὶ ἀγάλματος μὲν τοῦ θεοῦ παρόντος οὐκ ἂν τολμήσαις τι τούτων ποιεῖν ὧν ποιεῖς.

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39. Continued from previous page:
ἐκείνῳ δὲ παραπλησίας ἔχει τὰς ἀρετάς· ἐπεὶ μηδ' ἐν θεοῖς μηδὲν ὑπονοῆσαι κρεῖττον ἔξομεν φρονήσεως καὶ δικαιοσύνης, ἔτι δὲ ἀνδρείας καὶ σωφροσύνης. ὥστερ οὖν ὁ θεὸς διὰ τὴν παρουσίαν τούτων τῶν ἀρετῶν ἀήττητος μὲν ἡδονῆς ἀήττητος δὲ πλεονεξίας, κρείττων δ' ἐπιθυμίας κρείττων δὲ φθόνου καὶ ζηλοτυπίας, μεγαλόφρων δὲ καὶ εὐσεβετικὸς καὶ φιλάνθρωπος (τοιοῦτον γὰρ ἐπινοοῦμεν τὸν θεόν), οὕτω καὶ τὸ ἐκείνου μίμημα τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἠγητέον, ὅταν ἔχῃ κατὰ φύσιν, ὁμοίως ἔχειν καὶ οὕτως ἔχοντα εἶναι ζηλωτόν.

Good conduct, therefore, was acting in such a way that the divine part of one's nature had no cause to feel ashamed, and virtuous living was a joyful resignation to the will of divine providence. Living according to nature had come to mean following a personal god.

Philosophy, which could lead to virtue, began its cure with the consciousness of one's weakness. By daily self-examination and criticism, and by continual self-discipline, the strength of an independent spirit might be achieved, for "freedom and slavery, the one a virtue, the other a vice, are both deeds of moral choice".[42] Yet, for Epictetus, freedom and independence of spirit meant not so much the self-sufficient indifference of the early Stoics as a pious submission to what was ordained by god. Endurance and renunciation thus became the keynote of his philosophy.

Closely connected with the doctrine of man's kinship with god, was the importance placed on his duty towards his fellow-men, a duty which the earlier Stoics largely disregarded. In spite of Epictetus' typically Stoic lack of pity -"Do not be unwilling to show sympathy to another ---------- but take care that you do not lament within yourself also"[43] he nevertheless showed consideration for the feelings of other people, advocating personal cleanliness and care of the appearance not only as the first step towards moral cleanliness, but also for the sake of not being disagreeable to one's associates. He encouraged, as being in accordance with reason, marriage, family life and active participation in public affairs.

Believing in the theory, rejected by Seneca, that "Zeus placed by each one a guardian spirit, to whom he entrusted the task of watching over the man, and this guardian neither slept, nor could be deceived",[44] Epictetus regarded the material particle of fiery breath in man rather as a personal guardian angel sent by god for his protection. Since god

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42. Fragment 8 Schweighäuser. Quoted Adam, p. 68, para. 240. ἐλευθερία καὶ δουλεία, τὸ μὲν ἀρετῆς ὄνομα, τὸ δὲ κακίας, ἄμφω δὲ προαιρέσεως ἔργα.

43. Encheiridion, XVI. μέχρι μέντοι λόγου μὴ ὄκνει συμπεριφέρεσθαι αὐτῷ, κἂν οὕτω τύχῃ, καὶ συνεπιστενάξαι προσέχε μέντοι μὴ καὶ ἔσωθεν στενάξῃς.

44. Dissertationes, I, 14, 12. Quoted Adam, p. 67, para. 239. --- καὶ ἐπίτεοπον ἑκάστῳ παρέστησεν (ὁ Ζεὺς) τὸν ἑκάστου δαίμονα καὶ παρέδωκεν φυλάσσειν αὐτὸν αὐτῷ καὶ τοῦτον ἀκοίμητον καὶ ἀπαραλόγιστον.

had thus taken thought for the welfare of each man,Epictetus maintained that man should accept whatever post had been allotted to him,and should not leave it until god gave the signal. For this reason,he disagreed with his predecessors in discountenancing suicide,for he considered, as they had not,that man had a duty not only towards his fellow-citizens, but also towards the god within him.

With Seneca and Epictetus,Stoicism,as a religious philosophy, had reached its peak. It remained for the last great Roman Stoic,the Emperor Marcus Aurelius,in the second century A.D.,to write the final chapter in the history of the development of Stoicism in Rome.

To a greater extent,even,than Seneca,Marcus Aurelius found in Stoicism a solace for living,and,as with the former,the Emperor of Rome and the Stoic philosopher revealed two different personalities. While agreeing with Epictetus on all philosophical questions,he developed still further the religious aspect of Stoicism,at the cost of the material,making the early Stoic "right reason" synonymous with obedience to one's guardian spirit. With a curious disregard for traditional materialism,resulting no doubt from the steady growth of the religious spirit,he divided man into three parts - body,soul and mind - distinguishing the guiding principle,mind,from the elements of matter. Then,defining mind as each man's guardian spirit,which emanated from god,he identified god with supreme reason and the guardian spirit with the rational part of man. Morality,which,for him,was rational obedience to the divinity within,was thus raised to a religious level,and the purely intellectual rationalism of early Stoicism was replaced by an appeal to the better nature of man. The Stoic self-sufficiency of man as a rational being was giving way to his dependence upon a transcendent god.

This belief strengthened Marcus Aurelius' conviction in a divine providence by which all things had been ordered for the best. As a result,it was necessary to reconcile the wise ordering of the world with its obvious imperfections and injustices. The Epicurean view that the world could not be divine,"tanta stat praedita culpa", was refuted by the Stoic argument that,in its wisdom,providence had

permitted men to suffer misfortunes for their own advantage,and that things such as life,death,honour,pleasure,apparently unjustly distributed to men,were in effect indifferent and unimportant. "For the gods do exist and care for human affairs. In order that man might not fall into real vices,they determined everything for him; but if there had been any evil in the things that were left,they would have foreseen this too,in order that,in every way,they might prevent man's falling into them".[45] This typical optimism of the Stoics appeared as much out of place in the reign of Marcus Aurelius,troubled as it was by earthquakes,plague and military revolts,as did the pessimism of Lucretius at the time of Sulla,when Rome was still a virile nation. Yet the underlying tone of Stoicism was one of resignation and endurance, rather than hope,and it was in times like those of Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius - in tired,rather than hopeful ages - that philosophy provided the greatest consolation.

Theoretically,at any rate,as a result of his belief in the unity of the world in which mankind had a share,Marcus Aurelius accepted more thoroughly than any other Stoic the doctrine of the brotherhood of man,and,in his writings at least,he stressed the community of the human race. This spirit of cosmopolitanism,however,did not prevent his allowing the persecution of the Christians,whose refusal to worship the gods of polytheism was,in his eyes,evidence of poor citizenship.

His punctilious observation of state worship was strangely inconsistent with his acceptance of the one Stoic divinity. A justification was found,however,not only in the political expediency of fulfilling one's duties as a citizen,but also,as Epictetus had seen,in the theory that,beneath the one supreme being,were lesser powers,which included the individual daemons and the gods of mythology. In worshipping

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45. Meditationes,II,11. Quoted Adam,p.69,para.246.
ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰσί, καὶ μέλει αὐτοῖς τῶν ἀνθρωπείων· καὶ τοῖς μὲν κατ' ἀλήθειαν κακοῖς ἵνα μὴ περιπίπτῃ ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐπ' αὐτῷ τὸ πᾶν ἔθεντο· τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν εἴ τι κακὸν ἦν, καὶ τοῦτο ἂν προεῖδοντο, ἵνα ἐπῇν πάντῃ τὸ μὴ περιπίπτειν αὐτῷ.

the gods of Rome, the Stoic philosopher could, at the same time, pay homage to the numerous lesser divinities subordinated to the world-god.

Unlike Seneca, neither Epictetus nor Marcus Aurelius had any strong convictions concerning personal immortality. While giving no guarantee of personal survival, these Stoics emphasized rather the ultimate union with god, from whom they had originated, in which respect, though on a less material plane, they shared the beliefs of Zeno and Chrysippus. "You will disappear into the one who begot you, or rather, by a change, you will be taken up into its generative reason."[46] In the same way, Epictetus regarded death as a change from the present state to "that which is not now."[47] He and his successor agreed that death was "nothing else but a setting free of the component parts of which each living being was compounded,"[48] a point of view with which Epicurus himself would have wholeheartedly agreed. Both Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius accepted death as a natural change, and welcomed it as "the harbour for all, a place of refuge".[49] Yet, while agreeing on the ultimate union with god, neither reached any definite conclusion concerning the eventual world-conflagration and the destructibility of matter.

Compared with the early Stoics, Marcus Aurelius revealed a sympathy for mankind, and a warmth of emotion, which were entirely lacking in Zeno and Chrysippus. Less abstractly intellectual than many of his Stoic predecessors, and, at the same time, influenced by the new developments in Stoic theory, he found in Stoicism a doctrine which made him aware of man's kinship with god and, thereby, with each other, led him in his exhortations to himself to formulate lofty precepts, and provided him with an idealistic philosophy into which he could withdraw away from the actual world. The nobility of Marcus Aurelius, the humble

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46. Med. IV, 14. Quoted Adam, p. 69, para. 247. ἐνδφινισθήσῃ τῷ γεννήσαντι· μᾶλλον δὲ ἀναληφθήσῃ εἰς τὸν λόγον αὐτοῦ τὸν σπερματικὸν κατὰ μεταβολήν.

47. Diss. III, 24. τοῦτο θάνατος μεταβολὴ μείζων· ἐκ τοῦ νῦν ὄντος οὐκ εἰς τὸ μὴ ὄν, ἀλλ' εἰς τὸ τῶν μὴ ὄν.

48. Med. II, 17. Quoted Adam, p. 69, para. 244.
--- ὡς οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἡ λύσιν τῶν στοιχείων, ἐξ ὧν ἕκαστον ζῴου συγκρίνεται.

49. Diss. IV, 10.
οὗτος δ' ἐστὶν ὁ λιμὴν πάντων, ὁ θάνατος, αὕτη ἡ καταφυγή.

resignation of Epictetus and the humanity of Seneca were far removed from the strict,unattainable idealism of the early Stoa.

The development of Epicureanism and Stoicism in Rome followed widely different paths. The former,its doctrines fixed by its founder,was introduced into Rome in its original form,and was presented to the Roman people without modification. Its views seemed radical,it was a negative philosophy whose denial of any future life was not favourably received. The latter,on the other hand,passed through a long series of changes,beginning with the doubts of Panaetius and ending with the convictions of Marcus Aurelius. Yet, during the three centuries in which its doctrines were being revised, it drew closer to the Epicureanism propounded by Lucretius. Though differing in practice,by the end of the second century A.D.,the theory of both schools had much in common. Both aimed at making man self-sufficient and responsible,as a rational being,for his own actions. Both regarded life more as a burden than a privilege -the Epicurean seeing man as a stranger in a blind world which was unconcerned for his welfare and in which he had to exist as best he could,the Stoic regarding him as purposely placed in a universe designed for him and to whose purpose he was to submit himself. Both attempted to dispel the fear of death,- dissolution into component parts - though the later Stoics could not agree on the question of immortality.

By the time of Seneca,the inhuman,passionless ideal of the early Stoics had become mellowed,and the tenets of Stoic philosophy made more readily adaptable to ordinary conditions. Yet,notwithstanding this humanizing of the rigid Stoic attitude,the logical difficulties still remained,and no satisfactory solutions were found to the problems of the indifference of worldly objects in a world which was reverenced as a unified whole,the reconciliation between polytheism and monotheism,or the existence of free will in a deterministic universe. Such problems,peculiar not only to Stoicism,were bound to remain in philosophies involving more or less incompatible standards of science and religion . Just as the spiritual aspect of later Stoicism,as found

in Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius, far exceeded any earlier concept of a universal god, while its scientific doctrine was much more immature, so in Epicureanism, whereas the religious aspect was practically non-existent, the scientific theory was in advance of any theory of the universe previously set forth, and its value to science was revealed after its revival in the seventeenth century.

In spite of the humanity of the later Stoics and the apparent sincerity of their writings, no Roman Stoic ever believed in his creed as wholeheartedly as did Lucretius, and none wrote any work comparable with his philosophical poem. It was not the preachings of the numerous Stoic writers, but the lone voice of Lucretius, that sounded with the deepest feeling for humanity and the most complete conviction.

CHAPTER FIVE

Outline of the Roman Character - the compatibility of certain Epicurean and Stoic beliefs with the Roman outlook and ideals.

The average Roman of republican days - if an "average" type of any race could be said to exist - was distinguished by four outstanding characteristics:-training (disciplina),self-discipline (severitas),responsibility of outlook (gravitas),and purpose in achievement (constantia). Coupled with these,or,rather,arising from them, there existed a respect for the gods,for tradition and for authority, traits which at once revealed the profound natural differences in character between the reliable,conservative Romans and the versatile, yet at times irresponsible,Greeks.

These typically Roman qualities,which other nations have possessed only in part,formed the very basis of their civilization. Even the earliest days of the Republic produced heroes like Horatius, (508 B.C.),[1] and Marcus Curtius (c.360 B.C.)[2],noted for their tenacity of purpose,self-discipline,and devotion to the state,while,later,the example of Appius Claudius (c.280 B.C.)[3] gave proof of the underlying strain of grave responsibility.

Nevertheless,though some of these characteristics were to be found in every Roman,no one figure could be selected as a perfect embodiment of them all. Moreover,during the interval between 264 and 146 B.C.,many changes occurred,not so much in the basic Roman character as in the outlook of the people,changes which,superficial in themselves,were to have a far-reaching effect upon the Roman attitude

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1. Livy: II,10.
2. Ibid.,VII,6.
3. Cicero: De Senectute,VI.

in general and,in particular,upon its humanizing aspect. Just as the harsher tenets of early Stoicism were mellowed by the more humane influence of the later Republic,so,previously,had the outlook of the early Republic itself become more tolerant and less severe,owing to its contact with the Greek world.

Two Romans,very different in outlook yet,at the same time, revealing typically Roman traits,provided the best illustration of the development of the Roman character during this period.

The first,Marcus Porcius Cato,was born in the interval between the first and second Punic wars (234 B.C.),and died at the beginning of the third (149B.C.). In spite of his living in an age when the Roman state was experiencing,for the first time,conflict not only with a major external power but also in its own standards of living, Cato continued to lead a life which,outwardly at least,remained unaffected by the momentous changes taking place around it. Respect for the old traditions of Rome,together with a certain asperity of character, prevented him from greeting enthusiastically the new customs and wealth which were entering Rome and which,as he rightly foresaw,would change her traditions and her morality. He it was who dismissed the embassy of Greek philosophers in 159B.C.,and who,in the year of his death,from the same justifiable anxiety to preserve Roman customs at all costs, ensured that Rome's rival civilization,Carthage,should be involved in a war which could result only in her complete destruction.

Characterized by his public spirit and respect for tradition, his temperate,almost frugal,living,his capacity for hard work and his occasional lack of humanity,which was,after all,merely a result of his intensely practical outlook,Cato was typical of the early Roman. "Leaving home early in the morning,he walked to the market-place and defended those who needed his help; then he returned to his farm where, putting on a sleeveless shirt if it was winter,and stripping to the waist in summer,he worked with his servants,then,sitting down with them, ate the same bread and drank the same wine."[4]

4. Plutarch: Cato Maior,III,2. --- ὅτι πρωΐ μὲν εἰς ἀγορὰν βαδίζει καὶ παρίστατοι τοῖς δεομένοις, ἐπανελθὼν δ' εἰς τὸ χωρίον, ἂν μὲν ἡ χειμὼν ἐξωμίδα λαβών, θέρους δὲ γυμνὸς ἐργασάμενος μετὰ τῶν οἰκετῶν ἐσθίει τὸν αὐτὸν ἄρτον ὁμοῦ καθήμενος καὶ πίνει τὸν αὐτὸν οἶνον.

Yet,whatever feeling he had for his slaves disappeared when they became too old to work,for then,he sold them "and did not feed them when they were useless. For,generally speaking,he thought that nothing superfluous was cheap,but that what one did not need,even if it cost only a halfpenny,was dear. Also,he acquired grain-growing and grazing lands,rather than sprinkled lawns and clean-swept paths." [5] Conservative in all matters relating to the state,and unable,or unwilling,to see that Greece was able to supply the deficiencies of his own civilization, "he was utterly opposed to philosophy and,because of his zeal,he threw mud at all Greek culture and teaching." [6] Nevertheless, the very culture which he so deeply distrusted,was to influence and alter the Roman outlook to such an extent that,by the time of Plutarch, a man of Cato's type seemed rare. Even in Cato's own time,and in spite of his opposition,men were beginning to feel and show the effect of new learning and new luxuries,and Cato himself was conscious of the change. At the age of eighty-six,when defending himself in court,he stated : "It is difficult for one who has lived among men of one outlook to defend himself before those of another." [7] By 149 B.C.,the man who had "worked with his own hands,as his fathers had done,and gladly endured a simple dinner or a cold breakfast,plain clothes and an ordinary house - who preferred rather not to want superfluous things than to obtain them," [8] represented a way of life that was becoming outmoded,but which,in itself,was typical of the practical,strict simplicity of the early Roman and of his activity in the community.

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5. Plutarch:Cato Maior,IV,4. καὶ τούτους δὲ πρεσβυτέρους γενομένους ᾤετο δεῖν ἀποδίδοσθαι καὶ μὴ βόσκειν ἀχρήστους. ὅλως δὲ μηδὲν εὔωνον εἶναι τῶν περιττῶν, ἀλλ' οὗ τις οὐ δεῖται, κἂν ἀσσαρίου πιπράσκηται, πολλοῦ νομίζειν. κτᾶσθαι δὲ τὰ σπειρόμενα καὶ νεμόμενα μᾶλλον ἢ τὰ κινούμενα καὶ σαίρομενα.

6. Ibid.,XXIII,1. --- ὅλως φιλοσοφίᾳ προσκεκρουκὼς καὶ πᾶσαν Ἑλληνικὴν μοῦσαν καὶ παιδείαν ὑπὸ φιλοτιμίας προπηλακίζων.

7. Ibid.,XV,4. --- ὡς καλὸν ἐστιν ἐν ἄλλοις βεβιωκότα ἀνθρώποις ἐν ἄλλοις ἀπολογεῖσθαι.

8. Ibid.,IV,1. ὁ δὲ τὴν πάτριον αὐτουργίαν ὑπομένων καὶ δεῖπνον ἄφελὲς καὶ ἄοικον ἄπυρον καὶ λιτὴν ἐσθῆτα καὶ δημοτικὴν ἀσπαζόμενος οἴκησιν καὶ τὸ μὴ δεῖσθαι τῶν περιττῶν μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ κεκτῆσθαι θαυμάζων ----.

Contemporary with Cato, but far removed from him in outlook, stood P.Cornelius Scipio Africanus (236 - 184 B.C.). Unlike Cato a keen supporter of Hellenism, Scipio marked the beginning of a new age in which Greek ideas first contacted, then influenced, and finally became a part of, Roman life. Rome's increasing awareness of Greek literature and her knowledge of Hellenic policy revealed to her the Greek development of individual personalities; from Homer onwards, the pages of Greek history were filled with examples of men as leaders, bound not by a traditional duty to traditional customs and conventions but by a duty to their own intellect and their own persons. Fatal as this personality cult may have been for the political harmony of Greece as a nation, it was responsible not so much for producing great men - of whom every race has had its share - as for giving them the opportunity to assert their individual characters. Unlike the Romans of Cato's outlook, the Greeks understood that the characters of individual leaders, great in their own particular fields, could bring renown to the state as a whole and, consequently, could increase its prestige. The early Romans, on the other hand, moulded in the ways of their ancestors, through failing, at times, to seize opportunities for themselves at the expense of the state, remained conservatively unprogressive. Yet the solidity which kept the Roman community together was the very factor whose lack in Greece prevented any lasting unity among the states; and it was in his desire to preserve above all the stability of Rome that Cato regarded with such anxiety the growth of individual personality as he saw it in Scipio Africanus.

Influenced by the great heroes of Greece, and possessing a faculty of imagination which was entirely lacking in many of his Roman contemporaries, Scipio showed, no less in military matters than in his general outlook, a complete break with traditional Roman tactics. Supremely confident in his own ability, in 212 B.C., at the age of twenty-four, he offered himself as general to continue the war in Spain against the Carthaginians. Here, after capturing Carthago Nova "by daring

and good fortune"[9] in a surprise attack, he prosecuted the war with vigour, depending for his successes upon his audacity, anticipation and the power of his own personality. "Romans, help your Scipio in his danger"[10] was the rallying cry which led his troops on to win the battle of Carmone (207 B.C.).

How different from the early Roman respect for state tradition and conventions was this appeal of one individual; how much more striking to the imagination this colourful and unorthodox figure who inspired his men to fight for him as a person, rather than for the loftier, yet less visible, ideal of the Roman Republic.

It was not surprising that this new type of Roman - self-assertive, spectacular, defying the accepted traditions - should incur the displeasure of those of his fellow-countrymen who distrusted a clever, popular leader, and who feared that his personal influence might be turned against the established morality of the state. "They were all the more exasperated because he practised Greek customs, threw his toga back over his shoulder and frequented the wrestling-school."[11] Yet even those who envied him could not but acknowledge the military prowess of this man "great in purpose and achievement ---------who scrupulously honoured the gods",[12] nor could the advance of Greek customs in Rome be checked by bringing their adherent to trial and condemning him (189 B.C.).

Though Scipio predeceased his greatest antagonist, Cato, the way of life which he advocated outlived the latter's conservatism, and even Cato was compelled to admit that early Roman traditions were being replaced by the new customs which he had so vigorously opposed. While, from the point of view of age, Cato and Scipio were contemporaries, in their outlook they stood far apart. The former virtually represented

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9. Appian: Roman History, VI, 4, 23. (p.173) τόλμῃ καὶ τύχῃ.
10. Ibid., VI, 5, 27. (p.180)
"ἐπικουρεῖτε, ὦ Ῥωμαῖοι, κινδυνεύοντι ὑμῶν τῷ Σκιπίωνι."
11. Dio: Roman History, XVII, 62. (Vol. II, p.236) προσπαροξυνθέντες ὅτι τῇ τε Ἑλληνικῇ διαίτῃ ἐχρῆτο καὶ ὅτι ἱματίων ἀνεβάλλετο, ὅτι τε ἐς παλαίστρας παρέβαλλεν.
12. Ibid., XVI, 39. (Vol. II, p.191)
καὶ μεγαλόφρων καὶ μεγαλοπράγμων ---- διότι καὶ τὸ θεῖον ἀκριβῶς ἤγαλλεν.

the end of old Rome, the latter the beginning of a new era, in which Greek ideas took possession of Roman life. In his own way, each was right. To Cato, every departure from established custom was a change for the worse - a change which threatened the stability of the state and the moral conventions built up by citizens with high ideals. Action in the service of the community based on traditional moral principles, rather than the individual and, at times, unscrupulous self-assertion practised by the disillusioned and politically moribund Greeks of his day, was his ideal. In no other way could the Roman constitution, based as it was on law and custom, be preserved. The freedom of self-expression, which Scipio personified, was, in Cato's eyes, a show of indifference towards things Roman, by which, in time, the very foundations of the Roman state would be undermined, - a fear which was to be confirmed by the subsequent course of Roman history. Ultimately, the influx of new ideas, new wealth and luxuries, together with the economic effect of years of warfare on Italian soil, were to produce a nation whose personalities shared an outlook very far removed from that of the old Roman heroes. Even in Cato's time, however, it was not possible to check the drift, nor could the two incompatible ideals co-exist as separate entities and not affect each other. Stability had to give way to progress, the city-state had to become merged in the wider sphere of existence of the Roman Empire. Cato might protest, but it was Scipio who saw the trend of affairs and adapted himself to meet it.

However great their differences, both Cato and Scipio preserved the essential features of the Roman character. Typically Roman in his strength of purpose, his responsibility of outlook and his minute attention to religious observances, Scipio shared with Cato the Roman virtues of pietas, gravitas and constantia, which even the influence of Hellenism could not destroy. Yet the gravitas of Scipio, tempered as it was by his spontaneity, had lost the harshness of earlier times; as austere severity began to depart from the Roman character, humanity and tolerance entered in.

In war, as in politics, Cato and Scipio revealed themselves

predominantly as men of action,men who found an outlet for their self-expression in practising the art of warfare or the skills of government. In the intensely practical composition of the Roman genius,speculative, metaphysical thought played little part,and,to a Roman of republican days,interest in problems of pure thought seemed somewhat unpatriotic. The Greeks might pay honour to geometry and mathematics,but the Romans, with their yardstick of utility,limited their mathematical studies to the practical fields of mensuration and calculation.[13] Equally unimportant in Roman eyes,when compared with a study of Roman political life,was speculation about the heavens. Not that all Romans were equally averse to all kinds of contemplative thought; but,in general, the average Roman kept his imagination in check and regarded intellectual studies mainly from a utilitarian standpoint. Even Cicero, whose mind far outstripped those of his associates in its contemplative travels,was able to say : "Quid enim mihi L.Pauli nepos,hoc avunculo, nobilissima in familia atque in hac tam clara re publica natus,quaerit quo modo duo soles visi sint,non quaerit,cur in una republica duo senatus et duo paene iam populi sint ?"[14] Roman interest lay,above all,in affairs of state,in founding new communities or preserving existing ones - "neque enim est ulla res in qua proprius ad deorum numen virtus accedat humana"[15] and,in this regard for government and action in the community,Cato and Scipio shared the traditional Roman outlook.

Roman piety - respect for the gods - had produced in earliest times a corresponding respect for eternal values which,influenced by the essentially practical outlook of the Romans and by their demand for facts rather than abstractions,led to the development of an objective standard of morality. This standard,revealed in the laws and customs of Rome,was,by the time of Scipio,based solely on tradition and ancestral beliefs. Nevertheless,it supplied a code of behaviour which the Romans accepted and which,even after the subjective opinions of Hellenism gained ground,was widely respected by those who saw,in the

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13. Cicero:Tusc.Disp.,I,2,5. At nos metiendi ratiocinandique utilitate huius artis terminavimus modum.

14. Cicero: De Re Publica,I,19,31. (Müller,p.286.)

15. Ibid.,I,7,12.

early Romans, the main characteristics of Roman genius. "Quae enim tanta gravitas, quae tanta constantia, magnitudo animi, probitas, fides, quae tam excellens in omni genere virtus in ullis fuit, ut sit cum maioribus nostris comparanda."[16]

Originating as it did in the religion of the state, Roman morality provided the basis of individual, family, and state, life, and gave stability to the community. "Moribus antiquis res stat Romana virisque" - "Rome stands built upon the ancient ways of life and upon her men"[17] - was no idle claim, but an assertion whose truth was to be proclaimed long after the influence of Greek culture had first made itself felt. Yet this very reliance upon tradition, which reason could not always justify, and upon formal, religious observances, which had no intellectual appeal, resulted in a weakening of the customary moral code when confronted by systems of behaviour imported from other lands. In a state that was expanding into an empire, neither could ancestral customs provide an adequate guide to behaviour, nor formal, impersonal religion supply the needs of the human heart. It remained for the philosophies of Greece to supplement the deficiency.

Indicative of the growing awareness of Hellenism in Rome during the first and second centuries B.C. was the change in attitude towards philosophy. Whereas, in 155B.C., Cato had pleaded for the expulsion from Rome of Carneades and the Greek ambassadors, a hundred years later Cicero could speak of "philosophy, the mother of all the arts ----- an invention of the gods",[18] and address it as "guide of life, investigator of virtue, expeller of vices",[19] assigning to it all the credit formerly bestowed upon Roman religion and ancestral customs :"Tu urbis peperisti, tu dissipatos homines in societatem vitae convocasti, tu eos inter se primo domiciliis, deinde coniugiis, tum litterarum et vocum communione iunxisti, tu inventrix legum, tu magistra morum et disciplinae fuisti."[20]

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16. Cicero: Tusc. Disp., I, 1, 2.
17. Ennius: Fragment 46 of the Incertae Sedis Fragmenta. (Annals of Q. Ennius, ed. E. M. Steuart, 1925).
18. Tusc. Disp., I, 26, 64. Philosophia vero, omnium mater artium, ---inventum deorum.
19. Ibid., V, 2, 5. O vitae philosophia dux, o virtutis indagatrix, expultrixque vitiorum!
20. Ibid., V, 2, 5.

This transition from the marked aversion to new ways of thought, as revealed in Cato, to the acceptance and admiration of thoughts and customs of other nations, was due, in no small measure, to men like Scipio Africanus who, without departing entirely from the customs of his ancestors, nevertheless assimilated and adapted to his own use the customs of Greece. With Scipio Aemilianus, leader of the Scipionic circle, the ability of the Romans to assimilate knowledge from external sources, while still retaining their traditional characteristics, became an accomplished fact. In the later days of the Republic, not the absolute allegiance to tradition, but the capacity to absorb the new and still maintain a continuity of development was the outstanding Roman characteristic. Not wholly correct was Horace's observation that "captive Greece took captive her fierce conqueror",[21] for, in spite of the undoubted Greek influence, the Roman character retained the marks of its genius.

The Romans were "an able but unimaginative people, preferring law and profit to either science or art."[22] Nevertheless, their preference for utility did not prevent them from appreciating and understanding the Epicurean and Stoic philosophies, both of which originally had a scientific basis. Philosophy, moreover, was fortunate in that it had a practical application in providing a code of life and in training and developing the intellect. It was therefore useful and, by Roman standards, valuable. Among the literary classes in Rome, among those who felt the need for a wider type of religion than the state could supply and who, in the face of sceptical attacks upon traditional morality, sought a means of justifying intelligently their ancestral code, philosophy soon found favour. Of all the Greek learning which flowed into the Roman state, the flood of philosophy, which Cato had attempted to stem, swept away the hastily erected barriers and inundated the parched minds waiting to receive it.

During the first century B.C., when the teachings of Epicurus were being interpreted by their greatest exponent, Roman religion had

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21. Epist. II, 1, 156. Graecia capta ferum victorem cepit.

22. Wells: Short History of the World. (Pelican Ed. 1949, p. 109.)

reached a low ebb. Always more practical than spiritual,and based entirely upon ritualistic observance,it was far more widely used as a political weapon than valued as a deterrent to wrong-doing. Even in the minds of the Romans themselves,there existed some confusion between superstition and religion. The method of interpreting omens and auguries made it easier for a politician to maintain his position by postponing an election on religious grounds than to govern his own life aright. It was not surprising that,to thinking Romans,the state religion appeared as an organised system of hypocrisy,while even those most closely connected with the practice of augury, "kept up because of the beliefs of the common people and for its great service to the state" - "retinetur autem et ad opinionem vulgi et ad magnas utilitates rei",[23.] were not slow to acknowledge both its shortcomings and its potentialities.[24.]

Compared with the pretence of state religion,the Epicurean treatment of gods and divinities was refreshing in its candour. With its framework of natural philosophy,designed particularly to banish superstition and fear by removing the idea of fate in the universe,it was admirably suited to fill the minds of those,like Lucretius,for whom the malpractices of traditional religion had resulted in scepticism. For those who rejected the state religion but could not reject entirely the notion of a god,the Epicurean atom-gods provided a form of divinity without the resulting fear or superstition which accompanied the popular deities of Rome. Contemplation and adoration of gods who did not intervene in human activities,rather than the propitiation of sundry deities whose anger at not being appeased might bring disaster,was the extent of Epicurean religious practices. Freed from the intellectual difficulties arising from belief in the gods of popular mythology,and from the need for carrying out rites which,for them,had lost their meaning,the Epicureans alone could approach the temples of the gods with a calm mind.[25.] Among the adherents of Epicureanism during the first century B.C.,many must have found satisfaction in substituting this philo-

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23. Cicero: De Divinatione,II,33,70.
24. Compare Ibid.,II,24,52 ----Catonis,qui mirari se avebat quod non rideret haruspex,haruspicem cum vidisset.
25. See Lucretius: op.cit.,VI,75 - 75.

sophy for the traditional religion which they could no longer accept.

The belief in the agency of gods in the world,however, - a belief which regarded human actions as dependent on providence,and natural phenomena on divine caprice - was too firmly rooted,even among the more sceptical Romans,for the somewhat negative religious doctrines of Epicureanism to be widely accepted. Had Lucretius invented some compromise between his scientific conception of natural law and the superstitious belief in arbitrary divine action,his influence might have been stronger and more permanent,but his philosophical system less sincere. Because his theology,while meeting the demands of those who were ready for a new and loftier conception of natural law,did not satisfy the claims of the human heart,the general attitude of the Romans towards the Epicurean religious views was in keeping with Cicero's : "When Epicurus takes away from the gods the power of helping and doing good,he extirpates the very roots of religion from the minds of men".[26] What the Romans failed to realise,and the Epicureans to acknowledge, was that the Epicurean philosophy supplied all the framework necessary for a monotheistic religion. It was only a step from the theory of fixed and constant natural law to the acceptance of a divine mind responsible for creating order in the universe,but it was a step which the Epicureans,precluded by their ethical ideal of the pursuit of pleasure from acknowledging any divine action in the world,found it impossible to take.

Just as,in many countries,the vane of a local religion has been accompanied on the one hand by complete scepticism followed by the acceptance of a code with little or no religious basis,and,on the other,by the recognition of a code religious in essence but differing from the local beliefs,so,in Rome,among those who no longer believed in the local gods,Epicureanism appealed to the religious sceptics and Stoicism to those who,while dissatisfied with current practices,still clung to their traditional instinct for a religion of some kind. Because respect for the gods and for eternal values were inherent features of

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26. De Natura Deorum,I,43,121. Epicurus vero ex animis hominum extraxit radicitus religionem,cum dis inmortalibus et opem et gratiam sustulit.

the Roman character, the Stoic philosophy, which emphasized these features, gained a wider following, in the religious sphere at least, than Epicureanism, whose affinity with Roman traditional beliefs was less obvious.

In its doctrine of universal reason and providence governing all things, Stoicism supplied a much more adequate conception of divinity than the Roman "numina". Behind the Stoic cosmology was a single, directing power which the Romans, overlooking its originally impersonal, material aspect, identified with Jupiter, supreme ruler of the universe. Once this relationship was established between the traditional god of Rome and the universal, rational fire of the Stoics, it was but a slight step to regard the local deities as manifestations of the one creative fire. Thus, by an easy compromise, the gods of popular mythology were elevated to the rank of local representatives of the Stoic supreme reason. Zeno, and those who with him founded the creed as a materialist philosophy, would have looked askance at this rather forced connection between their impersonal, divine fire and the traditional, mythological personalities of Roman religion.

Among the typically Roman characteristics, respect for authority had long been a salient feature. Yet, the state religion, which imposed worship of the gods as a traditional duty from which some material benefit might be gained, did not provide the conception of a supreme power above the local gods, whose authority man should respect and to whose will he should conform his life. This authority for right living, which the state religion was unable to supply, was found in the Stoic Reason,- alternately regarded as Nature, Fate or Providence. Thus, by adaptation, and without rejecting traditional practices, the religion of Stoicism provided the Romans with a new notion of Jupiter and of the local deities, which they could continue to honour even more fittingly than before; it taught them that each particular deity, together with each individual human being, shared in the nature of the one divinity by virtue of the spark of reason within them. The Roman Stoic, respecting the authority of the divine will, sought to put his own life in harmony

with the spirit of the universe and thereby to find inward peace. More particularly during the troubled times of the Empire, the religion of Stoicism gave strength to many of its adherents.

Stoicism again showed affinity with the Roman character in its acceptance of divination. From the early days of the state, the Romans had maintained a long-standing belief in portents, omens and auspices, whose interpretation was the work of trained augurs. Even the less hidebound Romans like Scipio Africanus took heart at the sight of a serpent sliding along the road to Carthage,[27] or at a flight of birds, which he regarded as a heaven-sent sign of victory,[28] while Cicero, nominally at least, accepted and recommended the practice of divination. With the exception of Panaetius, most Stoics defended divination as a science, either from their belief in the powers of providence or as a result of their doctrine of "sympathy" existing between all parts of the universe. In this respect also, Stoicism was fortunate in its ability to maintain a position which, though in some respects inconsistent with its materialism, agreed with the traditional Roman viewpoint.

The attitude of the Epicureans towards divination, on the other hand, was consistent and uncompromising. "Animals offer no necessary reason why a storm should be produced, nor does any divine being sit observing the expeditions of these animals and then fulfil the signs which they have given. For such stupidity would not possess any ordinary being, even if very little enlightened, much less one who has obtained perfect happiness."[29] Roman followers of Epicurus could not deny the existence of providence and, at the same time, regard as indications of a divine will the incidents which they believed occurred

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27. Dio: op.cit., XVII, 63.
28. Appian: op.cit., VI, 5, 26.
29. Diogenes Laertius: X, 115.
οὐ γὰρ τὰ ζῷα ἀνάγκην τινὰ προσφέρεται τοῦ ἀποτελεσθῆναι χειμῶνα, οὐδὲ κάθηταί τις θεία φύσις παρατηροῦσα τὰς τῶν ζῴων τούτων ἐξόδους κἄπειτα τὰς ἐπισημασίας ταύτας ἐπιτελεῖ. οὐδὲ γὰρ εἰς τὸ τυχὸν ζῷον, κἂν μικρὸν χαριέστερον εἴη, ἡ τοιαύτη μωρία ἐμπέσοι, μὴ ὅτι εἰς παντελῆ εὐδαιμονίαν κεκτημένον.

solely by chance. In the religious sphere, their philosophy involved an almost total rejection of the traditional practices and beliefs. To those Romans who, disillusioned by the hypocritical, cold and formal practices of state religion, no longer looked for, or felt the need of, a divine providence, Epicureanism gave a sane and humane explanation of the universe. It was Stoicism, however, with its undoubted link with the Roman religious spirit and, where this link did not obviously exist, with its ability to appeal to local custom through compromise, which gained the greater number of adherents.

On the question of immortality, neither philosophy provided a satisfactory answer to the Roman craving for posthumous fame. In the early part of the second century, the poet, Ennius, could implore his friends not to bewail his death, as he himself would "live for ever on the lips of men",[30] while, two centuries later, Horace asserted his belief in the power of his writings to make him immortal - "Exegi monumentum aere perennius ----------non omnis moriar."[31] Yet the immortality sought by these writers, and by Romans generally, was not so much a personal existence after death as an immortal name, a name made famous during life by deeds which would cause it to be remembered. Remembrance by posterity was the greatest fame a man could obtain and, provided his life was such as to guarantee this, the possibility of a separate, personal after-life did not seem a matter of great concern among educated Romans. For this reason, the fear of death among the contemporaries of Lucretius was not of such magnitude as he himself believed. Even in the time of Seneca, when the generally declining condition of the state might have been expected to turn men's thoughts more towards heaven, the desire for fame of the name, rather than for immortality of the person, still prevailed. To the Romans, concerned more with affairs of this life than the next, the best guarantee of subjective immortality was a virtuous life, "etsi enim nihil habet in se gloria, cur expetatur, tamen virtutem tamquam umbra sequitur".[32]

In neither Stoic nor Epicurean teachings could the Romans

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30. Cicero: Tusc.Disp., I, 15, 34. Volito vivos per ora virum.
31. Odes, III, 30, lines 1 and 6.
32. Tusc.Disp., I, 46, 109.

find any certainty of objective immortality. Epicurean annihilation - a never-ending sleep - brought little comfort to a vigorous people, whose dignity must have been severely shaken by the realization that, in all possibility, they were merely a chance collection of atoms, while the Stoic immortality, limited as it was by the eventual world-conflagration, received its share of ridicule: "Stoici ------diu mansuros aiunt animos, semper negant."[33] In spite of the typically Roman desire for posthumous fame rather than life after death, the natural instinct for immortality was too deeply rooted, and human vanity too deeply ingrained, for them to be able to give up entirely the idea of some sort of existence after death. Particularly in the days of the Empire, when conditions of living were bad, death seemed to be a means of entry to a new, and better, existence, and, even during Republican days when the Roman race still retained its vigour, death appeared not as an eternal evil for those who had already endured every hardship in life, but as a harbour and a refuge; "portum potius paratum nobis et perfugium".[34] Neither in Stoicism nor in Epicureanism, however, was there to be found an assurance either of posthumous fame or of an after-world in which the inequalities of earthly life would be recompensed. These philosophies could only teach man to endure the present or, if endurance were no longer possible, to depart from it voluntarily.

In their attitude towards suicide, both schools of thought expressed ideas compatible with Roman practices. From the time of Marcus Curtius (360 B.C.) to Seneca (65 A.D.), Romans had regarded suicide not merely as an escape from life but, when occasion demanded, as a means of serving the state or obeying the command of an emperor. Voluntary self-destruction had never been looked upon as a crime, and philosophical theories which permitted, and even preferred, suicide if reason allowed it, or if pain had become unendurable, were likely to find favour.

While neither of these philosophies supplied all the needs of Rome in the religious sphere, they did at least remove, or minimize, many of the defects in the local religion. Just as Epicureanism, by its

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33. Tusc. Disp., I, 32, 78.
34. Ibid., I, 49, 118.

denial of any supernatural powers,aimed to remove the superstition associated with Roman rites,so Stoicism,by its compromise with popular mythology,gave the Romans a grander conception of providence. Yet the very religion which was being renounced by those who accepted these later types of Greek philosophy had been responsible,in the early days of Rome,for providing a firm standard of morality. By being connected with individual gods,isolated moral ideas received additional emphasis and attained an objective validity. They were thus interwoven into the religious cult,so that morality and correct worship of the gods became identical. Corrupt though the system of religious observance had become by the last century B.C., in its detailed setting out of the observances of rites and the performance of appropriate actions,it still supplied a certain objective standard of behaviour,acceptable to a people who,with typical lack of imagination,preferred to be instructed rather than to think. In Cato's time,this objective morality of Rome had appeared capable of no amendment,any new system of behaviour being a change for the worse. Even when the new learning had occasioned doubts in the minds of those who could no longer justify by reason a code that had become traditional,republican Romans of the first century still felt the need for having some objective standard and for replacing their fast-disappearing conventions by imported ethical codes.

In the moral,as in the religious,sphere,the later types of Greek philosophy,with their predominantly ethical basis,replaced or supplemented the existing standards. In particular,Stoicism,with its definitions and dogmatic expositions,appealed to the Roman instinct for absolute,rather than relative,concepts. By the same token,Epicureanism,which,though dogmatic in its physical theory,provided a more subjective standard of behaviour,failed to find such great affinity with the traditional instincts of the Roman character.

On the whole,the Epicurean theory was too inactive to be a real force for good,and its gods too tranquil and indifferent to furnish a religious sanction for conduct. Nevertheless,the Epicurean sage,free from perturbation and enjoying tranquillity of mind,served

as an example of perfection which true adherents might reasonably hope to follow. More human than the austere,passionless Stoic sage whose perfection was ridiculed by at least one Roman writer,[35.] the Epicurean wise man showed the result of moderate living and right choosing,basing his actions on ultimate results rather than interior motives. By limiting his desires to those necessary to nature and most easily satisfied,he revealed a marked affinity even with a Roman like Cato,for whom the requirements of nature were few. In spite of Cato's obvious dislike of philosophers,he and many of his contemporaries appeared, in the limitation of their desires,to possess some Epicurean tendencies, a fact which they,however,would have wholeheartedly denied.

Austerely practical though the attitude of the older Romans undoubtedly was,in their approach to man they looked to his capabilities,rather than his weaknesses. Deeds of ancestors and heroes of the past all helped to give the Romans an ideal for living,and to inspire them to reach similar peaks of patriotism or heights of character. In this,too,they were aided by their traditional code of morality,which they followed more because of its being Roman than because it was right. Romans thus had certain standards to maintain,and these standards became their measuring-stick for the rest of mankind. For this reason, Epicureanism,which took account of man as he was,with all his shortcomings,was less in keeping with the Roman character than Stoicism, which regarded man as he should be. An ideal,even if unattainable, drew more followers than a realistic theory,particularly among a people who naturally responded to challenge. "Adverse fortune should be overcome,not lamented; that is a man's duty. Weeping is only for an effeminate character" - "Conqueri fortunam adversam,non lamentari decet. Id viri est officium,fletus muliebri ingenio additus";[36.] such a statement was a true reflection of the Roman outlook,which claimed greater affinity with a system based on the suppression of pain and emotions than with one which,while regarding pain as the greatest evil,

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35. Horace: Epistles,I,i,106-108. ---sapiens uno minor est Jove,dives, liber,honoratus,pulcher,rex denique regum; praecipue sanus,nisi cum pituita molesta est.

36. Cicero: Tusc.Disp.,II,21,50.

aimed at preparing man not so much to conquer pain as to avoid it or, if this were not possible, to endure it for the sake of future pleasure. In their attitude towards emotions, moreover, the Romans as a race would have agreed with Cicero when he claimed that "all perturbations have their roots in error; they should not be pruned or cut back, but completely eradicated" - "sunt enim omnia ista ex errorum orta radicibus, quae evellenda et extrahenda penitus, non circumcidenda nec amputanda sunt",[37] - a point of view very closely related to the Stoic definition of emotions as "unnatural movements of the mind away from right reason". In their treatment of emotions, theoretically, at least, Zeno and Cicero had much in common; but it is difficult to reconcile the latter's statement concerning the eradication of emotions with his behaviour at the trial of Milo, when, as counsel for the defence, he was prevented by nervousness from delivering his prepared speech. Cicero, however, was not the only public figure to be deserted by his philosophical creed at a time of crisis.

While the Epicurean theory of pleasure provided for the average man no real stimulus to virtue and was, moreover, easily misunderstood, at the same time the creed as a whole freed its followers from superstition and showed the way to that inner peace which could be attained only by restraining all immoderate desires. This aspect of the creed, as well as Epicurus' insistence that the pleasures of the mind were greater than those of the body, was too often overlooked by the critics, who paid slight attention to its intellectual content. For Cicero, the greatest good resided in the mind, in virtue, but for Epicurus, as he saw it, it seemed to reside in the body, in pleasure.[38] Epicurus' failure to make virtue the highest good was sufficient, in the eyes of many Romans, to condemn his ethical system without further examination.

For the Romans, right action demanded a more substantial basis than pleasure. The heroes of old Rome had not undergone hardship for the sake of any resultant pleasure, but rather from a sense of duty,

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37. Cicero: Tusc.Disp., IV, 26, 57.

38. Ibid., III, 21, 50. Mihi summum in animo bonum videtur, illi autem in corpore; mihi in virtute, illi in voluptate.

not towards themselves as individuals but towards a group - the family, state or country. This feeling for community rather than self made the Romans more conscious both of the appeal of Stoicism and of the incompatibility of Epicurean quietism with their active community life. Happiness, for them, was to be found "not in the idle acceptance of positive delights or freedom from pain, but in a life of action or of contemplation",[39] and a philosophy which taught that men were "by nature fitted to form unions, societies and states"[40] was obviously more in keeping with the national character. The highly individualistic philosophy of Epicurus could be accepted only by the minority who were sufficiently emancipated from the bonds of tradition to make their individual decisions out of a sense of duty towards themselves. Their actions may not have made them noble; they did prevent their becoming hypocritical. Among the Romans who accepted Epicureanism - and those who accepted it did so wholeheartedly, there being few instances of conversion from Epicureanism to any other philosophy - there did not exist, in the moral sphere, at least, the marked lack of connection between principles and practices, a feature which characterised many of Rome's leading Stoics. This was understandable, however, as the superhuman Stoic ideal was less attainable than the fundamentally human hedonism of Epicurus.

Roman "gravitas" and sense of duty towards the state found greater affinity with the Stoic teaching that the wise man took part in political life as an act of duty than with the Epicurean contention that he entered into community life only if his nature was such that he could not otherwise be happy. To many Romans, the idea of undertaking a duty only to reap from it some reward was repugnant. Their great spokesman, Cicero, upheld the traditional Roman attitude in maintaining that duty was its own reward, whereas Epicurus expected everything to yield its quota of pleasure;[41] but, in the analysis of motives,

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39. Cicero: De Finibus, II, xiii, 41. Nec eam cessando, sive gaudentem, sive non dolentem, sed agendo aliquid considerandove quaeramus.
40. Ibid., III, xix, 63. Itaque natura sumus apti ad coetus, concilia, civitates.
41. Ibid., II, xxii, 73.

it was perhaps Epicurus who was the more honest,albeit the more cynical, of the two. The most ardent supporters of duty for duty's sake often failed to realise that the motive underlying their action was the voice of their own conscience and that,only by performing the duty,could they obtain an easy mind. From this point of view,the majority of actions performed nominally for the sake of duty were undertaken in order to obtain peace of mind or,to use Epicurus' term,imperturbability,which, for him,was synonymous with pleasure.

The constitution of the Roman state,based as it was on law and custom,had provided stability within the community. Yet the system of laws which had developed,along with the growth of the state,was rather a list of enactments with a local application than a theory of universal law. Although the idea of law for the foreigner had taken effect as early as 242 B.C.,with the appointment of a "praetor peregrinus",as the contact with other nations extended a feeling arose for the need of a common basis for law,which would apply not merely in the narrow precincts of the community but universally in the law courts of other countries. Just as the defects in local religion had been,to a certain extent,corrected by later Greek philosophies,so,in the legal sphere,the need for a firm basis of natural law was supplied by the Stoic theory of universal reason. Living according to nature,where nature was synonymous with universal reason,implied the existence of a certain code of immutable laws emanating from god,or nature,and applicable at all times to all rational beings. Among Roman jurists,this provided a new conception of common law,through which Roman law became more human and universal. It was no coincidence that the Roman lawyer who had such a firm grasp of universal law was also well-acquainted with the Stoic doctrine of divine,universal reason,and with the application of this theory:- "Est quidem vera lex recta ratione naturae congruens,diffusa in omnes,constans,sempiterna,---------- neque est quaerendus explanator aut interpres eius alius nec erit alia lex Romae,alia Athenis,alia nunc,alia posthac,sed et omnes gentes et omni tempore una lex et sempiterna et immutabilis continebit,unusque erit communis quasi magister et imperator omnium deus,ille legis huius inventor,disceptator,

lator ------."[42].

While the Epicurean exposition of natural scientific laws was beyond the comprehension of the average Roman, the Stoic theory of the relationship between man and the reasoning universe was intelligible, and law was the expression of that relationship. To rebel against the reason of the universe was to break a supreme law, to commit high treason. This conception of the moral principles underlying all law and government was made to apply to the existing laws and constitution of Rome which, in their turn, became to be regarded as the local representatives of universal reason. From Stoicism, then, Roman lawyers obtained an insight into the general principles of law, by which they were enabled not only to raise the status of law in their own community but also to exert a widespread influence on the subsequent development of natural law in other countries.

Man's recognition of divine law - right reason - led to his recognition of the application of that law in its humanitarian aspect. As a rational creature, man shared his reasoning not only with the supreme reason but with all other human beings. By virtue of its common reasoning, mankind also shared in a common humanity. Those whose minds were "plucked from the divine mind" - "decerptus ex mente divina"[43]. could no longer treat with scorn their fellow-travellers. "Homo sum; humani nihil a me alienum puto"[44]. might well have been the catchword of the later Roman Stoics; and, in spite of the apparent growth of cruelty and decline of respect in the first century of the Empire, a Roman Stoic could write in condemnation of the gladiatorial shows : "Man, a sacred thing to man, is slain for sport and merriment" - "homo, sacra res homini, iam per lusum ac iocum occiditur".[45].

Not without its effect on the harshness of Roman life was the Stoic belief in the community of reason among mankind. Moreover, by proclaiming the fraternity of the human race, the Stoics at the same time prepared the way for more humane treatment of slaves. In the second century B.C., Cato had made a practice of selling his slaves when

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42. Cicero: De Republica, III, 22, 33.
43. " Tusc. Disp., V, 13, 38.
44. Terence: Heauton-timorumenos, line 77.
45. Seneca: Ep. 95, 33.

they became too old to work. Three centuries later, Pliny wrote of manumitting those of his slaves who were ill, and of allowing them to dispose of their property by will,[46] a right which, in general, was not conceded to slaves. In no small measure was this change in attitude due to the influence of Stoicism, which showed the way to a gradual improvement in the treatment of slaves throughout the Roman world.

Similarly, the cosmopolitan outlook of the early Stoics found its place in the growing Roman Empire, and was not without effect upon the statesmen whose work it was to create from the Roman state the Roman commonwealth, as an equal partnership of races.

In philosophy, then, the Romans applied the conclusions reached by the Greeks, in so far as they suited their own character. In particular, in their treatment of Stoicism and Epicureanism, they not only applied, but also preserved, Greek theory. While they did not develop the scientific aspect of each philosophy, they adapted the ethical teachings to their own character and outlook, making them at the same time less abstract and more practical. In essence, the original Roman outlook was Stoic in its sternness towards self and in its tolerance towards foreigners, and the doctrines of Stoicism which emphasized these features found immediate affinity with the Roman character.

In spite of this initial disadvantage, however, Epicureanism, as interpreted by Lucretius, gained many supporters, among whom, in the literary field, were Vergil and Horace. While not altogether a professing Epicurean and, indeed, in later life inclined more towards Stoicism, Vergil had received his early philosophical training from Siro, the Epicurean lecturer who conducted a school at Naples.[47] Here, he was brought into contact with Lucretius' poem, whose influence on him was immediate and lasting. Profoundly affected by Lucretius' intensity of feeling and his scientific approach, Vergil owed to him, in no small measure, his own sympathy for mankind and his appreciation of nature. Though the Roman in him prevented his thoroughly subscribing to the Epicurean practices of withdrawing from public life or acknowledging the sublime indifference of the gods, he nevertheless appeared to accept

46. Pliny: Ep. 8, 16.
47. Catalepton 5; Oxford Book of Latin Verse, No. 110.

the Epicurean view of creation;[48] his later writings, however, revealed a combination of both Stoic and Epicurean cosmology :-

" ----------totamque infusa per artus
mens agitat molem, et magno se corpore miscet.

Igneus est ollis vigor et caelestis origo
seminibus." (Aeneid VI, lines 726-7, 730-1).

Vergil provided perhaps the best example of Roman adaptability - that gift of selecting the best from other races and interweaving it with the national character, making of both a harmonious whole.

In Horace, Epicurus found his Roman counterpart. Though more an eclectic than an adherent of a single philosophical school,[49] in character and temperament, to a greater extent even than Lucretius, Horace was suited to continue the ethical teachings of the Epicurean school. By nature neither energetic nor robust, this cheerful, "plump, sleek pig from Epicurus' herd"[50], who could laugh at himself as well as at others, aimed at making life better, easier and happier. Like Epicurus, he had a great capacity for friendship, and his effort to gain happiness for himself was equalled only by his concern for the happiness of his friends, whom he repeatedly urged to enjoy the present with a balanced mind.[51] Though in his later years an official court poet, he was not burdened with any of the administrative tasks which many Roman philosophers were called upon to accept, and thus was free to devote his time to securing for himself a quiet mind, such as awaited those whose lives were "blameless and free from wickedness".[52]

Just as Epicurus had taught that tranquillity of mind was the reward only of the man whose desires were limited, so Horace affirmed

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48. Eclogue VI.
49. Epistles, I, 1, 14: Nullius addictus iurare in verba magistri.
50. Epistles, I, 4, lines 15-16:
Me pinguem et nitidum bene curata cute vises
Cum ridere voles Epicuri de grege porcum.
51. Odes, II, 3; III, 29.
52. Odes, I, 22, 1 : Integer vitae scelerisque purus; compare also Epistles, I, 18, line 112.

that "neither the stormy sea nor the cruel tempest of the setting Arcturus or the rising Kid disturbs the man who is content with what is sufficient for his needs" -

"Desiderantem quod satis est neque
Tumultuosum sollicitat mare,
Nec saevus Arcturi cadentis
Impetus aut orientis Haedi". (Odes,III,1,25-28).

While,with his poetic instincts,he represented that Epicurean natural law of eventual dissolution by the more colourful idea of fate,withdrawing a name from an urn or cutting the thread of life,his attitude towards life which,he saw,was limited,closely resembled that of Epicurus. Moderate in his desires,content with a few possessions,he continually advocated a wise enjoyment of the present by laying aside fears for the future. Life was too brief to be wasted in anxious forebodings :-

"Prudens futuri temporis exitum
Caliginosa nocte premit deus,
Ridetque si mortalis ultra
Fas trepidat. Quod adest memento
Componere aequus; cetera fluminis
Ritu feruntur————————". (Odes,III,29,29-34).

Not for Horace the unattainable perfection of the Stoic wise man,excelling in every respect,"et sutor bonus et solus formosus et est rex",[53] whom he never tired of ridiculing. Not in extremes of virtue or vice, but in enjoyment of those things that were meant to be enjoyed and in a balanced outlook,lay the key to happy living.

To a certain extent,Horace's acceptance of a comparatively inert philosophy was caused by his temperament and health. His writings revealed that he gave his allegiance to those doctrines which had the greatest affinity with his own character. While the majority of his contemporaries,on the other hand,were anything but inert in character and outlook,there were among them a considerable number on whom the theories expounded by Lucretius and his followers made a lasting impression.

One of Cicero's favourite correspondents,Papirius Paetus, and his friend,Titus Pomponius Atticus,were both Epicureans,whose

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53. Satires,I,3,125. See also Epistles,I,1,106-108.(f.n.35,p.117.)

adherence to their beliefs was illustrated not so much in their writings as in their deeds. As an impartial onlooker, rather than an active partisan in Roman politics, Atticus maintained his neutrality - and, at the same time, survived the perils of the civil wars - by supporting no one party but befriending all. In his capacity for friendship and hospitality, as in the manner of his voluntary death inflicted in his old age when he was suffering from an incurable disease, he revealed himself as a true follower of Epicurus and one who, in an age when many principles were being sacrificed, consistently adhered to his ethical beliefs. Repelled by the austerity of Stoicism, and seeking a refuge from the turmoil of political life in the last days of the Republic, such Romans found, in Epicureanism, a means of living tranquilly amid the surrounding conflicts. Selfish they may have appeared, but, despite their withdrawal from the cares and duties of life and their carefully considered policy of neutrality in political matters, their readiness to give shelter to all who needed it was an indication of their great humanity, greater, perhaps, because of their political tolerance.

Among other Roman Epicureans of Cicero's acquaintance were Lucius Manlius Torquatus, the exponent of Epicurean ethics in the "De Finibus", Gaius Valerius Triarius, "in primis gravis et doctus adolescens"[54] and Marcus Fadius Gallus,[55] while an Insubrian, Catius, was mentioned by him as a recently deceased writer on Epicureanism.[56] In addition, Epicureanism gained many more supporters, including Titus Albucius, an orator who flourished in the second century B.C., Gaius Memmius, who was praetor in 58 B.C. and a friend of Lucretius, Gaius Cassius, one of Caesar's assassins who joined forces with Brutus, Gaius Vibius Pansa, consul in 43, "who followed pleasure, without losing his good character",[57] and Lucius Calpurnius Piso Frugi, whose record of public service was strangely inconsistent with his professed philosophy and whose notorious feastings branded him as more epicure than Epicurean.

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54. Cicero: De Finibus, I, v, 13.
55. " Ad Familiares, VII, 23-27.
56. " Ibid., XV, 16, 1 and XV, 19, 1-2. Catius Insuber, Ἐπικούρειος, qui nuper est mortuus.
57. " Ibid., XV, 19, 3. ---qui ἡδονήν sequitur, virtutem retinet.

In the last days of the Republic, then, Epicureanism attracted many educated Romans, the most sincere of whom found, in its ethical doctrines, a means of withdrawing from the difficulties of life and, in its theology, an intellectual substitute for the superstitions of Roman tartarology, which they could no longer accept. With the attempt of Augustus to revive ancient religion and virtue, however, it became expedient not to discuss too openly the free-thinking of Epicurus and the search for individual happiness - a factor which was probably responsible for Horace's later change of heart.[58] While Horace's transition from belief in the non-interference of Epicurean gods to an acknowledgement of the power of Jupiter to cause thunder in a cloudless sky was, to say the least, neither serious nor permanent, it was a reflection of his official court position, which made it preferable for him not to lead an attack on the national religion.

Moreover, the growing Roman Empire was in need, at this time, of able, active people, rather than seekers of peace and quiet, interested in nothing but their individual happiness. For this reason, the ethics of Stoicism, which permitted, and, indeed, considered it the duty of, its followers to take their part in public and family life, won the approval of those who, though discontented with existing conditions, preferred to rectify them by action, rather than ignore them in seclusion. The Stoicism adopted in Rome, however, did not retain completely its original form, but was tempered with typically Roman common-sense.

Apart from the Stoic leaders, who, each in his own way, modified or revised the doctrines of the school, there were many Romans who accepted and based their actions upon the Stoic creed. Among these, in Republican times, the most famous, by some ironical trick of fate, was Marcus Porcius Cato Uticensis, a great-grandson of the very Roman in whom Greek philosophy had found its greatest opponent. Like many Stoics, of an unamiable disposition and uncompromising in his uprightness, the younger Cato was renowned not only for his character but also for his self-inflicted death at Utica, an action in keeping with the

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58. See Odes, I, 34.

best Stoic/principles,which had taught him to despise external events. This "inflexible Stoic and Republican ————represented all that was best in the opposition to Caesarism".[59] Following in Cato's footsteps,later Roman Stoics - chief among whom were Thrasea Paetus,Helvidius Priscus,Rubellius Plautus and Junius Rusticus - formed the spearhead of the aristocratic opposition to the rule of the Emperors,and nobly faced the deaths that were forced upon them. If Stoicism made men stern and austere,it also made them courageous in the hour of death, and it gave them principles of virtue which they considered were worth a sacrifice.

In spite of the cosmopolitan outlook of Stoicism and the humanity of Epicureanism,both philosophies remained essentially the property of the educated classes. Because of their insistence on the attainment of,on the one hand,harmony with nature,or virtue,and,on the other,pleasure,or freedom from disturbance,as purely individual processes,they lacked the enthusiasm for mankind as a whole and the widespread proselytizing power which characterized some other creeds. Moreover,though the Roman character responded readily to certain of their ethical theories,their metaphysics and,indeed,the intellectual subtleties of their definitions made little appeal to a people trained in clear thinking and practical application. When Cicero accused the Epicureans of speaking an idiom of their own,[60] and the Stoics of using "little syllogisms,pin-pricks,which in no way change the hearts even of those whose intellects accept them",[61] he was voicing a truly Roman opinion.

When the old traditions of Rome had been weakened,men needed a creed by which to live. Neither could Epicurean freedom from superstition fortify them entirely against temptation nor Stoic glorification of reason provide a complete and sufficient guide to right action. In spite of the former's theoretical insistence on man's withdrawal from worldly ties,in practice,when unwisely interpreted,it allowed him to

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59. Pelham: Outlines of Roman History,p.313. (1936 Edition).
60. De Finibus,II,v,15. Ille (i.e.Epicurus) suo more loquatur.
61. Ibid., IV,iii,7. Pungunt enim,quasi aculeis,interrogatiunculis angustis,quibus etiam qui assentiuntur nihil commutantur animo.

remain in some respects too much a part of the world; the latter, despite its belief in the brotherhood of man through reason, in practice removed him too far from mankind and the world of nature. Even the later Stoics, whose outlook had been broadened by contact with the Roman world, lacked the common touch and had little real pity for the misfortunes of man. Belief in a universe ordered for the best in every way led to an almost indolent acceptance of the poor condition of others, and a self-satisfied reflection of the Stoic's own harmony with the rational soul of the universe. Such a creed, insisting as it did on absolute virtue, could bring little hope to those whose emotions were stronger than their intellects. Similarly, with Epicureanism, those who accepted its hedonism became genuine Epicureans only when they submitted to the intellectual process of choosing or rejecting their course of action according to the amount of resulting pleasure or pain. For the majority, however, this intellectual anticipation of unpleasant results was a less potent deterrent to wrong-doing than the actual experiencing of painful consequences and, quite apart from the metaphysical or scientific aspect of each philosophy, the high intellectual content of their ethical doctrines resulted in a consequently limited appeal. In addition, there remained some trace of the early suspicion towards philosophy, and not only among the less intellectual of the Romans; even a man of Tacitus' genius regarded it as a cloak for idleness.

Yet, in spite of the somewhat restricted appeal of the Epicurean and Stoic philosophies in Rome, their influence among educated Romans was widespread, and their doctrines supplied a very real need.

Epicureanism made its greatest contribution in the religious sphere, by condemning the superstitious practices of Roman religion and by making it possible for man to view natural phenomena in their proper perspective. The Epicurean, "praising the condition of a tranquil state and of the man who spends his life among banquets and songs,"[62].

62.
Seneca: Ep. 88,5. Nam modo Stoicum illum faciunt ------modo Epicureum, laudantem statum quietae civitatis et inter convivia cantusque vitam exigentis.

had a far saner approach to religious worship and usage than many of his critics,whose lives were bound up with fear and superstition. Cicero may have felt impelled to praise the system of augury for its great services to the state,but,in reality,its services appeared to benefit rather the college of augurs. Though,in return for the gods of mythology,which it abolished,Epicureanism could give only a notion of tranquil deities who took no part in the affairs of man,nevertheless, its attack upon current practices did much to prepare men's minds for the abandonment of traditional polytheistic worship and the acceptance of a new religion.

In this sphere,also,Stoicism had its greatest influence. Quite apart from its supplying a code of behaviour for those who demanded a doctrine by which to live,and its influence on Roman law and the treatment of slaves,its conception of a ruling spirit in the universe,albeit material in origin,gave the Romans a new picture of a guiding providence to whose will each individual should conform his life.

In their ethical doctrines,both philosophies were concerned primarily with the individual,the one in his search for happiness,the other in his attainment of inward peace arising from his submission to the divine spirit of the universe. Although Lucretius wrote with the fervour of a reformer,and although friendship was an outstanding feature of Epicureanism,neither this philosophy nor Stoicism took any real heed for society in general,preferring,each in its own way,to transform its own adherents rather than to remedy the condition of others. At a time when the whole basis of society was altering,however,it was natural that philosophers should be concerned with the cult of the individual,who was a definite personality,rather than with the effect of that individual upon a variable society of whose composition and outlook they were not at all certain,and they should not be judged too harshly on that account.

It remained for the doctrines of Christianity,a religion which had arisen and developed in a very different tradition from the Graeco-Roman philosophies,to bring comfort to the masses of society which

Greek teachings had failed to reach, and, eventually, to replace the religion of polytheism with a monotheistic creed, whose way had already been paved with the combined doctrines of the Roman followers of Epicurus and Zeno.

CHAPTER SIX

Effect of Epicurean and Stoic Teachings on Emperors of the Julio-Claudian Line.

The five preceding chapters have traced in some detail the development of Epicureanism and Stoicism from their origin in Greece to their culmination in the writings of Roman authors. The aim of this chapter is to show that the two philosophies, in particular the Stoic, affected not only the literary classes but also the rulers of the early Empire, whose administration in certain aspects revealed definite signs of that influence.

For this study, the five Julio - Claudian emperors have been selected, mainly because they were real Romans and, of all the emperors, most typical of the traditional Roman character and outlook. Although later emperors, such as Hadrian and Marcus Aurelius, acknowledged more freely their debt to Greek philosophy, it is the Julio-Claudians who provided by their lives and actions the best examples of the effect of that philosophy on the typical Roman character. Their work will therefore be examined in the light of the Epicurean and Stoic theories current in their day, to determine to what extent they were influenced by these theories.

It has been said that "no philosophical influence is demonstrable in the government of Augustus." [1] It is inconceivable, however, that this emperor, well versed in literature and knowing from Cicero's writings the teachings of both Panaetius and Posidonius, was not sufficiently influenced by the Stoic and Epicurean theories as to reveal some traces of them in his public life. Moreover, his close acquaintance with Horace and Vergil, both in their early days inclined towards Epicureanism, and even his social gatherings must have made him aware of the two philosophies most prevalent among the ruling classes of his day. The head of the Roman state could not fail

1. Oxford Class. Dict. - A. Momigliano, "Augustus" - p. 123.

to have been affected by the philosophies which had so influenced the minds of those with whom he was in daily contact.

By nature, Augustus was more Stoic than Epicurean. Rational, rather than emotional, cautious and with a strong sense of duty, he aspired to fulfil what he regarded as the destiny of Rome. His belief that it was Rome's mission to exercise fortitude and justice resembled a tenet from Zeno himself, while his unshaken faith in his own destiny, to which all personal happiness and ease must be sacrificed, was a Roman echo of Cleanthes' submission to the guiding spirit of the universe. There can be little doubt that both Augustus' belief in some divine power which governed the world and his sense of fatalism were direct results of his early studies of Posidonius. Unlike Julius Caesar, his predecessor, who had been convinced by Epicureanism of the uselessness of superstition, he paid great attention to dreams and omens. This was not entirely out of keeping with his fatalism, however, for the Stoics themselves were agreed on the importance of divination as a science, and of astrology as an illustration of the doctrine of universal sympathy.

In character, Augustus had much in common with the Roman Stoics, whose aim was to progress towards virtue by subordinating passion to reason. In his foresight, practical wisdom, moderation, fortitude and justice, he embodied the virtues which the Stoics regarded as the proper attributes of wise men and rulers, and which, in combination with his pragmatic rationalism, made him in certain respects as inhuman and unattractive as the perfect Stoic sage.

That Augustus viewed personal relationships with the almost self-sufficient indifference of the early Stoics can be seen from his attitude firstly towards his second wife Scribonia, whom he married merely for political reasons, and secondly towards his daughter, Julia. The latter's banishment in 2 B.C. was likewise the outcome of a reasoned, rather than emotional, decision. No ordinary Roman, no matter how strong his sense of "gravitas", could have behaved in such unnatural fashion as did Augustus, when calculated Stoic passionlessness overcame his human emotions. He was not affected by the genuine

feeling for humanity which was a keynote of the Epicureanism that left its mark on Caesar, and which was later to become a part of the Stoic philosophy .

In his conservatism,his simple and severe way of life, and his respect for old Roman tradition, Augustus was a typical Roman. His sense of duty,however,at a time when duty was becoming unfashionable, and of community service and responsibility,when the prevailing trend was towards individualism, was the direct result of Stoic teaching.

Yet,while Stoicism was responsible for this major influence, the motives behind some of Augustus' minor decisions were decidedly Epicurean, and were intended to gain for him freedom from disturbance, rather than to assist him in his progress towards virtue. Perhaps his speech to the Senate in 27 B.C. when he offered to give up his post and leave the Senate to manage its own affairs provided the best example of his ability to act from Epicurean motives if he found it desirable :- "I consider it most expedient, both that I should be free from trouble and not be the object of jealousy and intrigue, and that you should have a government based on liberty and conducted with moderation and friendly feeling;" and,again, "I choose the life of a private citizen and fair fame, rather than that of a sovereign and constant peril." [2] If these words are accepted at their face value, it becomes obvious that the Epicurean search for tranquillity away from public life was not altogether lost upon Augustus. Further,his resignation of his consulship in 23 B.C.,with his subsequent recovery of far greater powers, might well have been motivated by an Epicurean desire to undergo some pain for the sake of greater future pleasures.

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2. Dio's Roman History, Bk.LIII,6:2 and 8:7; Cary's translation.
συμφορώτατον ἡγοῦμαι κἀγὼ ἐμοὶ τὸ μήτε πράγματα ἔχειν μήτε φθονεῖσθαι μήτε ἐπιβουλεύεσθαι καὶ ὑμῖν τὸ μετ' ἐλευθερίας καὶ σωφρόνως καὶ φιλικῶς πολιτεύεσθαι. ----- καὶ διὰ ταῦτα καὶ ἰδιωτεῦσαι μᾶλλον εὐκλεῶς ἢ μοναρχῆσαι ἐπικινδύνως αἱροῦμαι.

Augustus' outlook and character were therefore moulded, to a certain extent, by Stoic and Epicurean theories. It is not surprising, then, that some of his administrative arrangements were similarly influenced.

During the last days of the Republic, in fact throughout the whole of the first century B.C., the minute attention previously paid to religious observances decreased. It seems probable that this decay in religious beliefs was aided and hastened by the spread of Epicureanism, with its doctrine that the gods did not interfere in human affairs and thus did not demand propitiation. The adverse affect upon the stability of the Roman state was fully realised by Augustus, and, in reaction against the growth of Epicurean godlessness and impiety, he remodelled the state religion. Ancient shrines were restored, temples rebuilt, and, at the revival of the Ludi Saeculares, honour was paid to Apollo, to whom a temple had been erected on the Palatine. The choice of Apollo as the patron god of Augustus was significant ; for Apollo, who in Greek literature had been connected with codes of law, high moral principles, religion and philosophy, stood above all for balance and moderation, the guiding principle of Augustan religion. More significant, however, was the fact that Stoicism, as set out particularly by Posidonius, had attempted a reconciliation between popular polytheistic religion and a belief in the one divine rational spirit which guided the universe. Therefore, when Augustus attempted to revive the soul of the Roman people and to give a soul to the empire as a whole, he was aided in his task by the Stoic conception of a world-god and of local gods which were manifestations of the one supreme being. Acting on this principle, he was able to relate the varied local deities to the one guiding spirit of Rome - its genius and its destiny. His revival of religion in Rome and throughout the empire generally met with considerable public support, not least because the growth of Stoicism during the previous century had prepared men's minds for the acceptance of a religious restoration.

Closely connected with these religious reforms was the

introduction of emperor-worship which, though not instituted by Augustus, owed its origin directly to his presence as ruler of the empire. While the cult of the monarch was ostensibly directed towards the official "Rome and Augustus", the personal inclusion of the emperor's name made it a more satisfactory form of homage, especially in the eastern parts of the empire, than the respect previously accorded to the abstract Roman state. The appearance of this cult throughout the empire at the time of Augustus was due in no small measure to the influence of Stoicism.

Stoic philosophers had spoken of the divine spark in man, which linked him directly with the ruling spirit of the universe, and had shown how, by the exercise of his reasoning, he could approach the divinity. They had drawn up a pattern of the ideal sage and the virtues which he should practise. It was therefore natural enough that an emperor, who was noted for these virtues, especially for his moderation and wisdom, and who, moreover, had brought peace after the tumult of the civil wars, should be regarded as a type of Stoic sage, a representative of the divine power on earth, and worshipped as if he were more than human.

In the provinces, the cult spread rapidly, and the worship of the genius of Rome and Augustus became a declaration of loyalty and a symbol of the political unity of the empire. Augustus permitted it, provided that temples were dedicated not to him personally but jointly in the name of Rome and Augustus.[3] If he, however, had not been acquainted with the concept of an ideal philosopher king, and felt that he himself, as the guardian of Rome's destiny, practised the duties required of a Stoic monarch, it is doubtful whether he would have officially sanctioned the cult, for the worship of men, dead or alive, was not a tradition of the Roman republic. Similarly, the cult itself may not have arisen if Stoicism had not conditioned the minds of those who accepted Augustus as the earthly representative of Stoic divine reason, and who saw in him virtues which coincided

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3. Suetonius: Divus Augustus, 52.

with their ideal of an imperial ruler.

Just as the revival of religion by Augustus appears to have been instituted to combat the practices of Epicureanism, so too it is probable that his moral and social reforms in 18 B.C. were a deliberate attempt to overcome the effect of Epicurean quietism and its insistence that happiness could be achieved by a prudent detachment from the cares and responsibilities of life. Once again, Stoic theory and practice provided the basis for his reforms.

His sumptuary law to reduce luxury [4] was in harmony with the austerity of the early Stoics, while his laws to make marriage almost compulsory and to provide certain privileges for families with three children found support in the Stoic viewpoint that marriage and community service were duties (right actions) to be undertaken by the wise. In fact, the motive behind these reforms was a desire to bring the people to a realization of their duties towards the state in their marriage and family life. It was easy enough, however, for Augustus to impose morality on others while he himself remained outside the law. Had he not been so greatly influenced by the inhuman ideals of Stoic teachings in this respect, he might have understood that, of all reform, the most difficult for any government to make is moral reform, and that neither emperors nor democratic politicians can regulate moral behaviour by statute law. That Augustus, whose shrewdness in most other matters cannot be disputed, should have consciously believed in his ability to make people good is proof that, at the root of his moral reforms, was a decided Stoic influence - the didactic attitude of the early Stoics and their insistence on right actions and duties as a means of progress towards virtue. When the austere, rational and unemotional figure of the Stoic sage is remembered, the failure of Augustus' domestic reforms may be even more readily understood.

With regard to both the religious and the moral reforms of Augustus, then, it was the spread of Epicurean teachings which

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4. Suetonius, 34.

in no small degree occasioned the necessity for reform, while the doctrines of Stoicism provided the pattern. In these spheres of administration, the influence of both philosophies was considerable.

"The apathy of the Stoic sage made it impossible for him to cherish any sympathetic feelings towards friends and family --- no generous enthusiasm was felt at the good fortune of friends, nor was sympathy extended to them in their trouble, for both emotions were signs of irrational weakness which would disturb the wise man's freedom from passion." [5] The unfeeling aloofness of the early Stoics had repelled many Roman minds, yet it was precisely this attitude which influenced so greatly Augustus' plans for a successor. Though Rome was not yet ready for a hereditary monarchy, Augustus lost no opportunity of ensuring that the nominee to be elected to the principate would belong to his own family. With this end in view, and in complete disregard for the feelings of the persons concerned, he married his daughter, Julia, firstly to Marcellus, then to Agrippa, and finally, on his death, to Tiberius who, like Agrippa, had been compelled to divorce his wife in order to become the emperor's son-in-law. Both Marcellus and Agrippa had been closely associated with Augustus in his administration, and the adoption of Gaius and Lucius, the children of Agrippa and Julia whom Augustus bought from their father [6] without regard for his personal feelings in the matter, was intended as an additional safeguard to the succession. Their deaths, and the banishment of their brother, Agrippa Posthumus, left Tiberius as the only immediate choice for a successor. Augustus therefore adopted him as his son, made him his colleague in the tribunician and proconsular power, and then instructed him to adopt as his successor, in preference to his own son, Drusus, his nephew Germanicus.

While this calculated manipulation of other people's lives may have produced the desired result of securing the succession for

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5. Cf. Chapter Three, p.61.
6. Suetonius, 64.

the Julio-Claudian family for the next four principates, the inhuman and unsympathetic attitude of Augustus is almost incomprehensible. The only probable explanation is that, in his attempt to carry out the duties of the ideal Stoic, he rigidly adhered to the doctrine that emotions were weaknesses which should be suppressed, and that perfection could be achieved only by acting according to reason, not passion. His suppression of his own emotions was at times unnatural; but his indifference towards the feelings of others was inexcusable.

The banishment of his daughter, Julia, has already been mentioned. Considering the way in which Augustus arranged her life, her misconduct is scarcely surprising. Yet, when Augustus learned of it, he gave way to a violent rage - one of the few emotional outbursts that he allowed himself; finally, sense of duty triumphed over sentiment and the sentence of banishment was passed. Dio's comment that "in the case of his daughter, he would show no mercy", [7] strengthens the conclusion that his attitude was moulded upon the Stoic pattern of unmitigated sternness and lack of pity. [8] The salutation, Pater Patriae, was well-earned, for the empire was his real family which claimed his protection and affection. His duty to the empire overruled all personal considerations. Even death could not alter his unrelenting disapproval of his daughter, for a clause in his will prevented her and her daughter from being buried in his own mausoleum. [9] Such inflexible self-discipline and severity could have arisen only from the Stoic concept of the perfect sage.

If the model of Stoic unemotionalism adversely affected Augustus in his family relationships, in his treatment of his subjects he received beneficial guidance from Stoic cosmopolitanism. His task it was to give a more practical and lasting form to the world-state proposed by Zeno. [10]

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7. Dio's Roman History, LV, 10, 16. ἐπὶ γὰρ τῇ θυγατρὶ μηδὲν μετριάσας.
8. Cf. Chapter Three, p. 64.
9. Suetonius, 101.
10. Cf. Chapter Three, p. 63.

That this task was forced upon him cannot be denied, for, at the end of the civil wars, he was faced with the alternative of empire or chaos. His work in consolidating the civilized world was thus occasioned by necessity, but his inspiration in carrying out this process was derived from the Stoic belief that, under the guidance of divine reason, all parts of the world were interrelated in a mutual sympathy. This belief was responsible, in some degree, for the change in attitude towards the provinces during Augustus' principate.

In republican days, the provinces had been regarded mainly as avenues of profit for their Roman rulers. Under the principate, however, the interdependence of Rome upon the empire and of the empire upon Rome was more fully realized. A feature of Augustus' policy in this respect was his fostering of municipia and cities throughout the empire, each retaining its own local traditions but closely linked to Rome in spirit. Within this huge confederation of cities, there was freedom of travel and trade, and the colour-bar was non-existent. The security of the Augustan peace earned the gratitude of the provinces, even if not always spontaneously, and the Roman legions stationed on the frontiers to preserve that peace were themselves a Romanizing agent.

While Augustus was less generous than Julius Caesar in granting full citizenship rights, the aim of his policy towards the empire as a whole was to break down purely national or racial barriers and to incorporate civilized mankind into a single state, at whose head should stand the imperial city inspired by its divine destiny. It is impossible to believe that the theoretical cosmopolis of Zeno, free from racial prejudice and presided over by divine reason, did not supply the vision which Augustus translated into the concrete reality of a cosmopolitan empire, sharing in the genius of Rome and Italy at its head.

This philosophical influence in Augustus' domestic and foreign policy was transmitted indirectly to the remaining Julio-Claudian emperors, all of whom, with the exception of Caligula,

continued along the lines laid down by Augustus. Since they were thus not required to initiate policy to the same extent, the effect of philosophy upon them is to be seen more in their personal attitude than in their administrative decisions.

Because of the veneration and respect accorded to Augustus, his immediate successor, Tiberius, entered the principate at a decided disadvantage. His position was made even more difficult by the clause in Augustus' will which made him his heir only because "sinister fortune" [11.] had removed Augustus' adopted sons, Gaius and Lucius. He therefore was not unnaturally undecided about taking over the empire, particularly as his withdrawal from public life some years previously had given him an opportunity of studying philosophy and astrology. Following the Epicurean doctrine that the head of a great nation was in a state of painful pre-eminence, open to danger and subject to the whims of fortune, [12.] he wished to return to the life of a private citizen. When finally his reasoning overcame his desire, he accepted the principate as a "miserable and burdensome servitude", "querens miseram et onerosam iniungi sibi servitutem." [13.] This act of Stoic submission, like his enforced marriage with Julia, was in keeping with his strong sense of duty.

Perhaps even more than Augustus, Tiberius possessed the characteristics of a natural Stoic. Like Zeno, he was austere and frugal, haughty and aloof, while his stern manner and his hatred of flattery did not win him popularity. In his position as ruler of the world, he was compelled, as Augustus had not been, to exercise Stoic endurance and resignation, for his was the nature of a subordinate rather than a leader, and the status of an emperor, which fortune and his sense of duty had procured for him, became more and more distasteful. Credit must be given him, therefore, for his generally

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11. Suetonius: Tiberius, 23.
12. Tacitus, Annales, I, 11.
13. Suetonius, 24.

just and moderate administration in a position which he had been forced to accept against his will. It is quite possible that, during his seven years of virtual exile at Rhodes - the home of Panaetius and Posidonius - he had studied the philosophy of Stoicism, and that his acceptance of the principate as an act of duty was a conscious attempt to imitate the Stoic sage.

The effect of Epicureanism in drawing men away from the gods and public duty has already been mentioned as a feature of the Augustan age. By the time of Tiberius, however, the austerity of Epicurus had been disregarded, and the search for tranquillity through absence of pain was being replaced by a facile indulgence in pleasures of every kind. The Roman empire, in fact, provided few examples of genuine Epicureans, most of those who professed the name being content to practise a grossly misinterpreted version of their founder's teachings. Unlike Augustus, Tiberius recognised the futility of legislating in such matters, and hoped, by his own example of frugality, to curb the excessive luxury of Roman epicures. Indeed, in his refusal to introduce sumptuary laws, there was a note of Epicurean expediency, for the disadvantage of incurring displeasure prevailed over the need for reform. This decision was indicative of his wisdom, however, for the remedy, as he realized, was a matter for individual, not government, action, and his moderation gave general satisfaction.

The influence of Epicureanism is seen also in his refusal to permit temples to be erected in his honour, for this he regarded as presumption and the height of arrogance.[14] He himself was only mortal, content if he discharged satisfactorily the difficult part he had to play. He sought worship not among the gods, but in men's esteem and affection. "Socios civis et deos ipsos precor, hos ut mihi ad finem usque vitae quietam et intelligentem humani divinique iuris mentem diunt,---".[15] How closely does this attitude

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14. Tacitus, Ann. IV,37.
15. Ibid., IV, 38.

correspond with the Epicurean view both of prayer as a means of gaining tranquillity of mind by communing with the gods, and of justice as a means to enjoy greater security.[16] Augustus had shown himself a true Roman in his desire for fame and honour, but Tiberius' modesty was an obviously non-Roman trait, which the Senate imputed to a degenerate spirit, unable to appreciate distinction and renown. It may well have been due, however, to the Epicurean doctrine of desires,[17] which regarded public honours as neither natural nor necessary. His hatred of flattery may have sprung from the same source.

Tiberius' character was, nevertheless, more suited to Stoic than Epicurean practices. More honest or, at any rate, less tactful than Augustus, he could not conceal from the populace his contempt, and from the senatorial lesser nobility his dislike. In this, he may have been imitating the superior aloofness of the Stoic sage, and with the same inevitable result. The Senate disliked his pride and reserve, and, in spite of his just and moderate administration in many spheres of government, there arose a strong opposition to the principate, particularly among the Stoic senators. Augustus, because of his Stoic outlook, had coincided with their idea of duty. Tiberius, on the other hand, though in many respects coming closer to the idea of a Stoic sage, incurred their displeasure first of all because of his character, and mainly because of the rise to power of Sejanus, under whom the senators for the first time realized their lack of importance. He therefore did not receive from the Senate the co-operation which he expected, and the Stoic opposition to him made him suspicious of rivals and intrigues. It is not surprising, then, that several of his speeches revealed a typically Epicurean craving for peace of mind.

In many phases of administration, however, it was Tiberius, rather than his Stoic opponents, who provided the best proof that government was a personal obligation, a duty entrusted by god.

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16. Cf. Chapter Two, pp. 23 and 32.
17. Cf. Ch. 2, p.29.

This Stoic sense of duty and service was particularly apparent in his treatment of the provinces, in whose welfare he was keenly interested. Public games in Rome were curtailed in order that the provincial armies might be maintained; taxes were kept as low as possible, and provincial governors who wished to increase the burden of taxation were advised that "it was the task of a good shepherd to shear his sheep, not fleece them".[18] In his attempt to check the avarice or inefficiency of provincial governors, Tiberius required local assemblies to report to him on the conduct of Roman officials in their district.

By his strict economy measures at Rome, where he showed constant opposition to useless expenditure, he was able to accumulate surplus funds which he could then use to assist cities overtaken by calamity.[19] The recognition of the responsibilities of empire and of Rome's duty to the provinces was a direct result of the growing Stoic cosmopolitanism, and of Tiberius' own consciousness of his personal obligation to his subjects. This attitude was little known before his time, and it is likely that his moderation towards the provinces was the outcome of Stoic theory. Tiberius' duty to govern the Roman world well was the consideration which overshadowed all other matters. It was a Stoic attitude which even the Stoic aristocracy, resenting the emperor's reserve towards them, were not yet ready to comprehend.

While Tiberius was far ahead of his time in his humane treatment of the provincials, in his deliberate suppression of his emotions at times of personal bereavement he, like Augustus, was influenced by the original Stoic sage. Deeply grieved though he was at the death of his son, Drusus, he finally overcame his sorrow and, with typical Roman gravitas and Stoic self-control, attended to public business as usual.[20] More than a century later, this enforced,

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18. Suetonius; Tiberius, 32: boni pastoris esse tondere pecus, non deglubere.
19. Tac. Ann. II,47.
20. Ibid., IV,8.

unnatural restraint of the early Stoics was disregarded, and a future Stoic emperor wept in public for his old master's death, "for neither philosophy nor a throne need remove our natural affections." [21.]

In legal matters also, Tiberius showed the effect of Stoic reasoning in preference to emotion. This was most evident at the trial of Piso in 20 A.D., for the suspected murder of Tiberius' adopted son, Germanicus. Whatever Tiberius' own feelings may have been, he maintained a cold detachment, and urged the senators to take notice of the evidence, rather than their own feelings and to observe the usual forms of law. "Nemo Drusi lacrimas, nemo maestitiam meam spectet, nec si qua in nos adversa finguntur." [22.] Tacitus, his biographer, regarded this stifling of his emotions as yet another example of his dissimulation. It appears more probable, however, that it was the effect of his Stoic self-control.

With the exception of the laws of treason, which both he and Augustus arbitrarily extended, his administration of the laws in the early period of his principate reflected his belief in justice as a virtue. "Ac primo eatenus interveniebat, ne quid perperam fieret." [23.] But for his misplaced trust in Sejanus, justice and moderation might have been the keynote of his reign.

If Augustus' Stoic reason had not suppressed his own feelings, Tiberius might not have become his son-in-law. If Stoic insistence on duty had not influenced Tiberius, he might not have accepted the principate. Because of Stoicism, then, he had both a wife and a position which he disliked ; but he possessed the virtues, wisdom, self-control, courage and justice, necessary for a Stoic ruler. If the Stoic senators had not so openly and often unjustifiably opposed his actions, his suspicious fears might never have arisen, and his withdrawal to Capreae never taken place. Tiberius had the disposition of a natural Stoic; yet even Stoicism could not fortify him against

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21. Marcus Aurelius, Vita Pii, X, 5 - quoted Farquharson "Marcus Aurelius, His Life and World", p.12.
22. Tac.Ann., III, 12.
23. Suetonius, 33.

all the misfortunes which overtook him and made him bitter. Perhaps his greatest misfortune was that, like Pompey, he stood "in the shadow of a mighty name".

Gaius Caesar Caligula had no philosophical training and, in fact, no training for his public office. His early years were spent wandering with his parents from camp to camp, and, at the age of twenty, he went to Capreae to live with Tiberius, at a time when the emperor was too old and too embittered to instruct him either in philosophy or in any other field of study. It is doubtful whether Gaius would have appreciated any attempt to train him in self-control and moderation, for "of all the liberal sciences, he gave his mind least to deep literature and learning".[24] This exhibitionist, however, with his insane love of power and popularity, could well have profited from some serious study and self-discipline. Had he received instruction during his formative years in the doctrines of Stoicism, his reign might have been better; certainly neither Stoicism nor Epicureanism could have made it worse. During his short reign, he exiled one teacher of philosophy and sentenced two others to death. The philosophical opposition to the principate, which first made itself felt at the time of Tiberius, thereby gained in strength and determination.

The emperor Claudius, who succeeded to the principate by chance in his fiftieth year, had more opportunity than his predecessors of studying philosophy and antiquities. Because of his supposed imbecility, he was given few important public positions in his early life, and was treated by both Augustus and Tiberius more as an unrelated private individual than as a possible successor. During this period, he studied philology, religion, law and history, and became a scholar with a depth of feeling for the traditions of Rome. Claudius was the first emperor since Augustus to have faith in the greatness of Rome and an understanding of the continuity of Roman history.

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24. Suetonius: Gaius Caligula, 53; ex disciplinis liberalibus minimum eruditioni.

It can be assumed that, through his studies, he became acquainted with Stoicism. This is supported by the fact that he was sufficiently well versed in Cicero's writings to undertake a defence of his style against that of Asinius Gallus. His sympathy for Cicero made him appreciate the ideal of co-operation between the senatorial class and the principate, but his attempts to achieve this were overruled by the Senate's distrust and opposition. He was therefore compelled to rule without their support and to organize his own secretariat to deal with matters of administration. It may well be, then, that the civil service of today owes its origin to the opposition of Stoic members of the Roman Senate at the time of Claudius.

Just as Claudius' reign marked a transition period in Roman history, when the spirit of the republic was being replaced by that of a cosmopolitan monarchy, so too it marked a similar transition in the development of Stoicism. The Stoicism which influenced both Tiberius and Augustus was fundamentally the doctrine of Panaetius and Posidonius. At the time of Claudius, however, the change from the harsh asceticism of the early Stoics to the broader humanity of Seneca and Epictetus was taking place, and, in many respects, was reflected in his work.

Claudius realized, perhaps more clearly than his forerunners, the cosmopolitan nature of the Roman state. His aim was to strengthen the traditional Roman institutions, in order to provide a solid foundation for the empire. He therefore attempted to restore ancient religious practices, reorganized the college of haruspices, and expelled the astrologers from Italy. At the same time, he was prepared to tolerate other kinds of religion and, at the beginning of his reign, even permitted freedom to the Jews throughout the empire, as well as restoring to the Alexandrine Jews the citizen rights which Caius had taken away. That subsequent events made it necessary for him to forbid Jewish assemblies in Rome does not alter the fact that, in the interests of imperial unity, he allowed

freedom to any religious movement which did not directly threaten the spirit of Roman religion. There can be little doubt that his early tolerance in religion was closely connected with the cosmopolitanism of the Stoics, and their belief in the common humanity of mankind.

Similarly too, Claudius' liberal extension of Roman citizenship and its privileges,[25] and his desire to give the provinces equal status by removing their inferiority to Italy, were practical illustrations of the Stoic acceptance of the fraternity of the human race. Though his attitude towards the provinces differed from that of Augustus, firstly in its refusal to acknowledge the superiority of Rome and Italy, and secondly in its suppression of regional autonomies, it was, in reality, a logical extension of Augustus' policy and, like it, was equally representative of the prevailing Stoic outlook. Just as the keynote of Augustus' Stoicism was divine reason, which, for him, was symbolized by Rome and Italy, in their position as guide and leader of the civilized world, so, in Claudius' time, humanity was becoming the keynote and was represented by the growing feeling of equality among all subjects in the imperial world-city.

Claudius was criticised for his severity in depriving of Roman citizenship an honourable and important Greek who was ignorant of Latin.[26] In view of his general interest in the welfare of his people, however, his action could scarcely be regarded as rash and inconsistent. His insistence on a knowledge of Latin as essential for a Roman citizen was entirely in keeping with his attempt to raise the provinces up to the level of Italy. It affords an interesting parallel with the provisions of the current immigration laws in our own country, which require an adequate knowledge of English as a prerequisite to naturalization.

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25. Tac. Ann., XI, 23 - 24.
26. Suetonius: Divus Claudius, 16.

Typical of the humanity of later Stoicism was Claudius' attitude towards slaves. When sick slaves were turned out on to the Insula Tiberina, in order that their masters would not need to cure them at home, Claudius ordered that all such slaves should be free and, after their recovery, should not return to their masters. "Quod si quis necare quem mallet quam exponere, caedis crimine teneri".[27] It may have been the same Stoic outlook which prompted him not to despise the service of freedmen, both in his own secretariat[28] and in other executive positions, such as those formerly held by the quaestors at Ostia, where he enlarged the harbour, and at Misenum, where the fleet was stationed.

Justice and humanity were seen in many of Claudius' administrative actions. He improved court procedure and forbade citizens to be tortured , took care that sufficient food was available at the market,[29] remitted taxes from Byzantium for five years in order to allow expansion of the fishing trade;[30] and was inclined to act with moderation towards noble members of foreign nations.[31] This spirit of fairness and respect, a combination of duty and humanity, appears to be a direct response to the growing cosmopolitanism of the later Stoics.

While the humanity of Stoicism thus exercised a considerable influence on Claudius, the doctrine of the value of reason over emotion, which had had such a profound effect on both Augustus and Tiberius, failed to affect him to any extent. Though Tacitus speaks of him as "void of sentiment, without a passion",[32] his administration

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27. Suetonius,25.
28. Ibid., 28.
29. Ibid., 18.
30. Tac. Ann., XII,63.
31. Ibid., XII,20; and cf. XII,37- Claudius granted a free pardon to the captured British king,Caractacus,and to his wife,daughter and brother.
32. Ibid., XII,3 : sed nihil arduum videbatur in animo principis, cui non iudicium,non odium erat nisi indita et iussa.

of the laws appears to have been governed more by his emotions than his reasoning. Less strict than Tiberius in adhering to the written law, he imposed easier or heavier penalties according to his feelings in the case. "In cognoscendo autem ac decernendo mira varietate animi fuit, modo circumspectus et sagax, interdum consultus ac praeceps, nonnumquam frivolus amentique similis." [33] In his duties as censor, he likewise made arbitrary decisions. This trend away from reason was a reaction against the inhumanity of the Stoic creed which caused Augustus to make his feelings subservient to his reasoning. It remained for Claudius' successor, Nero, to complete the cycle of reaction by allowing his reasoning to be overwhelmed completely by his emotions.

At the time of his accession, Nero was seventeen years old. He had learned Greek from Chaeremon, the Stoic, and had been trained in liberal sciences. After his mother, Agrippina, married Claudius, she recalled Seneca from exile and appointed him, together with Burrus, as educator of Nero, hoping that their wisdom and advice would assist her son on his way to the principate.[34] However, she discouraged the active study of philosophy, for she regarded it as an unsuitable training for the future ruler of Rome.[35] Nevertheless, Seneca's Stoicism, which permeated all his writings, must have exerted on Nero a considerable, and at first restraining, influence. He and Burrus hoped to teach their pupil the principles of virtue, or, at any rate, to check his outbursts. That their training was initially effective can be seen from Nero's speech to the Senate in 55 A.D., in which he promised to act humanely during his reign.[36]

Under Seneca and Burrus the empire prospered. Nero's guardians controlled matters of serious policy, while the emperor remained free to pursue his liking for poetry and diversions, the latter including watching members of different philosophical sects argue about their respective doctrines.[37] After his mother's

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33. Suetonius: Divus Claudius, 15.
34. Tac. Ann., XII,8.
35. Suetonius: Nero, 52.
36. Tac. Ann., XIII,11.
37. Ibid., XIV,16.

influence was removed, Nero gave himself wholeheartedly to chariot-racing and harp-playing. These undignified performances, strongly out of keeping with the gravitas of an emperor, were criticized by Seneca, but his attempts to prevent his pupil from becoming a public performer were ineffective.

Some time after the murder of Britannicus, Seneca wrote his treatise "de Clementia", obviously addressed to Nero and reminding him that rulers should be merciful. These persistent efforts by the Stoic philosopher to inculcate his beliefs upon an adolescent emperor, whose childhood had been repressed but who now possessed absolute power, could have only one result. Though Nero disapproved of Seneca's retirement from Rome in 62 A.D., on the grounds that the man who had guided his early steps might still be of some assistance to him, it was clear that he was becoming more and more irritated with the restrictions imposed by Stoicism, and more and more determined to live as he himself wished. In this,he was encouraged by the approval of Tigellinus, whom, because of his consistent agreement, he regarded as his greatest friend. It was inevitable that, in one of Nero's temperament, attempts to restrain him should provoke a reaction; and it is possible that his deliberate disregard for authority, as well as his craving for popularity, was an obstinate endeavour on his part to shake off the controlling influence of Seneca's Stoic theories. That Seneca should be ordered to die for his trouble, was a foregone conclusion.

Similarly, the opposition of Stoic republicans in the Senate only served to make Nero all the more assertive regarding his own position, and all the more anxious to remove those who attempted to frustrate his plans. Particularly annoying to him was the passive, yet pointed, resistance shown by the Stoic Paetus Thrasea, firstly when, in disagreement with the Senate's servile approval of Nero's treatment of Agrippina, he walked out of the senate-house, and,then, by his failure to attend Nero's Iuvenalia. The desire of the Stoic section of the Senate to preserve in this way some semblance of

individual freedom was regarded by the public prosecutor as a neglect of duty, a defiance of the laws, and a danger to liberty itself; Paetus and his followers, he said, with their sullen, gloomy and discontented looks, hoped to show their disapproval of Nero's jovial festivities.[38] This reasoning increased the emperor's dislike of the "proud, turbulent and troublesome" Stoic sect,[39] and those who had hoped, by their reproaches, to curb his excessive instincts, found instead that their opposition only made him more autocratic. The result was an outbreak of judicial murders among the Stoic faction in the Senate, and the exile of Stoic teachers, such as Musonius Rufus. Stoicism gained in strength, however, from this despotic persecution. The calm and heroic fortitude with which Romans like Plautus, Paetus and even Seneca faced their unavoidable deaths set a seal on Stoic teachings; and emphasized their belief that those who held power had responsibilities towards their subjects, as well as privileges.

This doctrine of the duties of a monarch had as little appeal for Nero as the Stoic theory of reason. Many of his administrative actions showed the extent to which his reaction against Stoicism had caused him to ignore reason completely. His impracticable desire to abolish the whole system of taxes in order to increase his popularity,[40] his punishment of the Christians on account of "their sullen hatred of the whole human race";[41] the canonization of Poppaea's deceased daughter as a goddess,[42] and his intention, when the news of Galba's revolt was received, to appear unarmed before the soldiers and obtain their sympathy by weeping,[43] were all indicative of the ruling power of his emotions and of his

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38. Tac. Ann., XVI,22.
39. Ibid., XIV,57 - Stoicorum adrogantia sectaque quae turbidos et negotiorum adpetentis faciat.
40. Ibid., XIII,50.
41. Ibid., XV,44 - haud proinde in crimine incendii quam odio humani generis convicti sunt.
42. Ibid., XV,23.
43. Suetonius : Nero, 43.

determination to act wholly in accordance with his feelings. Likewise, his capricious temper was not affected by the growing humanity which was a feature of Claudius' reign. The man who, in defiance of the people's demand for mercy,[44] could supervise the execution of a household of slaves, one of whom had killed his master, was not at all influenced by the increasing belief in the fraternity of mankind.

The effect of Stoicism on Nero was, therefore, in the main unfortunate. Its broader doctrines failed to reach him, and the influence of Seneca, though for a time beneficial, in the end made him crueller and more oppressive. The opposition of the Stoic senators produced the same result. Criticism and disapproval, even when fully deserved, increased his egotism and his desire to avenge his wounded pride. It is, of course, a moot point whether Nero's excesses were the cause, rather than the product, of Stoic opposition. There are grounds for concluding, however, that, if Seneca and other Stoics had not offended his vanity, his rule might have been far less oppressive.

During the ninety-five years, then, in which Rome was ruled by the Julio-Claudian emperors,[45] philosophy was not confined solely to the men of letters. Though many phases of the emperors' administration were obviously unaffected by the contemporary Stoic and Epicurean theories, many other aspects, such as those discussed in this chapter, revealed a decided philosophical basis.

As has been noted, the effect of Epicureanism was limited, but, as far as Augustus was concerned, very real. It provided a reason for many of his reforms, especially in the spheres of religion and morals. It was unable, however, to supply a suitable method of action in most matters of administration. This was not surprising, since the duties of the rulers of Rome involved the very responsibilities which the Epicureans, in search of tranquillity and peace of

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44. Tac. Ann., XIV, 45.
45. 27 B.C. to 68 A.D.

mind, aimed at all costs to avoid. A philosophy of inaction can be of little practical benefit to an active statesman.

The influence of Stoicism, on the other hand, was considerable and far-reaching. It is no coincidence that the three most able rulers of the Julio-Claudians were those on whom Stoicism had the greatest effect. Augustus - with his faith in Rome and her destiny, Tiberius - with his sense of responsibility towards his subjects, and Claudius - with his striving for unity and equality between Rome and the empire, illustrated the influence of three main Stoic principles, divine reason, duty and cosmopolitanism. Because these principles were actively incorporated into their administration, they affected, even if indirectly, the future history of the world.

The lives and works of the Julio-Claudians clearly demonstrate the way in which they were influenced by Stoicism, not only in its original form but also in its subsequent variations. The changes in outlook of these emperors correspond closely to the growth of Stoic doctrine in its middle and later periods. Characteristic of early and middle Stoicism was its lofty ideal of divine reason and its unnatural elevation of human reason, while the later period, with its accent on cosmopolitanism, showed a change of emphasis from the all-importance of reason to a more human acknowledgement of the existence of emotions. A parallel development can be traced in the attitudes of Augustus and Tiberius, with whom reason was of more importance than feeling, of Claudius, in whom the conflict between reason and feeling became apparent, and of Nero, who resolved the conflict by admitting the absolute supremacy of emotion.

It is not unreasonable to assume, therefore, that the differences in outlook between the Julio-Claudian emperors were determined, to a large extent, by the doctrines of their Stoic contemporaries. But for this influence, the history of the Roman empire and, through it, of the world as a whole, might have been very different.

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